Читать бесплатно онлайн книгу автора  Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 3 (of 16)

Various

Transcriber’s Note: A number of obvious printer’s errors (u for n, inconsistent spelling of Senators’ and Representatives’ names, punctuation, etc) have been amended. Other than that, the original text remains unchanged.

ABRIDGMENT
OF THE
DEBATES OF CONGRESS,
FROM 1789 TO 1856.

FROM GALES AND SEATON’S ANNALS OF CONGRESS; FROM THEIR
REGISTER OF DEBATES; AND FROM THE OFFICIAL
REPORTED DEBATES, BY JOHN C. RIVES.

BY
THE AUTHOR OF THE THIRTY YEARS’ VIEW.

VOL. III.

NEW YORK
D. APPLETON & COMPANY, 443 & 445 BROADWAY.
1861

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1856, by
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY,
in the Clerk’s Office of the District Court for the Southern District of New York.

EIGHTH CONGRESS.—FIRST SESSION.

BEGUN AT THE CITY OF WASHINGTON, OCTOBER 17, 1803.

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,—THOMAS JEFFERSON.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE SENATE.

LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE SENATE.

New Hampshire.—Simeon Olcott, William Plumer.

Vermont.—S. R. Bradley, Israel Smith.

Massachusetts.—Jonathan Mason, Timothy Pickering.

Rhode Island.—Christopher Ellery, Samuel I. Potter.

Connecticut.—James Hillhouse, Uriah Tracy.

New York.—De Witt Clinton, Theodorus Bailey.

New Jersey.—Jonathan Dayton, John Condit.

Pennsylvania.—George Logan, Samuel Maclay.

Delaware.—William H. Wells, Samuel White.

Maryland.—Robert Wright, Samuel Smith.

Virginia.—Wilson C. Nicholas, John Taylor.

North Carolina.—Jesse Franklin, David Stone.

South Carolina.—Pierce Butler, Thomas Sumter.

Georgia.—A. Baldwin, James Jackson.

Tennessee.—William Cocke, Joseph Anderson.

Kentucky.—John Breckenridge, John Browne.

Ohio.—Thomas Worthington, John Smith.

Monday, October 17, 1803.

The first session of the eighth Congress, conformably to the Constitution of the United States, commenced at the city of Washington, agreeably to the Proclamation of the President of the United States for that purpose; and the Senate assembled on this day.

PRESENT:

Simeon Olcott and William Plumer, from New Hampshire;

Timothy Pickering, from Massachusetts;

James Hillhouse and Uriah Tracy, from Connecticut;

Christopher Ellery and Samuel I. Potter, from Rhode Island;

Stephen R. Bradley and Israel Smith, from Vermont;

De Witt Clinton and Theodorus Bailey, from New York;

Jonathan Dayton and John Condit, from New Jersey;

George Logan and Samuel Maclay, from Pennsylvania;

William Hill Wells and Samuel White, from Delaware;

Robert Wright and Samuel Smith, from Maryland;

John Taylor and Wilson Carey Nicholas, from Virginia;

John Brown and John Breckenridge, from Kentucky;

Jesse Franklin and David Stone, from North Carolina;

Joseph Anderson and William Cocke, from Tennessee;

Abraham Baldwin, from Georgia; and

Thomas Worthington, from Ohio.

The Vice President being absent, the Senate proceeded to the election of a President, pro tem., as the constitution provides, and the ballots being collected and counted, the whole number was found to be twenty-nine, of which fifteen make a majority. Mr. Brown had 24, Mr. Baldwin 2, Mr. Dayton 2, and Mr. Pickering 1.

Consequently, the Honorable John Brown was elected President of the Senate, pro tempore.

The credentials of the following Senators were severally read, to wit:

Of Joseph Anderson, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Tennessee; of Theodorus Bailey, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of New York; of James Hillhouse, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Connecticut; of Samuel Maclay, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Pennsylvania; of Samuel I. Potter, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Rhode Island; of Israel Smith, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Vermont; of Samuel White, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Delaware; for the term of six years from and after the third day of March last, respectively: also, of Thomas Worthington, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Ohio; of John Condit, appointed a Senator by the Executive of the State of New Jersey; of John Taylor, appointed a Senator by the Executive of the State of Virginia, in place of S. T. Mason, deceased; of Timothy Pickering, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Massachusetts, in the place of Dwight Foster, resigned; and the oath required by law was, by the President, administered to them respectively.

The oath was also administered to Samuel Smith, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Maryland, for the term of six years from and after the third day of March last.

Ordered, That the Secretary wait on the President of the United States and acquaint him that a quorum of the Senate is assembled, and that, in the absence of the Vice President, they have elected the Hon. John Brown President of the Senate, pro tempore.

The Secretary was directed to give a similar notice to the House of Representatives.

Resolved, That James Mathers, Sergeant-at-Arms and Doorkeeper to the Senate, be, and he is hereby, authorized to employ one additional assistant and two horses, for the purpose of performing such services as are usually required by the Doorkeeper to the Senate; and that the sum of twenty-eight dollars be allowed him weekly for that purpose during the session, and for twenty days after.

Resolved, That each Senator be supplied during the present session with three such newspapers, printed in any of the States, as he may choose, provided that the same be furnished at the usual rate for the annual charge of such papers.

A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate that a quorum of the House had assembled, and had elected the Hon. Nathaniel Macon their Speaker, and is ready to proceed to business.

Ordered, That Messrs. Clinton and Breckenridge be a committee on the part of the Senate, together with such committee as the House of Representatives may appoint on their part, to wait on the President of the United States, and notify him that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled, and ready to receive any communications that he may be pleased to make to them.

A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate, that the House agree to the resolution of the Senate for the appointment of a joint committee to wait on the President of the United States, and have appointed a committee on their part.

On motion, Resolved, That two Chaplains, of different denominations, be appointed to Congress for the present session, one by each House, who shall interchange weekly.

Ordered, That the Secretary desire the concurrence of the House of Representatives in this resolution.

The Senate proceeded to the choice of a Chaplain on their part, and the ballots having been collected and counted, the whole number was twenty-eight; of which fifteen make a majority. Mr. Gantt had 15 votes, and Mr. M’Cormick 13.

Consequently, the Rev. Dr. Gantt was elected.

Mr. Clinton reported, from the joint committee appointed for the purpose, that they had waited on the President of the United States, and that he had acquainted them that he would make a communication to the two Houses, by message, immediately.

The following Message was received from the President of the United States:

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

In calling you together, fellow-citizens, at an earlier day than was contemplated by the act of the last session of Congress, I have not been insensible to the personal inconveniences necessarily resulting from an unexpected change in your arrangements. But matters of great public concernment have rendered this call necessary, and the interest you feel in these will supersede, in your minds, all private considerations.

Congress witnessed, at their late session, the extraordinary agitation produced in the public mind by the suspension of our right of deposit at the port of New Orleans, no assignment of another place having been made according to treaty. They were sensible that the continuance of that privation would be more injurious to our nation than any consequences which could flow from any mode of redress; but, reposing just confidence in the good faith of the Government whose officer had committed the wrong, friendly and reasonable representations were resorted to, and the right of deposit was restored.

Previous, however, to this period, we had not been unaware of the danger to which our peace would be perpetually exposed whilst so important a key to the commerce of the western country remained under a foreign power. Difficulties too were presenting themselves as to the navigation of other streams, which, arising within our territories, pass through those adjacent. Propositions had therefore been authorized for obtaining, on fair conditions, the sovereignty of New Orleans, and of other possessions in that quarter, interesting to our quiet, to such extent as was deemed practicable; and the provisional appropriation of two millions of dollars, to be applied and accounted for by the President of the United States, intended as part of the price, was considered as conveying the sanction of Congress to the acquisition proposed.[1] The enlightened Government of France saw, with just discernment, the importance to both nations of such liberal arrangements as might best and permanently promote the peace, interests, and friendship of both; and the property and sovereignty of all Louisiana, which had been restored to them, has, on certain conditions, been transferred to the United States, by instruments bearing date the 30th of April last. When these shall have received the constitutional sanction of the Senate, they will, without delay, be communicated to the Representatives for the exercise of their functions, as to those conditions which are within the powers vested by the constitution in Congress. Whilst the property and sovereignty of the Mississippi and its waters secure an independent outlet for the produce of the Western States, and an uncontrolled navigation through their whole course, free from collision with other Powers, and the dangers to our peace from that source, the fertility of the country, its climate and extent, promise, in due season, important aids to our Treasury, an ample provision for our posterity, and a wide spread for the blessings of freedom and equal laws.

With the wisdom of Congress it will rest to take those ulterior measures which may be necessary for the immediate occupation and temporary government of the country; for its incorporation into our Union; for rendering the change of government a blessing to our newly adopted brethren; for securing to them the rights of conscience and property; for confirming to the Indian inhabitants their occupancy and self-government, establishing friendly and commercial relations with them, and for ascertaining the geography of the country acquired. Such materials for your information relative to its affairs in general, as the short space of time has permitted me to collect, will be laid before you when the subject shall be in a state for your consideration.

The small vessels authorized by Congress, with a view to the Mediterranean service, have been sent into that sea, and will be able more effectually to confine the Tripoline cruisers within their harbors, and supersede the necessity of convoy to our commerce in that quarter. They will sensibly lessen the expenses of that service the ensuing year.

A further knowledge of the ground in the north-eastern and north-western angles of the United States has evinced that the boundaries established by the treaty of Paris, between the British territories and ours in those parts, were too imperfectly described to be susceptible of execution. It has therefore been thought worthy of attention, for preserving and cherishing the harmony and useful intercourse subsisting between the two nations, to remove, by timely arrangements, what unfavorable incidents might otherwise render a ground of future misunderstanding. A convention has therefore been entered into, which provides for a practicable demarcation of those limits, to the satisfaction of both parties.

An account of the receipts and expenditures of the year ending 30th September last, with the estimates for the service of the ensuing year, will be laid before you by the Secretary of the Treasury, so soon as the receipts of the last quarter shall be returned from the more distant States. It is already ascertained that the amount paid into the Treasury for that year has been between eleven and twelve millions of dollars; and that the revenue accrued, during the same term, exceeds the sum counted on as sufficient for our current expenses, and to extinguish the public debt within the period heretofore proposed.

We have seen with sincere concern the flames of war lighted up again in Europe, and nations, with which we have the most friendly and useful relations, engaged in mutual destruction. While we regret the miseries in which we see others involved, let us bow with gratitude to that kind Providence, which, inspiring with wisdom and moderation our late Legislative Councils, while placed under the urgency of the greatest wrongs, guarded us from hastily entering into the sanguinary contest, and left us only to look on and to pity its ravages. These will be the heaviest on those immediately engaged. Yet the nations pursuing peace will not be exempt from all evil. In the course of this conflict let it be our endeavor, as it is our interest and desire, to cultivate the friendship of the belligerent nations by every act of justice, and of innocent kindness; to receive their armed vessels with hospitality from the distresses of the sea, but to administer the means of annoyance to none; to establish in our harbors such a police as may maintain law and order; to restrain our citizens from embarking individually in a war in which their country takes no part; to punish severely those persons, citizen or alien, who shall usurp the cover of our flag for vessels not entitled to it, infecting thereby with suspicion those of real Americans, and committing us into controversies for the redress of wrongs not our own; to exact from every nation the observance, towards our vessels and citizens, of those principles and practices which all civilized people acknowledge; to merit the character of a just nation, and maintain that of an independent one, preferring every consequence to insult and habitual wrong. Separated by a wide ocean from the nations of Europe, and from the political interests which entangle them together, with productions and wants which render our commerce and friendship useful to them, and theirs to us, it cannot be the interest of any to assail us, nor ours to disturb them. We should be most unwise, indeed, were we to cast away the singular blessings of the position in which nature has placed us, the opportunity she has endowed us with, of pursuing, at a distance from foreign contentions, the paths of industry, peace, and happiness; of cultivating general friendship, and of bringing collisions of interest to the umpire of reason rather than of force. How desirable, then, must it be, in a Government like ours, to see its citizens adopt, individually, the views, the interests, and the conduct, which their country should pursue, divesting themselves of those passions and partialities which tend to lessen useful friendships, and to embarrass and embroil us, in the calamitous scenes of Europe! Confident, fellow-citizens, that you will duly estimate the importance of neutral dispositions towards the observance of neutral conduct, that you will be sensible how much it is our duty to look on the bloody arena spread before us, with commiseration, indeed, but with no other wish than to see it closed, I am persuaded you will cordially cherish these dispositions in all discussions among yourselves, and in all communications with your constituents; and I anticipate, with satisfaction, the measures of wisdom which the great interests now committed to you will give you an opportunity of providing, and myself, that of approving and of carrying into execution with the fidelity I owe to my country.

TH. JEFFERSON.

Oct. 17, 1803.

The Message was read, and five hundred copies thereof ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate.

Tuesday, October 18.

Pierce Butler, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of South Carolina, for the unexpired time for which the late John Ewing Colhoun was elected to serve, produced his credentials, which were read, and the oath required by law was administered to him by the President.

James Jackson, from the State of Georgia, attended.

The credentials of Samuel Smith, a Senator from the State of Maryland, were read.

Friday, October 21.

John Quincy Adams, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Massachusetts, for six years, commencing the 4th day of March last, produced his credentials, which were read; and the oath required by law was administered to him by the President.

Mr. Clinton, after a few prefatory observations on the necessity of designating the persons, severally, whom the people should wish to hold the offices of President and Vice-President of the United States, and stating that the State which he represented, as well as others in the Union, had, through the medium of their Legislatures, strongly recommended the adoption of the principle, laid on the table the following motion, which he read; and it was made the order of the day for the next day, and printed.

[The amendment proposed by Mr. Clinton grew out of the attempt in the House of Representatives to elect Mr. Burr President, and to prevent such attempt in future, in the event of an equality of votes between the two highest on the list, it required the electors to discriminate between the presidential and vice-presidential office, and name the persons voted for for each.]

Mr. Breckenridge gave notice, that he should, to-morrow, ask leave to bring in a bill to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April last, and for other purposes.

Saturday, October 22.

The following Message was received from the President of the United States:

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

In my communication to you of the 17th instant, I informed you that conventions had been entered into with the Government of France for the cession of Louisiana to the United States. These, with the advice and consent of the Senate, having now been ratified, and my ratification exchanged for that of the First Consul of France in due form, they are communicated to you for consideration in your Legislative capacity. You will observe that some important conditions cannot be carried into execution, but with the aid of the Legislature; and that time presses a decision on them without delay.

The ulterior provisions, also, suggested in the same communication, for the occupation and government of the country, will call for early attention. Such information relative to its government as time and distance have permitted me to obtain, will be ready to be laid before you in a few days. But, as permanent arrangements for this object may require time and deliberation, it is for your consideration whether you will not forthwith make such temporary provisions for the preservation, in the meanwhile, of order and tranquillity in the country, as the case may require.

TH. JEFFERSON.

Oct. 21, 1803.

The Message was read, and, together with the papers therein referred to, ordered to lie for consideration.

Agreeably to notice given yesterday, Mr. Breckenridge had leave to bring in a bill to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April last, and for other purposes; which bill was read, and ordered to the second reading. The bill is in the following words:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to take possession of and occupy the territories ceded by France to the United States by the treaty concluded at Paris, on the 30th day of April last, between the two nations; and that he may for that purpose, and in order to maintain in the said territories the authority of the United States, employ any part of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the force authorized by an act passed the 3d day of March last, entitled “An act directing a detachment from the militia of the United States, and for erecting certain arsenals,” which he may deem necessary: And so much of the sum appropriated by the said act as may be necessary is hereby appropriated for the purpose of carrying this act into effect; to be applied under the direction of the President of the United States.

Sec 2.. And be it further enacted, That until Congress shall have made provision for the temporary government of the said territories, all the military, civil, and judicial powers exercised by the officers of the existing government of the same, shall be vested in such person or persons, and shall be exercised by and in such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct.

Amendment to the Constitution.

The order of the day being called for on Mr. Clinton’s motion of yesterday,

Mr. Clinton said that, as the resolution was but now printed, and laid before the Senate, it might be proper to refer it to Monday for further consideration, but if it was requisite, by the rules of the Senate, that the resolution must have three separate readings, and on three different days, he should call for a second reading on Saturday, that it might be in readiness for a third reading on Monday, and be ultimately acted upon that day, as the Legislatures of Tennessee and Vermont were in session, and probably must be at the trouble of an extra session to act upon the amendment, unless it could be sent to them before they separated.

Mr. Brown, of Kentucky, the President pro tem. of the Senate, said the written rule of the Senate determined that bills should have three readings, and on different days, without unanimous consent to the contrary; but the resolutions were not included; and that he should be glad of the opinion of the Senate upon the subject.

Mr. Tracy of Connecticut said, that there was no written rule which would reach the case, but the Vice President, upon the ground that they came within the reason of the rule, had determined that all resolutions which required a joint vote of both Houses to give them efficacy, should take the same course as bills, and have three readings, and on different days, before a final vote; and as this resolution went to the alteration of the supreme law of the land, as the constitution was declared to be, he thought it highly requisite to give the deliberations all the solemnity which was required in passing bills.

Mr. Bradley, of Vermont, then offered two amendments to the resolution; one went to the form only, and the other makes a majority of votes of the electors requisite for the choice of Vice President, and in case such majority is not obtained, places the choice of Vice President in the Senate.

Mr. Butler, of South Carolina, proposed an amendment by adding a new clause, in substance: “That at the next election of President, no person should be eligible who had served more than eight years, and, in all future elections, no person should be eligible more than four years in any period of eight years.”

Mr. Dayton, of New Jersey, moved to refer the resolution, with all the amendments, to a select committee; he said that it was a subject far too important to be carried in this way. There has been no time to consider it. Something more was due in this instance, than, as it were, offering it one moment, and deciding upon it the next.

Mr. Hillhouse, of Connecticut, supported the motion for referring the question to a select committee. He was opposed to entering now upon the business. Why should this subject be hurried? Why not have taken it up last session? We might in that case have had time to consider it. He had not often known a resolution, of the nature of that before the House, disposed of otherwise, in the first instance, than being referred to a committee. He never knew it refused. In a great and free empire, like the United States, this question is of the highest importance—no less than the choice of the First Magistrate. It is laid upon the table to-day, and we are to determine upon it to-morrow. He hoped not, and as he never knew it refused before, he hoped that it would not be adopted now. He wished it to be referred to a select committee; that it should there be examined, line by line, letter by letter. In the present mode of doing business, it is impossible to act with accuracy. He again trusted and hoped that it would be referred to a select committee.

Mr. Jackson, of Georgia, wished the business to be immediately proceeded upon. He was an admirer of Mr. Jefferson; he was happy, and he trusted all were happy, while he was President. But, continued Mr. J., we know not who may follow him; we may have a Buonaparte, or one who will be equally obnoxious to the people. He hoped the motions would be incorporated and immediately come before the House.

Mr. Wright, of Maryland, spoke for some time against the resolution going to a committee. He was against the amendment proposed by Mr. Butler. A committee might report when they pleased. He therefore thought it necessary to proceed with the question immediately.

Mr. Smith, of Maryland, wished to have some principles fixed. If the motion and amendments were to go to a committee, he would not tack them together, for by this mode they might both be lost. It has been said that the subject might have been entered into last session. There was then a multiplicity of business of importance before the House, yet this subject might have been entered into. As it stands, this is the proper place to make objections. The mover of the resolution does not say that it shall be determined on Monday; he means that it shall then be before the whole House.

After some desultory observations, in which one member observed that he thought it disorderly, the question on Mr. Butler’s amendment was put—ayes 16, nays 15.

A committee was then chosen for the purpose, namely:

Mr. Butler, Mr. Bradley, Mr. Clinton, Mr. Nicholas, and Mr. Smith.

Monday, October 24.

Louisiana Cession.

The bill to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April last, and for other purposes, was read the second time and referred to Messrs. Breckenridge, Dayton, and Baldwin, to consider and report thereon.

Amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. Butler, from the committee, to whom was referred, on the 22d inst., the motion for an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, made report, which was read.

Mr. Dayton moved to strike out all which respected the appointment of a Vice President.

He said the great inducements of the framers of the constitution to admit the office of Vice President was, that, by the mode of choice, the best and most respectable man should be designated; and that the electors of each State should vote for one person at least, living in a different State from themselves; and if the substance of the amendment was adopted, he thought the office had better be abolished. Jealousies were natural between President and Vice President; no heir apparent ever loved the person on the throne. With this resolution for an amendment to the constitution we were left with all the inconveniencies, without a single advantage from the office of Vice President.

Mr. Clinton.—The obvious intention of the amendment proposed by the gentleman from New Jersey, is to put off or get rid of the main question. It would more comport with the candor of the gentleman to meet the question fairly. Can the gentleman suppose that the electors will not vote for a man of respectability for Vice President? True, the qualifications are distinct, and ought not to be confounded; this will stave off the question till the Legislatures of the States of Tennessee and Vermont are out of session, and the object must be very obvious.

Mr. Dayton.—The custom of the gentleman from New York has been of late to arraign motives instead of meeting arguments; on Saturday he accused me of wishing to procrastinate, and now the same is repeated.

The reasons of erecting the office are frustrated by the amendment to the constitution now proposed; it will be preferable, therefore, to abolish the office.

Mr. Clinton.—The charge of the gentleman from New Jersey is totally unfounded that I arraign motives, and do not meet arguments. On Saturday the gentleman accused me of precipitation; I am not in the habit of arraigning motives, as this Senate can witness, and the charge is totally untrue.

Mr. Nicholas.—To secure the United States from the dangers which existed during the last choice of President, the present resolution was introduced. It was impossible to act upon, or pass the amendment offered by the member from New Jersey, with a full view of all its bearings at this time. It ought not to stand in the way of the resolution reported by the committee, for two-thirds or three-quarters of the State Legislatures would be in session in two or three months; the Senate had, therefore, better not admit the amendment, even if convinced that it was correct, because it might jeopardize the main amendment of discriminating.

Mr. Butler moved a postponement until Wednesday, because the amendment was important, and he had not had sufficient time to make up his mind.

Mr. Worthington said the same.

This motion was seconded.

The question for postponement was taken, and lost—ayes 15, noes 16.

The amendment of Mr. Dayton was now before the Senate.

A motion for adjournment was now made and carried—ayes 16, noes 15.

Tuesday, October 25.

John Smith, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Ohio, attended and produced his credentials, which were read, and the oath required by law was administered to him by the President.

Mr. Breckenridge, from the committee to whom was referred, on the 24th instant, the bill to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April last, and for other purposes, reported it without amendment.

Ordered, That this bill pass to a third reading.

Wednesday, October 26.

Louisiana Treaty.

The bill to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April last, and for other purposes, was read the third time. And, on the question, Shall this bill pass? it was determined in the affirmative—yeas 26, nays 6, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Anderson, Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Butler, Cocke, Condit, Dayton, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Potter, I. Smith, J. Smith, S. Smith, Stone, Taylor, Wells, White, Worthington, and Wright.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Hillhouse, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, and Tracy.[2]

Saturday, October 29.

Mr. Breckenridge, from the committee of conference on the amendments of the House of Representatives to the bill, entitled “An act to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April last, and for the temporary government thereof,” reported, that the Senate recede from their disagreement to the amendments, and agree thereto, with amendments; and a division of the report was called for.

And, on the question to adopt the report, so far as that the Senate recede from their disagreement to the amendments of the House of Representatives, it passed in the affirmative.

And, on the question to adopt the remaining division of the report, it passed in the negative.

So it was Resolved, That the Senate recede from their disagreement to the amendments of the House of Representatives to the said bill, and agree thereto.[3]

Monday, October 31.

On motion, it was,

Resolved, unanimously, That the members of the Senate, from a sincere desire of showing every mark of respect due to the memory of the Hon. Stevens Thompson Mason, deceased, late a member thereof, will go into mourning for him one month, by the usual mode of wearing a crape around the left arm.[4]

Wednesday, November 2.

Louisiana Treaty.

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill, entitled “An act authorizing the creation of a stock to the amount of eleven millions two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, for the purpose of carrying into effect the convention of the 30th of April, 1803, between the United States of America and the French Republic, and making provision for the payment of the same;” and having amended the bill—

On the question, Shall the bill pass?

Mr. White rose and made the following remarks:

Mr. President, by the provisions of the bill before us, and which are thus far in conformity with the words of the treaty, we have until three months after the exchange of ratifications and the delivery of possession to pay this money in. Where, then, is the necessity for such haste on this subject? It seems to me to be anticipating our business unnecessarily, and perhaps unwisely; it is showing on our part a degree of anxiety that may be taken advantage of and operate to our injury, and that may serve to retard the accomplishment of the very object that gentlemen seem to have so much at heart. It is not at present altogether certain that we shall ever have occasion to use this stock, and it will be time enough to provide it when the occasion arises, when we see ourselves in the undisturbed possession of this mighty boon, or wherefore are we allowed these three months’ credit after the delivery of possession? The ratifications have been already exchanged; the French officer who is to make the cession is said to be at New Orleans, and previous to the adjournment of Congress we shall know with certainty whether the First Consul will or can carry this treaty faithfully into operation. We have already passed a bill authorizing the President to take possession, for which I voted, and it will be time enough to create this stock and to make the other necessary arrangements when we find ourselves in possession of the territory, or when we ascertain with certainty that it will be given to us.

But, Mr. President, it is now a well-known fact, that Spain considers herself injured by this treaty, and if it should be in her power to prevent it, will not agree to the cession of New Orleans and Louisiana to the United States. She considers herself absolved from her contract with France, in consequence of the latter having neglected to comply with certain stipulations in the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, to be performed on her part, and of having violated her engagement never to transfer this country into other hands. Gentlemen may say this money is to be paid upon the responsibility of the President of the United States, and not until after the delivery of possession to us of the territory; but why cast from ourselves all the responsibility upon this subject, and impose the whole weight upon the President, which may hereafter prove dangerous and embarrassing to him? Why make the President the sole and absolute judge of what shall be a faithful delivery of possession under the treaty? What he may think a delivery of possession sufficient to justify the payment of this money, we might not; and I have no hesitation in saying that if, in acquiring this territory under the treaty, we have to fire a single musket, to charge a bayonet, or to lose a drop of blood, it will not be such a cession on the part of France as should justify to the people of this country the payment of any, and much less so enormous a sum of money. What would the case be, sir? It would be buying of France authority to make war upon Spain; it would be giving the First Consul fifteen millions of dollars to stand aloof until we can settle our differences with His Catholic Majesty. Would honorable gentlemen submit to the degradation of purchasing even his neutrality at so inconvenient a price? We are told that there is in the hands of the French Prefect at New Orleans a royal order of His Catholic Majesty, founded upon the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, for the delivery of possession of this territory to France; but which has never been done—the precedent conditions not having been performed on the part of France. This royal order, it is probable, will be handed over to our Commissioner, or to whoever may be sent down to receive possession. We may then be told that we have the right of France, as she acquired it from Spain, which is all she is bound by her treaty to transfer to us; we may be shown the Spaniards, who yet claim to be the rightful owners of the country, and be told that we have the permission of the First Consul to subdue or drive them out, and, according to the words of the treaty, to take possession. Of our capacity to do so I have no doubt; but this we could have done, sir, six months ago, and with one-sixth of fifteen millions of dollars, when they had wantonly violated the sacred obligations of a treaty, had insulted our Government, and prostrated all the commerce of our Western country. Then we had, indeed, a just cause for chastising them; the laws of nations and of honor authorized it, and all the world would have applauded our conduct. And it is well known that if France had been so disposed she could not have brought a single man or ship to their relief; before the news could have reached Europe, she was blockaded in her own ports by the British fleet. But that time was permitted to go by unimproved, and instead of regretting the past, let us provide for the future.

Admitting then, Mr. President, that His Catholic Majesty is hostile to the cession of this territory to the United States, and no honorable gentleman will deny it, what reasons have we to suppose that the French Prefect, provided the Spaniards should interfere, can give to us peaceable possession of the country? He is acknowledged there in no public character, is clothed with no authority, nor has he a single soldier to enforce his orders. I speak now, sir, from mere probabilities. I wish not to be understood as predicting that the French will not cede to us the actual and quiet possession of the territory. I hope to God they may, for possession of it we must have—I mean of New Orleans, and of such other positions on the Mississippi as may be necessary to secure to us for ever the complete and uninterrupted navigation of that river. This I have ever been in favor of; I think it essential to the peace of the United States, and to the prosperity of our Western country. But as to Louisiana, this new, immense, unbounded world, if it should ever be incorporated into this Union, which I have no idea can be done but by altering the constitution, I believe it will be the greatest curse that could at present befall us; it may be productive of innumerable evils, and especially of one that I fear even to look upon. Gentlemen on all sides, with very few exceptions, agree that the settlement of this country will be highly injurious and dangerous to the United States; but as to what has been suggested of removing the Creeks and other nations of Indians from the eastern to the western banks of the Mississippi, and of making the fertile regions of Louisiana a howling wilderness, never to be trodden by the foot of civilized man, it is impracticable. The gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Cocke) has shown his usual candor on this subject, and I believe with him, to use his strong language, that you had as well pretend to inhibit the fish from swimming in the sea as to prevent the population of that country after its sovereignty shall become ours. To every man acquainted with the adventurous, roving, and enterprising temper of our people, and with the manner in which our Western country has been settled, such an idea must be chimerical. The inducements will be so strong that it will be impossible to restrain our citizens from crossing the river. Louisiana must and will become settled, if we hold it, and with the very population that would otherwise occupy part of our present territory. Thus our citizens will be removed to the immense distance of two or three thousand miles from the capital of the Union, where they will scarcely ever feel the rays of the General Government; their affections will become alienated; they will gradually begin to view us as strangers; they will form other commercial connections, and our interests will become distinct.

These, with other causes that human wisdom may not now foresee, will in time effect a separation, and I fear our bounds will be fixed nearer to our houses than the waters of the Mississippi. We have already territory enough, and when I contemplate the evils that may arise to these States, from this intended incorporation of Louisiana into the Union, I would rather see it given to France, to Spain, or to any other nation of the earth, upon the mere condition that no citizen of the United States should ever settle within its limits, than to see the territory sold for a hundred millions of dollars, and we retain the sovereignty. But however dangerous the possession of Louisiana might prove to us, I do not presume to say that the retention of it would not have been very convenient to France, and we know that at the time of the mission of Mr. Monroe, our Administration had never thought of the purchase of Louisiana, and that nothing short of the fullest conviction on the part of the First Consul that he was on the very eve of a war with England; that this being the most defenceless point of his possessions, if such they could be called, was the one at which the British would first strike, and that it must inevitably fall into their hands, could ever have induced his pride and ambition to make the sale. He judged wisely, that he had better sell it for as much as he could get than lose it entirely. And I do say that under existing circumstances, even supposing that this extent of territory was a desirable acquisition, fifteen millions of dollars was a most enormous sum to give. Our Commissioners were negotiating in Paris—they must have known the relative situation of France and England—they must have known at the moment that a war was unavoidable between the two countries, and they knew the pecuniary necessities of France and the naval power of Great Britain. These imperious circumstances should have been turned to our advantage, and if we were to purchase, should have lessened the consideration. Viewing, Mr. President, this subject in any point of light—either as it regards the territory purchased, the high consideration to be given, the contract itself, or any of the circumstances attending it, I see no necessity for precipitating the passage of this bill; and if this motion for postponement should fail, and the question on the final passage of the bill be taken now, I shall certainly vote against it.

The further consideration of the bill was postponed until to-morrow.

Thursday, November 3.

Louisiana Treaty.

The bill, entitled “An act authorizing the creation of a stock to the amount of eleven millions two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, for the purpose of carrying into effect the Convention of the 30th of April, 1803, between the United States of America and the French Republic, and making provision for the payment of the same,” was read the third time; and, having been amended, on the question, Shall this bill pass as amended?

Mr. Wells said: Mr. President, having always held to the opinion that, when a treaty was duly made under the constituted authorities of the United States, Congress was bound to pass the laws necessary to carry it into effect; and as the vote which I am about to give may not at first seem to conform itself to this opinion, I feel an obligation imposed upon me to state, in as concise a manner as I can, the reasons why I withhold my assent from the passage of this bill.

There are two acts necessary to be performed to carry the present treaty into effect—one by the French Government, the other by our own. They are to deliver us a fair and effectual possession of the ceded territory; and then, and not till then, are we to pay the purchase money. We have already authorized the President to receive possession. This co-operation on our part was requisite to enable the French to comply with the stipulation they had made; they could not deliver unless somebody was appointed to receive. In this view of the subject, the question which presents itself to my mind is, who shall judge whether the French Government does, or does not, faithfully comply with the previous condition? The bill on your table gives to the President this power. I am for our retaining and exercising it ourselves. I may be asked, why not delegate this power to the President? Sir, I answer by inquiring why we should delegate it? To us it properly belongs; and, unless some advantage will be derived to the United States, it shall not be transferred with my consent. Congress will be in session at the time that the delivery of the ceded territory takes place; and if we should then be satisfied that the French have executed with fidelity that part of the treaty which is incumbent upon them first to perform, I pledge myself to vote for the payment of the purchase money. This appears to me, arguing upon general principles, to be the course which ought to be pursued, even supposing there were attending this case no particular difficulties. But in this special case are there not among the archives of the Senate sufficient documents, and which have been withheld from the House of Representatives, to justify an apprehension that the French Government was not invested with the capacity to convey this property to us, and that we shall not receive that kind of possession which is stipulated for by the treaty? I am not permitted, by the order of this body, to make any other than this general reference to those documents. Suffice it to say that they have strongly impressed me with an opinion that, even if possession is rendered to us, the territory will come into our hands without any title to justify our holding it.

Mr. Jackson.—Mr. President: The honorable gentleman (Mr. Wells) has said that the French have no title, and, having no title herself, we can derive none from her. Is not, I ask, the King of Spain’s proclamation, declaring the cession of Louisiana to France, and his orders to his Governor and officers to deliver it to France, a title? Do nations give any other? I believe the honorable gentleman can find no solitary instance of feofment or conveyance between States. The treaty of St. Ildefonso was the groundwork of the cession, and whatever might have been the terms to be performed by France, the King of Spain’s proclamation and orders have declared to all the world that they were complied with. The honorable gentleman, however, insists that there is no consideration expressed in the treaty, and therefore it must be void; if the honorable gentleman will but look attentively at the ninth article, I am persuaded he will perceive one: the conventions are made part of the treaty; they are declared to have execution in the same manner, as if they had been inserted in the treaty; they are to be ratified in the same form, and at the same time, so that the one shall not be distinct from the other. What inference can possibly be drawn, but that the payments to be made by them were full consideration for Louisiana? But the honorable gentleman lays stress on that part of the treaty which declares that “the First Consul of the French Republic, desiring to give to the United States a strong proof of his friendship, doth hereby cede to the United States the territory,” &c.; inferring from thence that our title rests on the friendship of Buonaparte alone. Sir, let my opinion of the present Government of France be what it may, and I confess it is not very favorable, Buonaparte, by the consent of the nation, is placed at its head; he is the organ through which the will of the nation is expressed, and is and must be respected as such by all other Powers. No nation has a right to interfere with the rule or police of another. It is enough that the nation wills it, and Buonaparte’s act is the act of the whole nation, which cannot recall it, even if Buonaparte should cease to govern and another form of government be adopted. Last session we were impressed with the necessity of taking immediate possession of the island of New Orleans in the face of two nations, and now we entertain doubts if we can combat the weakest of those Powers; and we are further told we are going to sacrifice the immense sum of fifteen millions of dollars, and have to go to war with Spain for the country afterwards; when, last session, war was to take place at all events, and no costs were equal to the object. Gentlemen seem to be displeased, because we have procured it peaceably, and at probably ten times less expense than it would have cost us had we taken forcible possession of New Orleans alone, which, I am persuaded, would have involved us in a war which would have saddled us with a debt of from one to two hundred millions, and perhaps have lost New Orleans, and the right of deposit, after all. I again repeat, sir, that I do not believe that Spain will venture war with the United States. I believe she dare not; if she does, she will pay the costs. The Floridas will be immediately ours; they will almost take themselves. The inhabitants pant for the blessings of your equal and wise Government; they ardently long to become a part of the United States. An officer, duly authorized, and armed with the bare proclamation of the President, would go near to take them; the inhabitants by hundreds would flock to his standard, the very Spanish force itself would assist in their reduction; it is composed principally of the Irish brigade and Creoles—the former disaffected, and the latter the dregs of mankind. With two or three squadrons of dragoons, and the same number of companies of infantry, not a doubt ought to exist of the total conquest of East Florida by an officer of tolerable talents. Exclusive, however, of the loss of the Floridas, to use the language of a late member of Congress, the road to Mexico is now open to us, which, if Spain acts in an amicable way, I wish may, and hope will, be shut, as respects the United States, for ever. For these reasons, I think, sir, Spain will avoid a war, in which she has nothing to gain and every thing to lose.

Mr. President, the honorable gentleman appears to be extremely apprehensive of vesting the powers delegated by the bill, now on its passage, in the President, and wishes to retain it in the Legislature. Is this a Legislative or an Executive business? Assuredly, in my mind, of the latter nature. The President gave instructions for, and, with our consent, ratified the treaty. We have given him the power to take possession, which his officers are at this moment doing; and surely, as the ostensible party, the representative of the sovereignty to whom France will alone look, he ought to possess the power of fulfilling our part of the contract. Gentlemen, indeed, had doubted, on a former occasion, the propriety of giving the President the power of taking possession and organizing a temporary government, which every inferior officer, in case of conquest or cession, from the general to the subaltern, if commanding, has a right to do; but I little expected these doubts after we had gone so far. For my part, sir, I have none of those fears. I believe the President will be as cautious as ourselves, and the bill is as carefully worded as possible; for the money is not to be paid until after Louisiana shall be placed in our possession.

Mr. Wright.—Mr. President, I presumed from the observations of the honorable gentleman from Delaware, (Mr. Wells,) that he had not minutely attended to the provisions of this bill, on which the transfer of this stock is made expressly to depend. The treaty has in the most guarded manner secured us in the possession of the ceded territory, as a condition precedent to the payment of the purchase money, and this bill has expressly provided that no part of the stock shall be transferred till the possession stipulated by the treaty shall have been obtained. Not such a possession as the gentleman has said the President may be satisfied with—“the delivery of a twig and turf, or the knocker of a door.” The treaty has defined the possession intended: it is the possession of Louisiana, the island and city of New Orleans, with the forts and arsenals, the troops having been withdrawn from thence. But, sir, from his remarks, it would seem that his objections to this bill had been predicated on his want of confidence in the Executive, as he has expressed his fears that the stock would be transferred, before the prerequisite conditions had been performed. He says, we ought to be satisfied that the possession stipulated by the treaty shall have been delivered up before we pass this bill. Has he forgot that, by the constitution, the President is to superintend the execution of the law? Or has he forgot that treaties are the supreme law of the land? Or why, while he professes to respect this constitution, does he oppose the commission of the execution of this law to that organ of the Government to which it has been assigned by the constitution? Why, I ask, does he distrust the President? Has he not been, throughout the whole of this business, very much alive to the peaceful acquisition of this immense territory, and the invaluable waters of the Mississippi? a property which, but the other day, we were told was all-important, and so necessary to our political existence that if it was not obtained the Western people would sever themselves from the Union. This property, for which countless millions were then proposed to be expended, and the best blood of our citizens to be shed, and which then was to be had at all hazards, per fas aut per nefas, seems now to have lost its worth, and it would seem as if some gentlemen could not be satisfied with the purchase, because our title was not recorded in the blood of its inhabitants. But that this is not the wish of the American people, has been unequivocally declared by their immediate representatives in Congress, as well as by this House, who had each expressed their approbation of the peaceful title we had acquired, by majorities I thought not to be misunderstood. And the gentleman, although he voted for the ratification of the treaty, now again calls on us to investigate the title. It is certainly too late.

Mr. Pickering said, if he entertained the opinion just now expressed by the gentleman from Delaware, (Mr. Wells,) of the binding force of all treaties made by the President and Senate, he should think it to be his duty to vote for the bill now under consideration. “The constitution, and the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.”—But a treaty to be thus obligatory, must not contravene the constitution, nor contain any stipulations which transcend the powers therein given to the President and Senate. The treaty between the United States and the French Republic, professing to cede Louisiana to the United States, appeared to him to contain such an exceptionable stipulation—a stipulation which cannot be executed by any authority now existing. It is declared in the third article, that “the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States.” But neither the President and Senate, nor the President and Congress, are competent to such an act of incorporation. He believed that our Administration admitted that this incorporation could not be effected without an amendment of the constitution; and he conceived that this necessary amendment could not be made in the ordinary mode by the concurrence of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress, and the ratification by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States. He believed the assent of each individual State to be necessary for the admission of a foreign country as an associate in the Union; in like manner as in a commercial house, the consent of each member would be necessary to admit a new partner into the company; and whether the assent of every State to such an indispensable amendment were attainable, was uncertain. But the articles of a treaty were necessarily related to each other; the stipulation in one article being the consideration for another. If, therefore, in respect to the Louisiana Treaty, the United States fail to execute, and within a reasonable time, the engagement in the third article, (to incorporate that territory into the Union,) the French Government will have a right to declare the whole treaty void. We must then abandon the country, or go to war to maintain our possession. But it was to prevent war that the pacific measures of the last winter were adopted—they were to “lay the foundation for future peace.”

Mr. P. had never doubted the right of the United States to acquire new territory, either by purchase or by conquest, and to govern the territory so acquired as a dependent province; and in this way might Louisiana have become a territory of the United States, and have received a form of government infinitely preferable to that to which its inhabitants are now subject.

Mr. Dayton.—As the honorable gentleman from Massachusetts has quoted what was suggested by me in a former debate, to deduce from it an inference which the information I gave can by no means warrant, I must be allowed the liberty of correcting him. When I said that there existed an essential difference between the French and Spanish officers at New Orleans as to the real boundaries of the province of Louisiana, I did not mean to insinuate that this disagreement extended so far as an opposition to the French taking possession. It was a question of limits only, varying, however, so much in extent as would have produced a serious altercation between those two countries, although closely allied.

The Spanish Governor had taken it upon himself to proclaim that the province lately ceded and about to be given over to France would be confined on the east of the Mississippi to the river Iberville, and the lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain, or in other words to the island of New Orleans; but the French Prefect on the contrary declared that he neither had nor would give his assent to the establishment of those limits, which would be regarded no longer than until the arrival of their troops.

The same gentleman (Mr. Pickering) has said that the advocates of this measure seem to rely much more upon their power than upon their right, and in this assertion I am compelled to say that he has done us very great injustice. The title of the French is founded upon the often quoted treaty of St Ildefonso, confirmed by the royal order signed by the King of Spain himself, so lately as the 15th October, 1802, directing the delivery of the “colony of Louisiana and its dependencies as well as of the city and island of New Orleans, without any exception, to General Victor, or other officer duly authorized by that Republic to take charge of the said delivery.”

When at New Orleans in July last, I obtained from the best source a translated copy of that royal order, and can aver that it absolutely directs possession to be given without reservation or condition. It is not, and cannot be, denied that the lately ratified treaty of Paris transfers to us completely all the title acquired by France in virtue of the first treaty and order alluded to. We have, then, most incontestably, the right of possession, and our object now is, by passing the bill before us to obtain the possession itself, which we can certainly never effect, consistently with good faith, if the reasonings and objections of my honorable friends from Delaware and Massachusetts should prevail. We are asked by the same gentlemen what will be the consequence if it shall appear that the royal order has been revoked? I answer, first, that it is not in the least degree probable, for neither of them pretend to have heard of such revocation, nor is it intimated in the confidential communications before the Senate. But admitting for argument’s sake that it were revoked, of what avail could it be against a third party, who had in the mean time become a bona fide purchaser? Shall one nation give to another a written, formal evidence of transfer of territory, and revoke it at pleasure, especially after a third shall have been tempted and induced by that very evidence of title to contract for the purchase of it? Would an act so fraudulent be countenanced between individuals in a court of equity? Could it be justified between nations in a high court of honor? The honorable gentleman from Delaware has taken a more delicate ground of objection. He has insinuated that there exists in the knowledge of the Senate, the evidence of a serious opposition to our possessing that country, which, if known to the other branch of the Legislature, would probably have defeated this bill in its progress there. Allusions artfully made in this manner to documents communicated under the injunction of secrecy, place us in an embarrassing situation. Forbidden by our rules to expose the papers referred to, even in argument, we can only declare what impressions they have made upon ourselves. Every Senator must understand him, every one must have heard and read, and weighed deliberately the contents of those documents, and, for myself, I am free to avow my belief, that, if known to every member of the other House, they would have had no effect against this bill, but would rather have quickened and ensured its progress, for such is the influence they have upon me.

Mr. Taylor.—There have been, Mr. President, two objections made against the treaty; one that the United States cannot constitutionally acquire territory; the other, that the treaty stipulates for the admission of a new State into the Union; a stipulation which the treaty-making power is unable to comply with. To these objections I shall endeavor to give answers not heretofore urged.

Before a confederation, each State in the Union possessed a right, as attached to sovereignty, of acquiring territory, by war, purchase, or treaty. This right must be either still possessed, or forbidden both to each State and to the General Government, or transferred to the General Government. It is not possessed by the States separately, because war and compacts with foreign powers and with each other are prohibited to a separate State; and no other means of acquiring territory exist. By depriving every State of the means of exercising the right of acquiring territory, the constitution has deprived each separate State of the right itself. Neither the means nor the right of acquiring territory are forbidden to the United States; on the contrary, in the fourth article of the constitution, Congress is empowered “to dispose of and regulate the territory belonging to the United States.” This recognizes the right of the United States to hold territory. The means of acquiring territory consist of war and compact; both are expressly surrendered to Congress and forbidden to the several States; and no right in a separate State to hold territory without its limits is recognized by the constitution, nor any mode of effecting it possible, consistent with it. The means of acquiring and the right of holding territory, being both given to the United States, and prohibited to each State, it follows that these attributes of sovereignty once held by each State are thus transferred to the United States; and that, if the means of acquiring and the right of holding, are equivalent to the right of acquiring territory, then this right merged from the separate States to the United States, as indispensably annexed to the treaty-making power, and the power of making war; or, indeed, is literally given to the General Government by the constitution.

Having proved, sir, that the United States may constitutionally acquire, hold, dispose of, and regulate territory, the other objection to be considered is, whether the third article of the treaty does stipulate that Louisiana shall be erected into a State? It is conceded that the treaty-making power cannot, by treaty, erect a new State, however they may stipulate for it. I premise, that in the construction of this article, it is proper to recollect that the negotiators must be supposed to have understood our constitution. It became very particularly their duty to do so, because, in this article itself, they have recited “the principles of the constitution” as their guide. Hence, it is obvious, they did not intend to infringe, but to adhere to those principles; and therefore, if the article will admit of a construction consistent with this presumable knowledge and intention of the negotiators, the probability of its accuracy will be greater than one formed in a supposition that the negotiators were either ignorant of that which they ought to have known, or that they fraudulently professed a purpose which they really intended to defeat. The following construction is reconcilable with what the negotiators ought to have known, and with what they professed to intend.

Recollect, sir, that it has been proved that the United States may acquire territory. Territory, so acquired, becomes from the acquisition itself a portion of the territories of the United States, or may be united with their territories without being erected into a State. A union of territory is one thing; of States, another. Both are exemplified by an actual existence. The United States possess territory, comprised in the union of territory, and not in the union of States. Congress is empowered to regulate or dispose of territorial sections of the Union, and have exercised the power; but it is not empowered to regulate or dispose of State sections of the Union. The citizens of these territorial sections are citizens of the United States, and they have all the rights of citizens of the United States; but such rights do not include those political rights arising from State compacts or governments, which are dissimilar in different States. Supposing the General Government or treaty-making power have no right to add or unite States and State citizens to the Union, yet they have a power of adding or uniting to it territory and territorial citizens of the United States.

The territory is ceded by the first article of the treaty. It will no longer be denied that the United States may constitutionally acquire territory. The third article declares that “the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States.” And these words are said to require the territory to be erected into a State. This they do not express, and the words are literally satisfied by incorporating them into the Union as a Territory, and not as a State. The constitution recognizes and the practice warrants an incorporation of a Territory and its inhabitants into the Union, without admitting either as a State. And this construction of the first member of the article is necessary to shield its two other members from a charge of surplusage, and even absurdity. For if the words “the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States” intended that Louisiana and its inhabitants should become a State in the Union of States, there existed no reason for proceeding to stipulate that these same inhabitants should be made “citizens as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution.” Their admission into the Union of States would have made them citizens of the United States. Is it not then absurd to suppose that the first member of this third article intended to admit Louisiana into the Union as a State, which would instantly entitle the inhabitants to the benefit of the article of the constitution declaring, that “the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States,” and yet to have gone on to stipulate for citizenship, under the limitation “as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution,” after it had been bestowed without limitation? Again, the concluding member of the article is to bestow “protection in the mean time;” incorporating this stipulation, and the stipulation for citizenship, with the construction which accuses the treaty of unconstitutionality, the article altogether must be understood thus: “The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be taken into the Union of States, which will instantly give them all the rights of citizenship, after which they shall be made citizens as soon as possible; and after they are taken into the Union of States, they shall be protected in the interim between becoming a State in the Union, and being made citizens, in their liberty, property, and religion.”

By supposing the first member of the article to require that the inhabitants and their territory shall be incorporated in the Union, in the known and recognized political character of a Territory, these inconsistencies are avoided, and the article reconciled to the constitution, as understood by the opposers of the bill; the stipulation also for citizenship “as soon as possible” according to the principles of the constitution, and the delay meditated by these words, and the subsequent words “in the mean time,” so utterly inconsistent with the instantaneous citizenship, which would follow an admission into the Union as a State, are both fully explained. Being incorporated in the Union as a Territory, and not as a State, a stipulation for citizenship became necessary; whereas it would have been unnecessary had the inhabitants been incorporated as a State, and not as a Territory. And as they were not to be invested with citizenship by becoming a State, the delay which would occur between the incorporation of the Territory into the Union and the arrival of the inhabitants to citizenship according to the principles of the constitution, under some uniform rule of naturalization, exhibited an interim which demanded the concluding stipulation, for “protection in the mean time for liberty, property, and religion.” As a State of the Union, they would not have needed a stipulation for the safety of their “liberty, property and religion;” as a Territory, this stipulation would govern and restrain the undefined power of Congress to make “rules and regulations for Territories.”

Mr. Tracy.—Mr. President: I shall vote against this bill, and will give some of the reasons which govern my vote in this case.

It is well known that this bill is introduced to carry into effect the treaty between the United States and France, which has been lately ratified. If that treaty be an unconstitutional compact, such a one as the President and Senate had no rightful authority to make, the conclusion is easy, that it creates no obligation on any branch or member of the Government to vote for this bill, or any other, which is calculated to carry into effect such unconstitutional compact.

The third and seventh articles of the treaty are, in my opinion, unconstitutional.

The third article is in the following words:

“The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States, and admitted, as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States, and, in the mean time, they shall be maintained in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion they profess.”

The obvious meaning of this article is, that the inhabitants of Louisiana are incorporated, by it, into the Union, upon the same footing that the Territorial Governments are, and, like them, the Territory, when the population is sufficiently numerous, must be admitted as a State, with every right of any other State.

Have the President and Senate a constitutional right to do all this?

When we advert to the constitution, we shall find that the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, may make treaties. Now, say gentlemen, this power is undefined, and one gentleman says, it is unlimited.

True, there is no definition in words of the extent and nature of the treaty-making power. Two modes of ascertaining its extent have been mentioned: one is, by ascertaining the extent of the same power among the monarchs of Europe, and making that the standard of the treaty-making power here; and the other is, to limit the power of the President and Senate, in respect to treaties, by the constitution and the nature and principles of our Government.

Upon the first criterion, it is obvious that we cannot obtain any satisfactory definition of the treaty-making power, as applicable to our Government.

The paragraph in the constitution, which says that “new States may be admitted by Congress into this Union,” has been quoted to justify this treaty. To this, two answers may be given, either of which are conclusive in my favor. First, if Congress have the power collectively of admitting Louisiana, it cannot be vested in the President and Senate alone. Secondly, Congress have no power to admit new foreign States into the Union, without the consent of the old partners. The article of the constitution, if any person will take the trouble to examine it, refers to domestic States only, and not at all to foreign States; and it is unreasonable to suppose that Congress should, by a majority only, admit new foreign States, and swallow up, by it, the old partners, when two-thirds of all the members are made requisite for the least alteration in the constitution. The words of the constitution are completely satisfied by a construction which shall include only the admission of domestic States, who were all parties to the Revolutionary war, and to the compact; and the spirit of the association seems to embrace no other. But I repeat it, if the Congress collectively has this power, the President and Senate cannot, of course, have it exclusively.

I think, sir, that, from a fair construction of the constitution, and an impartial view of the nature and principles of our association, the President and Senate have not the power of thus obtruding upon us Louisiana.

The seventh article admits for twelve years the ships of France and Spain into the ceded territory, free of foreign duty. This is giving a commercial preference to those ports over the other ports of the United States; because it is well known that a duty of forty-four cents on tonnage, and ten per cent. on duties, are paid by all foreign ships or vessels in all the ports of the United States. If it be said we must repeal those laws, and then the preference will cease, the answer is, that this seventh article gives the exclusive right of entering the ports of Louisiana to the ships of France and Spain, and if our discriminating duties were repealed this day, the preference would be given to the ports of the United States against those of Louisiana, so that the preference, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, which the constitution expressly prohibits from being given to the ports of one State over those of another, would be given by this treaty, in violation of the constitution. I acknowledge, if Louisiana is not admitted into the Union, and that if there is no promise to admit her, then this part of our argument will not apply; but, in declaring these to be facts, my opponents are driven to acknowledge that the third article of this treaty is void, which answers every purpose which I wish to establish, that this treaty is unconstitutional and void, and that I have, consequently, a right to withhold my vote from any bill which shall be introduced to carry it into effect. I acknowledge, sir, that my opinion ever has been, and still is, that when a treaty is ratified by the constituted authorities, and is a constitutional treaty, every member of the community is bound by it, as a law of the land; but not so by a treaty which is unconstitutional. The terms of this treaty may be extravagant and unwise, yet, in my legislative capacity, that can form no excuse for an opposition; we may have no title, we may have given an enormous sum, we may have made a silly attempt to destroy the discriminating duties, yet, if the treaty be not unconstitutional, every member of the Government is bound to carry it into effect.

Mr. Breckenridge observed, that he little expected a proceeding so much out of order would have been attempted, as a re-discussion of the merits of the treaty on the passage of this bill; but as the gentlemen in the opposition had urged it, he would, exhausted as the subject was, claim the indulgence of the Senate in replying to some of their remarks.

No gentleman, continued he, has yet ventured to deny, that it is incumbent on the United States to secure to the citizens of the western waters, the uninterrupted use of the Mississippi. Under this impression of duty, what has been the conduct of the General Government, and particularly of the gentlemen now in the opposition, for the last eight months? When the right of deposit was violated by a Spanish officer without authority from his Government, these gentlemen considered our national honor so deeply implicated, and the rights of the western people so wantonly violated, that no atonement or redress was admissible, except through the medium of the bayonet. Negotiation was scouted at. It was deemed pusillanimous, and was said to exhibit a want of fellow-feeling for the western people, and a disregard to their essential rights. Fortunately for their country, the counsel of these gentlemen was rejected, and their war measures negatived. The so much scouted process of negotiation was, however, persisted in, and instead of restoring the right of deposit, and securing more effectually for the future our right to navigate the Mississippi, the Mississippi itself was acquired, and every thing which appertained to it. I did suppose that those gentlemen, who at the last session so strongly urged war measures for the attainment of this object, upon an avowal that it was too important to trust to the tardy and less effectual process of negotiation, would have stood foremost in carrying the treaty into effect, and that the peaceful mode by which it was acquired would not lessen with them the importance of the acquisition. But it seems to me, sir, that the opinions of a certain portion of the United States with respect to this ill-fated Mississippi, have varied as often as the fashions. [Here Mr. B. made some remarks on the attempts which were made in the old Congress, and which had nearly proved successful, to cede this river to Spain for twenty-five years.] But, I trust, continued he, these opinions, schemes, and projects will for ever be silenced and crushed by the vote which we are this evening about to pass.

Permit me to examine some of the principal reasons which are deemed so powerful by gentlemen as to induce them to vote for the destruction of this treaty. Unfortunately for the gentlemen, no two of them can agree on the same set of objections; and what is still more unfortunate, I believe there are no two of them concur in any one objection. In one thing only they seem to agree, and that is to vote against the bill. An honorable gentleman from Delaware (Mr. White) considered the price to be enormous. An honorable gentleman from Connecticut, who has just sat down, (Mr. Tracy,) says he has no objection whatever to the price; it is, he supposes, not too much. An honorable gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Pickering) says that France acquired no title from Spain, and therefore our title is bad. The same gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Tracy) says he has no objection to the title from France; he thinks it a good one. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Pickering) contends that the United States cannot under the constitution acquire foreign territory. The gentleman from Connecticut is of a different opinion, and has no doubt but that the United States can acquire and hold foreign territory; but that Congress alone have the power of incorporating that territory into the Union. What weight, therefore, ought all their lesser objections to be entitled to, when they are at war among themselves on the greater one?

The same gentleman has told us, that this acquisition will, from its extent, soon prove destructive to the confederacy.

This, continued Mr. B., is an old and hackneyed doctrine; that a republic ought not to be too extensive. But the gentleman has assumed two facts, and then reasoned from them. First, that the extent is too great; and secondly, that the country will be soon populated. I would ask, sir, what is his standard extent for a republic? How does he come at that standard? Our boundary is already extensive. Would his standard extent be violated by including the island of Orleans and the Floridas? I presume not, as all parties seem to think their acquisition, in part or in whole, essential. Why not then acquire territory on the west, as well as on the east side of the Mississippi? Is the Goddess of Liberty restrained by water courses? Is she governed by geographical limits? Is her dominion on this continent confined to the east side of the Mississippi? So far from believing in the doctrine that a republic ought to be confined within narrow limits, I believe, on the contrary, that the more extensive its dominion the more safe and more durable it will be. In proportion to the number of hands you intrust the precious blessings of a free government to, in the same proportion do you multiply the chances for their preservation. I entertain, therefore, no fears for the confederacy on account of its extent.

I had hoped, sir, that the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Tracy,) from the trouble he was so good as to give himself yesterday in assisting to amend this bill, would have voted for it; but it seems he is constrained to vote to-day against it. He asks, if the United States have power to acquire and add new States to the Union, can they not also cede States? Can they not, for example, cede Connecticut to France? I answer they cannot; but for none of the reasons assigned by him. The Government of the United States cannot cede Connecticut, because, first, it would be annihilating part of that sovereignty of the nation which is whole and entire, and upon which the Government of the United States is dependent for its existence; and secondly, because the fourth section of the fourth article of the constitution forbids it. But how does it follow as a consequence, that because the United States cannot cede an existing State, they cannot acquire a new State? He admits explicitly that Congress may acquire territory and hold it as a territory, but cannot incorporate it into the Union. By this construction he admits the power to acquire territory, a modification infinitely more dangerous than the unconditional admission of a new State; for by his construction, territories and citizens are considered and held as the property of the Government of the United States, and may consequently be used as dangerous engines in the hands of the Government against the States and people.

Could we not, says the same gentleman, incorporate in the Union some foreign nation containing ten millions of inhabitants—Africa, for instance—and thereby destroy our Government? Certainly the thing would be possible if Congress would do it, and the people consent to it; but it is supposing so extreme a case and is so barely possible, that it does not merit serious refutation. It is also possible and equally probable that republicanism itself may one day or other become unfashionable, (for I believe it is not without its enemies,) and that the people of America may call for a king. From such hypotheses it is impossible to deduce any thing for or against the construction contended for. The true construction must depend on the manifest import of the instrument and the good sense of the community.

The same gentleman, in reply to the observations which fell from the gentleman from South Carolina, as to the admission of new States, observes, that although Congress may admit new States, the President and Senate, who are but a component part, cannot. Apply this doctrine to the case before us. How could Congress by any mode of legislation admit this country into the Union until it was acquired? And how can this acquisition be made except through the treaty-making power? Could the gentleman rise in his place and move for leave to bring in a bill for the purchase of Louisiana and its admission into the Union? I take it that no transaction of this or any other kind with a foreign power can take place except through the Executive Department, and that in the form of a treaty, agreement, or convention. When the acquisition is made, Congress can then make such disposition of it as may be expedient.

Mr. Adams.—It is not my intention to trespass long upon the patience of the Senate, on a subject which has already been debated almost to satiety; but, as objections on constitutional grounds have been raised against the bill under discussion, I wish to say a very few words in justification of the vote which I think it my duty to give.

The objections against the passage of the bill, as far as my recollection serves me, are two: the first, started by the honorable gentleman from Delaware who opened this debate; the second, urged by several of the other members who have spoken upon the question.

The gentleman from Delaware admits the necessity of making the provision for carrying into execution, on our part, the treaty which has been duly ratified by the Senate, provided we can obtain complete and undoubted possession of the territory ceded us by France, in that treaty. But he observes, that the term possession is indefinite; that it may mean nothing more than the delivery of a twig, or of the knob of a door. That, from sources of the authenticity of which we have no reason to doubt, we are informed that Spain is very far from acquiescing in the cession of this territory to us; that probably the Spanish officers will not deliver peaceable possession; and that we ought not to put out of our own hands the power of withholding the payment of this money, until it shall be ascertained, beyond all question, that the territory, for which it is the consideration, is in our hands. But, sir, admitting that the word possession were of itself not sufficiently precise, I think, with the gentleman last up, that the fourth and fifth articles of the treaty, read by him, render it so in this instance. The fourth, stipulating that the French commissary shall do every act necessary to receive the country from the Spanish officers, and transmit it to the agent of the United States—and the fifth, providing, not only that all the military posts shall be delivered to us, and that the troops, whether of France or Spain, shall cease to occupy them, but that those troops shall all be embarked within three months after the ratification of the treaty. Now, when the country has been formally surrendered to us, when all the military posts are in our hands, and when all the troops, French or Spanish, have been embarked, what possible adverse possession can there be to contend against ours? Until all these conditions shall have been fulfilled on the part of France, neither the convention nor the bill before us requires the payment of money on ours; and we may safely trust the execution of the law to the discretion of the President of the United States. For, even if I could see any reason for distrusting him in the exercise of such a power, under different circumstances, which I certainly do not, still, in the present case, his own interest, and the weight of responsibility resting upon him, are ample security to us, against any undue precipitation on his part, in the payment of the money. On the other hand, I am extremely solicitous that every tittle of the engagements on our part in these conventions should be performed with the most scrupulous good faith, and I see no purpose of utility that can be answered by postponing the determination on the passage of this bill.

But it has been argued that the bill ought not to pass, because the treaty itself is unconstitutional, or, to use the words of the gentleman from Connecticut, an extra-constitutional act; because it contains engagements which the powers of the Senate were not competent to ratify, the powers of Congress not competent to confirm, and, as two of the gentlemen have contended, not even the Legislatures of the number of States requisite to effect an amendment of the constitution are adequate to sanction. It is therefore, say they, a nullity; we cannot fulfil our part of its conditions, and on our failure in the performance of any one stipulation, France may consider herself as absolved from the obligations of the whole treaty on her. I do not conceive it necessary to enter into the merits of the treaty at this time. The proper occasion for that discussion is past. But, allowing even that this is a case for which the constitution has not provided, it does not in my mind follow, that the treaty is a nullity, or that its obligations, either on us or on France, must necessarily be cancelled. For my own part, I am free to confess, that the third article, and more especially the seventh, contain engagements placing us in a dilemma, from which I see no possible mode of extricating ourselves but by an amendment, or rather an addition to the constitution. The gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Tracy,) both on a former occasion, and in this day’s debate, appears to me to have shown this to demonstration. But what is this more than saying, that the President and Senate have bound the nation to engagements which require the co-operation of more extensive powers than theirs, to carry them into execution? Nothing is more common, in the negotiations between nation and nation, than for a minister to agree to and sign articles beyond the extent of his powers. This is what your ministers, in the very case before you, have confessedly done. It is well known that their powers did not authorize them to conclude this treaty; but they acted for the benefit of their country, and this House by a large majority has advised to the ratification of their proceedings. Suppose then, not only that the ministers who signed, but the President and Senate who ratified this compact, have exceeded their powers. Suppose that the other House of Congress, who have given their assent by passing this and other bills for the fulfilment of the obligations it imposes on us, have exceeded their powers. Nay, suppose even that the majority of States competent to amend the constitution in other cases, could not amend it in this, without exceeding their powers—and this is the extremest point to which any gentleman on this floor has extended his scruples—suppose all this, and there still remains in the country a power competent to adopt and sanction every part of our engagements, and to carry them entirely into execution. For, notwithstanding the objections and apprehensions of many individuals, of many wise, able and excellent men, in various parts of the Union, yet such is the public favor attending the transaction which commenced by the negotiation of this treaty, and which I hope will terminate in our full, undisturbed and undisputed possession of the ceded territory, that I firmly believe if an amendment to the constitution, amply sufficient for the accomplishment of every thing for which we have contracted, shall be proposed, as I think it ought, it will be adopted by the Legislature of every State in the Union. We can therefore fulfil our part of the conventions, and this is all that France has a right to require of us.

Mr. Nicholas.—Mr. President: The gentlemen on the other side differ among themselves. The two gentlemen from Delaware say, that if peaceable possession is given of Louisiana this bill ought to pass; the other gentlemen who have spoken in opposition to it have declared, that if they believed the constitution was not violated by the treaty, they should think themselves bound to vote for the bill. To this Senate it cannot be necessary to answer arguments denying the power of the Government to make such a treaty; it has already been affirmed, so far as we could affirm it, by two-thirds of this body; it is then only now necessary to show that we ought to pass the bill at this time. In addition to the reasons which have been so ably and forcibly urged by my friends, I will remark, that the treaty-making power of this Government is so limited, that engagements to pay money cannot be carried into effect without the consent and co-operation of Congress. This was solemnly decided, after a long discussion of several weeks, by the House of Representatives, which made the appropriations for carrying the British treaty into effect, and such I believe is the understanding of nine-tenths of the American people, as to the construction of their constitution. This decision must be also known to foreigners, and if not, they are bound to know the extent of the powers of the Government with which they treat. If this bill should be rejected, I ask gentlemen whether they believe, that France would or ought to execute the treaty on her part? It is known to the French Government that the President and Senate cannot create stock, nor provide for the payment of either principal or interest of stock; and if that Government should be informed that a bill, authorizing the issue of stock to pay for the purchase, “after possession shall be delivered,” had been rejected by the only department of our Government competent to the execution of that part of the treaty, they would have strong ground to suspect that we did not mean to execute the treaty on our part; particularly when they are informed, that the arguments most pressed in opposition to the bill were grounded upon a belief that the Government of the United States had not a constitutional power to execute the treaty. Of one thing I am confident, that if they have the distrust of us which some gentlemen have this day expressed of them, the country will not be delivered to the agents of our Government should this bill be rejected.

The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Tracy) muse consider the grant of power to the Legislature as a limitation of the treaty-making power, for he says, “that the power to admit new States and to make citizens is given to Congress, and not to the treaty-making power;” therefore an engagement in a treaty to do either of these things is unconstitutional. I cannot help expressing my surprise at that gentleman’s giving that opinion, and I think myself justifiable in saying, that if it is now his opinion, it was not always so. The contrary opinion is the only justification of that gentleman’s approbation of the British treaty, and of his vote for carrying it into effect. By that treaty a great number of persons had a right to become American citizens immediately; not only without a law, but contrary to an existing law. And by that treaty many of the powers specially given to Congress were exercised by the treaty-making power. It is for gentlemen who supported that treaty, to reconcile the construction given by them to the constitution in its application to that instrument, with their exposition of it at this time.

If the third article of the treaty is an engagement to incorporate the Territory of Louisiana into the Union of the United States, and to make it a State, it cannot be considered as an unconstitutional exercise of the treaty-making power; for it will not be asserted by any rational man that the territory is incorporated as a State by the treaty itself, when it is expressly declared that “the inhabitants shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution.” Evidently referring the question of incorporation, in whatever character it was to take place, to the competent authority; and leaving to that authority to do it, at such time, and in such manner, as they may think proper. If, as some gentlemen suppose, Congress possess this power, they are free to exercise it in the manner that they may think most conducive to the public good. If it can only be done by an amendment to the constitution, it is a matter of discretion with the States whether they will do it or not; for it cannot be done “according to the principles of the Federal Constitution,” if the Congress or the States are deprived of that discretion, which is given to the first, and secured to the last, by the constitution. In the third section of the fourth article of the constitution it is said, “New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union.” If Congress have the power, it is derived from this source; for there are no other words in the constitution that can, by any construction that can be given to them, be considered as conveying this power. If Congress have not this power, the constitutional mode would be by an amendment to the constitution. If it should be conceded then that the admission of this territory into the Union, as a State, was in the contemplation of the contracting parties, it must be understood with a reservation of the right of this Congress or of the States to do it, or not; the words “admitted as soon as possible,” must refer to the voluntary admission in one of the two modes that I have mentioned; for in no other way can a State be admitted into this Union.

The question was then taken on the passage of the bill, and carried in the affirmative—yeas 26, nays 5, as follows:

Yeas—Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Butler, Cocke, Condit, Dayton, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Olcott, Plumer, Potter, Israel Smith, John Smith, Stone, Taylor, Worthington, and Wright.

Nays—Messrs. Hillhouse, Pickering, Tracy, Wells, and White.

Friday, November 4.

The following Message was received from the President of the United States:

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

By the copy now communicated of a letter from Captain Bainbridge, of the Philadelphia frigate, to our Consul at Gibraltar, you will learn that an act of hostility has been committed on a merchant vessel of the United States, by an armed ship of the Emperor of Morocco. This conduct on the part of that power is without cause and without explanation. It is fortunate that Captain Bainbridge fell in with and took the capturing vessel and her prize; and I have the satisfaction to inform you that about the date of this transaction, such a force would be arriving in the neighborhood of Gibraltar, both from the east and from the west, as leaves less to be feared for our commerce, from the suddenness of the aggression.

On the 4th of September, the Constitution frigate, Captain Preble, with Mr. Lear on board, was within two days’ sail of Gibraltar, where the Philadelphia would then be arrived with her prize; and such explanations would probably be instituted as the state of things required, and as might perhaps arrest the progress of hostilities.

In the mean while, it is for Congress to consider the provisional authorities which may be necessary to restrain the depredations of this power, should they be continued.

TH. JEFFERSON.

Nov. 4, 1803.

The Message and papers therein referred to were read and ordered to lie for consideration.

Thursday, November 10.

The credentials of John Condit, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of New Jersey, for the time limited in the Constitution of the United States, were presented and read.

Ordered, That they lie on file.

Friday, November 11.

The President communicated a letter from De Witt Clinton, late a Senator from the State of New York, stating that he had resigned his seat in the Senate.

Monday, November 14.

The President administered the oath required by law to Mr. Condit, a Senator from the State of New Jersey.

Tuesday, November 15.

Mr. Worthington presented the petition of a number of the inhabitants of the Indiana Territory, praying to be set off into a separate district, for reasons therein stated.

Ordered, That it be referred to Mr. Bradley and others, the committee to whom were referred on the 7th instant, petitions on the same subject, to consider and report thereon to the Senate.

Wednesday, November 23.

Amendment to the Constitution.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the report of the committee to whom was referred the motion for an amendment to the constitution in the mode of electing the President and the Vice President of the United States; whereupon, the President pro tem. (Mr. Brown) submitted to the consideration of the Senate the following question of order:

“When an amendment to be proposed to the constitution is under consideration, shall the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present be requisite to decide any question for amendments, or extending to the merits, being short of the final question?”

[A debate took place on this proposition, tedious, intricate, and desultory, which it was very difficult to follow, and often to comprehend.]

The proposition offered by the President was then called up for decision, whether two-thirds were necessary—ayes 13, noes 18.

Mr. Butler desired to know from the President if the question now decided did not require a majority of two-thirds?

The President said, according to the rule of the House, the question required only a principal majority to decide.

Mr. Dayton’s motion for striking out what related to the Vice President was called for, and the question taken on striking out—ayes 12, noes 19.

The report of the committee at large being then under consideration,

Mr. Nicholas moved to strike out all following the seventh line of the report, to the end, for the purpose of inserting the following:

“In all future elections of President and Vice President, the Electors shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and, in distinct ballots, the person voted for as Vice President, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. The person voted for as President, having a majority of the votes of all the Electors appointed, shall be the President; and if no person have such majority, then from the three highest on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose the President in the manner directed by the constitution. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice President, shall be the Vice President; and in case of an equal number of votes for two or more persons for Vice President, they being the highest on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice President from those having such equal number, in the manner directed by the constitution; but no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President, shall be eligible to that of Vice President of the United States.”

Mr. Adams objected to the number “three” instead of five, and wished five to be restored, as the House of Representatives had already agreed to it. He asked for a division of the question; which was not agreed to.

Upon the question for striking out being put, it was carried without a dissenting voice, and the amendment of Mr. Nicholas adopted in the report, leaving the number blank.

Mr. Dayton moved to fill up the blank with the number five; upon the question being put, it was lost—only eleven rose in the affirmative.

Mr. Anderson moved to strike out the word “two” in the nineteenth line—ayes 6. Lost.

Mr. S. Smith then moved to fill the blank with the word “three;” which was carried—ayes 18, noes 13.

Mr. Adams suggested an objection to the amendment as it stood, which appeared to arise out of the treaty of cession of Louisiana. His original idea was adverse to the limitation to natural-born citizens, as superfluous; but, as it stood, the terms upon which Louisiana was acquired had rendered a change necessary, for it appeared to him that there was no alternative, but to admit those born in Louisiana as well as those born in the United States to the right of being chosen for President and Vice President.

Mr. Butler said that, if there was a numerous portion of those who were already citizens of the United States who can never aspire to, nor be eligible for, those situations under the constitution, he did not see how this supposed alternative could be upheld. The people of Louisiana, under the treaty and under the constitution, will clearly come under the description of naturalized citizens. While he was up, he would take the opportunity of speaking to the question at large, and to examine the motives which produced this amendment; the principal cause of solicitude, on this subject, he understood to be the base intrigues which were said to have been carried on at the Presidential election.

Mr. Wright called to order; and a short altercation on the point of order took place.

Mr. Butler proceeded. He had on a former day asked if he might, in this stage of the discussion, take a view of the whole subject; the House had decided in the affirmative. When the proposition was first laid before the House, he had felt a disposition in favor of it; his mind had been shocked by those base intrigues, which had taken place at the late Presidential election, and he was hurried by indignation into a temper which a little cool reflection and some observation on a particular mode of action in that House, had checked and corrected, and finally convinced him that much caution was required in a proceeding of that nature, and that, in all human probability, such a scene of intrigue may never occur again; that it became questionable whether any steps whatever were necessary. Upon a careful review of the subject, it appeared to him that an alteration might make matters worse; for though at present there has been afforded, by a course of accidents and oversights, room for intrigue, it would be preferable to leave it to the care and discretion of the States at large to prevent the recurrence of the danger, than put into the hands of four of the large States the perpetual choice of President, to the exclusion of the other thirteen States. It was a reasonable principle that every State should, in turn, have the choice of the Chief Magistrate made from among its citizens. The jealousy of the small States was natural; and he would not tire the House by bringing to their ears arguments from the history of Greece, because the subject must be familiar to every member of that House, and, indeed, to every school-boy. He would not weary them with the painful history of the conflicts of Athens and Sparta, for the supremacy of Greece, and the fatal effects of their quarrels and ambition on the smaller States of that inveterate confederacy of Republics. Their history is that of all nations in similar circumstances; for man is man in every clime, and passion mingles in all his actions. If the smaller States were to agree to this amendment, it would fix for ever the combination of the larger States, and they would not only choose the President but the Vice President also in spite of the smaller States. It would ill become him who had been a member of that convention which had the honor of forming the present constitution to let a measure such as the present pass without the most deliberate investigation of its effects. Before the present constitution was adopted all the States held an equal vote on all national questions; by the constitution their sovereignty was guarantied, and the instrument of guarantee and right, he had subscribed his name to as a Representative from South Carolina, and had used all the zeal and influence of which he was possessed to promote its adoption. To give his assent to any violation of it, or any unnecessary innovation on its principles, would be a deviation from morality.

The question was immediately taken on the report and carried—yeas 20, nays 11.

Mr. Adams said, that though he had voted for the amendment, he disapproved of the alteration from five to three. He felt, however, though a representative of a large State, a deep interest in this question. Was there no champion of the small States to stand up in that House and vindicate their rights?

Mr. Dayton was not here as champion of the small States; but, as the representative of one of them, he was ready to enter his protest against being delivered over bound hand and foot to four or five of the large States. The gentleman from South Carolina had offered arguments on the subject irrefutable. The little portion of influence left us he has demonstrated to be now about to be taken away, and the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Adams,) after aiding the effort with his vote, has taken mercy upon us, and after he has helped to knock us down, asks us why we do not stand up for ourselves.

Mr. S. Smith was not surprised to find those who were members of the old Congress, in which the subject of large and small States was frequently agitated, familiar with the subject of those days. Under the present constitution he had been ten years in Congress and had never heard the subject agitated, nor the least ground given for any apprehension on this subject; he had seen the small States possess all the advantages secured to them without even a moment’s jealousy. The State he represented was once considered a large State; the increase of others in population, however, had rendered it properly belonging to neither class; it was an intermediate State; but from the natural progression of the Union it must be ranked among the small States. In this view then he could speak dispassionately, and the small States could not with reason be apprehensive that a State, which must speedily take rank among them, could be indifferent to their rights if there were the least cause for apprehension.

He had moved for the insertion of three instead of five, with this precise and special intention, that the people themselves should have the power of electing the President and Vice President; and that intrigues should be thereby for ever frustrated. The intention of the convention was that the election of the chief officers of the Government should come as immediately from the people as was practicable, and that the Legislature should possess the power only in such an exigency as accident might give birth to, but which they had considered as likely to occur. Had it not been for these considerations, the large States never would have given up the advantages which they held in point of numbers. If the number five were to be continued, and the House of Representatives made the last resort, he would undertake to say, that four times out of five the choice would devolve upon them.

Mr. Hillhouse.—In avoiding rocks he feared we were steering for quicksands. The evils that are past we know; those that may arrive we know not. The object proposed is to provide against a storm, a phenomenon not rare or unfrequent in republics. You are called upon to act upon a calculation that all the States in the Union will vote for the same persons, or that each of two parties opposed in politics will have an individual candidate. Suppose the two candidates who had the highest votes on the late election had been the champions of two opposite parties, and that neither would recede, what then would be the consequence; according to the gentleman from Maryland, a civil war! When men are bent on a favorite pursuit, they are too apt to shut out all consequences which do not bear out their object. Thus gentlemen can very well discover the danger they have escaped, but they do not perceive that the opposition of two powerful candidates gives, besides the hazard of civil war, the hazard of placing one of them on a permanent throne. The First Magistracy of this nation is an object capable of exciting ambition; and no doubt it would one day or other be sought after by dangerous and enterprising men. It was to place a check upon this ambition that the constitution provided a competitor for the Chief Magistrate, and declared that both should not be chosen from the same State. Here also was a guard against State pride, and this guard you wish to take away; and what will be the consequence? Instead of two or three or five, you will have as many candidates as there are States in the Union. By voting for two persons without designation, the States stood a double chance of a majority, besides the chance of a majority of all the States in the House of Representatives. For once or twice there may be such an organization of party as will secure for a conspicuous character the majority of votes. But that character cannot live always. The evil of the last election will recur, and be greater, because the whole field will be to range in.

He hoped this amendment would not be hastily adopted. The subsisting mode was the result of much deliberation and solemn compromise, after having long agitated the convention. It is now attacked by party, whatever gentlemen may say to the contrary; the gentleman from South Carolina has confessed it. If gentlemen will suffer themselves to look forward without passion, great good may come from the present mode; men of each of the parties may hold the two principal offices of the Government; they will be checks upon each other; our Government is composed of checks; and let us preserve it from party spirit, which has been tyrannical in all ages. These checks take off the fiery edge of persecution. Would not one of a different party placed in that chair tend to check and preserve in temper the overheated zeal of party? he would conduct himself with firmness because of the minor party; he would take care that the majority should have justice, but he would also guard the minority from oppression. If we cannot destroy party we ought to place every check upon it. If the present amendment pass, nine out of ten times the election will go to the other House, and then the only difference will be that you had a comedy the last time, and you’ll have a tragedy the next. Though it was impossible to prevent party altogether, much more when population and luxury increase, and corruption and vice with them, it was prudent to preserve as many checks against it as was practicable. He had been long in Congress and saw the conflicting interests of large and small States operate; the time may not be remote when party will adopt new designations; federal and republican parties have had their day, their designations will not last long, and the ground of difference between parties will not be the same that it has been; new names and new views will be taken; it has been the course in all nations. There has not yet been a rotation of offices in which the small States could look for their share, but the time may, it will come when the small will wrestle with the large States for their rights. Each State has felt that though its limits were not so extensive as others, its rights were not disregarded. Suffer this confidence to be done away, and you may bid adieu to it; three or four large States will take upon them in rotation to nominate the Executive, and the second officer also. This will be felt. A fanciful difference in politics is the bugbear of party now, because no other, no real cause of difference has subsisted. But remedy will create a real disease. States like individuals may say we will be of no party, and whenever this shall happen blood will follow.

Mr. Bradley moved an adjournment. The motion was agreed to.

Thursday, November 24.

Amendment to the Constitution.

The consideration of the report on the amendment to the constitution being taken up, the amendment as directed to be printed on the preceding day, was taken up, and read, as follows:

Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, two-thirds of both Houses concurring, That the following amendment be proposed to the Legislatures of the several States as an amendment to the constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by three-fourths of the said Legislatures, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as a part of the said constitution, viz:

In all future elections of President and Vice President, the Electors shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and, in distinct ballots, the person voted for as Vice President, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. The person voted for as President having a majority of the votes of all the Electors appointed, shall be the President, and if no person have such majority, then from the three highest on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose the President in the manner directed by the constitution. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice President, shall be Vice President; and in case of an equal number of votes for two or more persons for the Vice President, they being the highest on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice President from those having such equal number, in the manner directed by the constitution; but no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President, shall be eligible to that of the President of the United States.

Mr. Bradley did not approve of the amendment as it now stood; he could not see why the Vice President should not be chosen by a majority, as well as the President. He considered the possibility of the Vice President becoming President by any casualty, as a good reason for both being chosen by the same ratio of numbers. If it should be carried as the amendment now stands, the office of Vice President would be hawked about at market, and given as change for votes for the Presidency. And what would be the effect?—that it might so happen that a citizen chosen only for the office of Vice President, might by the death of the President, though chosen only by a plurality, become President, and hold the office for three years eleven months and thirty days. He did not approve of many arguments which he had heard on the preceding day, and however disposed to concur in the principle of designation for the two offices, he could not give it his vote in the present shape. He would, in order to render the report more congenial with his wishes, move to strike out the following words beginning with the words shall, in the thirteenth line, to constitution, in the eighteenth. The motion was seconded.

Mr. Tracy opposed the striking out, as not in order, it being an amendment to an amendment already received by the House. He thought, however, it would be in order to reconcile the whole, and then any part might be amended.

The President said that the motion for amending the amendment was not in order; but if the member from Vermont, or any other gentleman of the majority on the question yesterday chose to move for a recommittal, or even to refer the report to a select committee, it would be in order.

Mr. Bradley then renewed his motion as before, for striking out and inserting after the 13th line; this amendment he thought of great importance, as under the constitution as it now stands the Vice President must be a person of the highest respectability, well known, and of established reputation throughout the United States; but if the discriminating principle prevails without some precautions such as the amendment proposed, that assurance would be lost; and he should not be surprised to hear of as many candidates for Vice President as there are States, as the votes for President would be offered in truck for votes for Vice President, and an enterprising character might employ his emissaries through all the States to purchase them, and your amendment lays the foundation for intrigues. He was desirous that he who is to be set up as candidate for the Vice President should as at present be equally respectable, or that there should be none—that at least he should be the second man in the nation; adopt the designating principle, without the most guarded precautions, and you lose that assurance.

Mr. Hillhouse accorded with the gentleman’s amendment, as it naturally grows out of the principles of the report. There was not a word in the constitution about voting for the Vice President, no vote in fact is given for such an office; the alteration to designation alters the whole thing; and as the gentleman has expressed, will send the Vice President’s office into market to be handed about as change for the candidate supported by larger States; he would prefer leaving the choice of President and Vice President at once to the larger States than take it in this way. In calm times any government may work well, but he wished in calm times to provide against storm. If we designate any, then designate both and on equal terms.

Mr. Jackson said, that though coming from a small State he had not been instructed, and was therefore at perfect liberty to act according to the best of his judgment; though his State was now, in regard to population, small, and though it were to remain so, he could have but one opinion on this subject. He saw abundance of reason for preferring three to five. The constitution under the present form has directed the choice to be made from five. But the reason of this was consistent with the result to be produced; the electors were to vote for two persons indiscriminately, but with the restriction of voting for one only belonging to the State where the vote was given. The voting for two would necessarily bring forward four candidates, and a fifth possibly, for we saw in the two elections before the last that there was one more than the four, though in each case the fifth had but one vote; he alluded to the vote for Mr. Jay. In the amendment proposed you are called upon to designate for each office, and there can be little apprehension of having more than two or three principal candidates; and for twenty years to come he had no apprehension of a greater number of candidates if this amendment prevails.

Mr. Wright.—We need not be told in this house, that the constitution was the result of a compromise, or that care was taken to guard the rights of each State; these things we must be very ignorant, indeed, not to know. But does it therefore follow that it is not susceptible of amendment or correction under experience? Does it follow, because, for mutual interest and security, this compromise was made, that we are precluded from effecting any greater good? No man would accuse him of a wish to see the interest of any State impaired. But we can preserve the spirit and intention of the constitution in full vigor, without impairing any interests. And this is to be done, by the discriminating principle; it fulfills the intention, and it forefends the recurrence of that danger from which you have once escaped. By this principle, each elector may name his man for each office, and this can be done whether the number be three or five. For the latter number he was disposed; because already adopted by the other House, and he did not wish to delay its progress. If we were to form a constitution, he would provide that there should be only two candidates presented to the House. But he did not rely on any number so much as on the discriminating principle.

Mr. Nicholas.—Several gentlemen profess much reluctance to make any change in the constitution; he would make no such profession; and though he should be as jealous of improper alterations, or the introduction of principles incompatible with Republican Government, he would not hesitate to make any alteration calculated to promote, or secure the public liberty upon a firmer basis; nay, if it could be made better he would expunge the whole book. Gentlemen who are for adhering so closely to the constitution, appear not to consider that a choice of President from the number three, is more in the spirit of the constitution than from five; and preserves the relation that the election of two persons, under the present form, holds to the number five. A reason equally forcible with him was, that, by taking the number three instead of five, you place the choice with more certainty in the people at large, and render the choice more consonant to their wishes. With him, also, it was a most powerful reason for preferring three, that it would render the Chief Magistrate dependent only on the people at large, and independent of any party or any State interest. The people held the sovereign power, and it was intended by the constitution that they should have the election of the Chief Magistrate. It was never contemplated as a case likely to occur, but in an extreme case, that the election should go to the House of Representatives. What, he asked, would have been the effect, had Mr. Jay been elected when he had only one vote? What, he would ask, would be the impression made upon our own people, and upon foreign nations, had Mr. Aaron Burr been chosen at the last election, when the universal sentiment was to place the present Chief Magistrate in that station? He did not mean any thing disrespectful or invidious towards the Vice President, he barely stated the fact, so well known, and asked, what would be the effect? Where would be the bond of attachment to that constitution which could admit of an investiture in a case so important, in known opposition to the wishes of the people? The effect would be fatal to the constitution itself; it would weaken public attachment to it, and the affectation, if alone for the small States, would not have been heard of in the deep murmur of discontent.

An adjournment was now called for and carried.

Tuesday, November 29.

Amendment to the Constitution.

The order of the day being called up on the amendments to the constitution, a considerable time elapsed, when

Mr. Dayton rose and said, that since no other gentleman thought proper to address the Chair, although laboring himself under a very severe cold, which rendered speaking painful, he could not suffer the question to pass without an effort to arrest it in its progress; and should consider his last breath well expended in endeavoring to prevent the degradation which the State he represented would suffer if the amendment were to prevail.

As to the question immediately before the Senate for filling the blank with five, he felt himself indebted to the member from Tennessee for renewing the subject. He was grateful, also, to the member from Maryland (Mr. Wright) for declaring he would support it, as well as for giving the assurance that he was disposed to consider and spare the interests of the small States as far as possible, consistently with the great object of discrimination.

Every member who had spoken on this subject seemed to have admitted, by the very course and pointing of their arguments, even though they may have denied it in words, that this was really a question between great and small States, and disguise it as they would, the question would be so considered out of doors. The privilege given by the constitution extended to five, out of which the choice of President should be made; and why should the smaller, for whose benefit and security that number was given, now wantonly throw it away without an equivalent? As to the Vice President, his election had no influence upon the number, because the choice of President in the House of Representatives was as free and unqualified as if that subordinate office did not exist. Nay, he said, he would venture to assert that, even if the number five were continued, and the Vice Presidency entirely abolished, there would not be as great a latitude of choice as under the present mode, because those five out of whom the choice must eventually be made, were much more likely hereafter to be nominated by the great States, inasmuch as their electors would no longer be compelled to vote for a man of a different State. The honorable gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Smith) has said, he was not surprised that those who had seats in the old Congress, should perplex themselves with the distinctions; but he could tell that gentleman, that it was not in the old Congress he had learnt them, for there he had seen all the votes of the States equal, and had known the comparatively little State of Maryland controlling the will of the Ancient Dominion. It was in the Federal Convention that distinction was made and acknowledged; and he defied that member to do, what had been before requested of the honorable gentleman of Virginia, viz: to open the constitution, and point out a single article, if he could, that had not evidently been framed upon a presumption of diversity (he had almost said, adversity) of interest between the great and small States.

Mr. Adams in a former debate had stated that he had not a wish to avoid or seek for the yeas and nays on any question; on the present occasion, however, he would, when the question was taken, call for the yeas and nays. But his own vote on the final question would be governed by the decision of the number five, and he wished to have some record of his vote, that he might be hereafter able to defend himself against any charge of inconsistency. On the principle of the amendment he had formed his opinion, and he was free to confess, that notwithstanding the many able productions which he had seen against it, he thought it calculated to produce more good than evil. He was not, however, influenced in this opinion by the instructions which had been read in a preceding debate from a former Legislature of Massachusetts to their Senators; he presumed these were not read by way of intimidation. To the instructions of those to whom he owed his seat in that House he would pay every respect that was due, but he did not think that the resolutions of a Legislature passed in March 1799 or 1800 ought to have the same weight. Since that time four total and complete changes had taken place, and probably not one third of those who gave those instructions now remained. He held a seat in the Legislature himself three years since, but did not perceive any particular anxiety on the subject, and he did not think that the present Legislature would be extremely offended if he were to give a direct vote against what was recommended four years ago.

The constitution was a combination of federative and popular principles. When you argue upon, or wish to change any of its federative principles, you must use analogies as arguments; popular arguments will not apply to federative principles. The House of Representatives was founded on popular principles; in this House the representation is federative, and not popular; it is in its nature aristocratic. The foundation of all popular representation is equality of votes; but even the ratio of representation is different in different States; the numbers in Massachusetts and Virginia, in Vermont and Delaware, are different in their proportions; but still an equality of representation is preserved, and the only difference is in the details. But if you argue upon the principles of the Senate, this equality of popular representation, or by an equal or relatively equal number, will not apply; you must discuss it upon another species of equality, of sovereignties, and the independence of several States federatively connected. Applying principles then to the election of President, if you reduce the number from which the House of Representatives is authorized to choose, do you not attack the principles of the federal compact, rather than the rights of the small States? The Executive, it had been said, is the man of the people; true, and he is also, as was said, though upon different grounds, the man of the Legislature—it was here a combined principle, federative and popular. Virginia had in that House twenty-two popular representatives, in this she has two federative; Delaware has one popular and two federative representatives. And even in the operation of election in the popular branch of Congress, the federative principle is pursued, and the State which has only one popular representative has an equal voice in that instance with the State that has twenty-two popular representatives. It was therefore evident that the attempt to alter the number from five to three, is an attack upon the federative principle, and not upon the small States.

Mr. S. Smith, when he made the motion for filling up the blank with three, did it after the most deliberate consideration of the theory and the principles of the constitution; which, if he understood it right, intended that the election of the Executive should be in the people, or as nearly as was possible, consistent with public order and security to the right of suffrage. The provision admitting the choice by the House of Representatives, was itself intended only for an extreme case, where great inconvenience might result from sending a defective election back to the people, as is customary in Massachusetts, where, if the majority is deficient, a new election is required. Our object in the amendment is or should be to make the election more certain by the people. This was to be done most effectually by leaving it to them to designate the persons whom they preferred for each office. As under the present form there was an extreme case, so there might be when the change of number should take place; for, although even with the number three, there was a possibility of the choice devolving on the House of Representatives, yet the adoption of the designating principle and the number three, would render the case less probable. It never was the intention of the framers of the constitution that the election should go to the House of Representatives but in the extreme case; nor was it ever contemplated that about one-fifth of the people should choose a President for the rest, which certainly would be the case if what some gentlemen contended for were to take place. When gentlemen contend for such a power as would transfer the choice from the people, and place it in the hands of a minority so small, how happens it that gentlemen will not bear to hear of the efforts which such arguments or such measures would produce on the larger States? It was not the interest of the small States to combine against the large. Suppose it were possible that the four large States should combine—and a combination of the small States alone could produce such an effect—nine States in the Union have but thirty-two votes out of one hundred and forty-two, yet nine States, with one vote each, make a majority of seventeen, though in relation to population they contain only about one-fifth of the whole; and by such a proceeding the one-fifth might choose a President and Vice President in defiance of the other four-fifths. What would be the consequence of such an election? At a subsequent election the large States would combine, and by the use of their votes they would frustrate every object which the small States might use their efforts to accomplish.

Notwithstanding what had been said concerning the jealousy of States, he could see nothing in it but the leaven of the old Congress, thrown in to work up feelings that had been long still. It was the forlorn hope, the last stratagem of party; and he was the more disposed to think so, when he saw gentlemen from the large States coming forward as the champions of the small—this might, to be sure, be magnanimity; but if his discernment did not deceive him, it was a stratagem to divide the friends of the amendment. Why was not the same jealousy entertained of the power of thirteen out of seventeen combining and giving absolute law to the other four? Why have gentlemen paid no regard to the experience which they have had from the last election, when less than one third of the members harassed the public mind, kept the Union in agitation, and Congress engrossed to the exclusion of nearly all other business for two weeks? Suppose that the House had been as accessible to corruption as the diets of other nations have been, and that three men, having in their power the votes of three States, had been seized upon, and the election made contrary to the wishes of the people. What would be the effect—on the minds of the people—on the administration of the Government—and on the attachment which the people feel for the constitution itself? He need not attempt to describe the effects. But it is our duty to prevent the return of such dangers, by keeping the election out of that House. And the most effectual mode is to fix the selection from the number three.

Mr. Pickering had not intended to have spoken on this question so far as it concerned the numbers; but as he should probably vote differently from his colleague, he conceived it proper to give his motives for his vote. His wishes for the entire preservation of the constitution were so strong, that he regretted any change was contemplated to be made in it, and he wished if an alteration was made to keep as near as possible to the spirit of the constitution as it now is, and it appeared to him that the number three conformed more to that spirit than the number five. He believed it to be the intention of the constitution, that the people should elect. As to what gentlemen said concerning the will of the people, he paid but little regard to it. The will of the people! he did not know how the will of the people could be known—how gentlemen came by it; it would not be asserted that it was to be found in the newspapers, or in private society; in truth he believed it never had been fairly expressed on the subject. We have seen an amendment brought forward from New York, but was that an expression of the public opinion? if it was, it was a very remarkable one, for it contained an absurdity—visible to every one. He wished to avoid innovations on the constitution, and to preserve the combined operation of federative and popular principles upon which it rested unimpaired.

Mr. Worthington hoped the number three would be adopted in preference to five. Nevertheless he approved so much of the principle of designation in the election of the President and Vice President, that rather than lose it he would vote for it with either number.

The yeas and nays being called for on filling up the blank with the largest number according to order; the votes were—yeas 12, nays 19, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Adams, Bailey, Butler, Condit, Dayton, Hillhouse, Olcott, Plumer, Tracy, Wells, White, and Wright.

Nays.—Messrs. Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Pickering, Potter, Israel Smith, John Smith, Samuel Smith, Stone, Taylor, and Worthington.

The question on the number three being inserted was then put, and the yeas and nays being demanded by one fifth of the members present; they were, yeas 21, nays 10, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Pickering, Potter, Israel Smith, John Smith, Samuel Smith, Stone, Taylor, Worthington, and Wright.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Butler, Condit, Dayton, Hillhouse, Olcott, Plumer, Tracy, Wells, and White.

The House then adjourned.

Friday, December 2.

Mr. White, of Delaware, rose and addressed the chair as follows:

Mr. President: It may be expected that we, who oppose the present measure, and especially those of us who belong to the smaller States, and who think the interests of those States will be most injuriously affected by its adoption, shall assign some reasons for our opinion, and for the resistance we give it: I will for myself endeavor to do so. I know well the prejudices of many in favor of this proposed amendment to the constitution; I know too, and acknowledge with pleasure, the weight of abilities on the other side of the House by which those prejudices, if I may so be permitted to call them, will be sustained; this might perhaps be sufficient to create embarrassment or even silence on my part, but for the consciousness I feel in the rectitude of my views, and my full reliance on the talents of those with whom I have the honor generally to think and act. Upon a subject of the nature and importance of the one before us a great diversity of sentiment must be expected, and is perhaps necessary to the due and proper investigation of it. Without detaining the Senate with further preliminary remarks, presuming upon that patience and polite indulgence that are at all times extended by this honorable body to gentlemen who claim their attention, I will proceed immediately to the subject of the resolution; barely premising that notwithstanding the opinions of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Taylor) and the gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. Jackson,) whose opinions I highly respect, I must yet think with my honorable friend from New Jersey (Mr. Dayton) that the Constitution of the United States bears upon the face of it the strongest marks of its having been made under the influence of State classifications. It was a work of compromise, though not formed, as stated by the gentleman from Virginia, by the large States yielding most, but by the smaller States yielding much more to the general good.

It will be recollected that, previous to the adoption of the constitution, on all legislative subjects, in fact, on every measure of the constitution, each State had an equal voice; but very different is the case now, when, in the popular branch of your Government, you see one State represented by twenty-two members, and another by but one, voting according to numbers. So that, notwithstanding the ideas of those gentlemen, and the declaration of an honorable member from Maryland, on my right, (Mr. Smith,) that, during his ten years’ service in Congress, he had never seen anything like State jealousies, State divisions, or State classification, I must be permitted to predicate part of my argument upon this business. Should any gentleman be able to show that the foundation is unsound, the superstructure of course will be easily demolished. Admitting, then, sir, for the sake of argument, that there were no very great objections to this proposed alteration in the mode of electing a President and Vice President, and that it were now part of the constitution, it might be unwise to strike it out, unless much stronger arguments had been urged against than I have heard in favor of it; yet I would not now vote for its adoption.

The United States are now divided, and will probably continue so, into two great political parties; whenever, under this amendment, a Presidential election shall come round, and the four rival candidates be proposed, two of them only will be voted for as President—one of these two must be the man; the chances in favor of each will be equal. Will not this increased probability of success afford more than double the inducement to those candidates, and their friends, to tamper with the Electors, to exercise intrigue, bribery, and corruption, as in an election upon the present plan, where the whole four would be voted for alike, where the chances against each are as three to one, and it is totally uncertain which of the gentlemen may succeed to the high office? And there must, indeed, be a great scarcity of character in the United States, when, in so extensive and populous a country, four citizens cannot be found, either of them worthy even of the Chief Magistracy of the nation. But, Mr. President, I have never yet seen the great inconvenience that has been so much clamored about, and that will be provided against in future by substituting this amendment. There was, indeed, a time when it became necessary for the House of Representatives to elect, by ballot, a President of the United States from the two highest in vote, and they were engaged here some days, as I have been told, in a very good-humored way, in the exercise of that constitutional right. They at length decided; and what was the consequence? The people were satisfied, and here the thing ended. What does this prove? that the constitution is defective? No, sir, but rather the wisdom and efficiency of the very provision intended to be stricken out, and that the people are acquainted with the nature of their Government; and give me leave to say, if fortune had smiled upon another man, and that election had eventuated in another way, the consequence would have been precisely the same; the great mass of the people would have been content and quiet; and those factious, restless disorganizers, that are the eternal disturbers of all well administered Governments, and who then talked of resistance, would have had too much prudence to hazard their necks in so dangerous an enterprise. I will not undertake to say that there was no danger apprehended on that occasion. I know many of the friends of the constitution had their fears; the experiment however proved them groundless; but what was the danger apprehended pending the election in the House of Representatives? Was it that they might choose Colonel Burr or Mr. Jefferson President? Not at all; they had, notwithstanding what had been said on this subject by the gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. Wright,) a clear constitutional right to choose either of them, as much so as the Electors in the several States had to vote for them in the first instance; the particular man was a consideration of but secondary importance to the country; the only ground of alarm was, lest the House should separate without making any choice, and the Government be without a head, the consequences of which no man could well calculate.

It has of late, Mr. President, become fashionable to attach very little importance to the office of Vice President, to consider it a matter but of small consequence who the man may be; to view his post merely as an idle post of honor, and the incumbent as a cipher in the Government; or according to the idea expressed by an honorable member from Georgia, (Mr. Jackson,) quoting, I believe, the language of some Eastern politician, as a fifth wheel to a coach; but in my humble opinion this doctrine is both incorrect and dangerous. The Vice President is not only the second officer of Government in point of rank, but of importance, and should be a man possessing and worthy of the confidence of the nation. I grant, sir, should this designating mode of election succeed, it will go very far to destroy, not the certain or contingent duties of the office, for the latter by this resolution are considerably extended, but what may be much more dangerous, the personal consequence and worth of the officer; by rendering the Electors more indifferent about the reputation and qualification of the candidate, seeing they vote for him but as a secondary character; and which may occasion this high and important trust to be deposited in very unsafe hands. By a provision in the first section of the second article of the constitution, “in case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President”—and he is constitutionally the President, not until another can be made only, but of the residue of the term, which may be nearly four years; and this is not to be supposed a remote or improbable case. In the State to which I have the honor to belong, within a few years past, two instances have happened of the place of Governor becoming vacant, and the duties of the office, according to the constitution of that State, devolving upon the Speaker of the Senate. We know well too, generally speaking, that before any man can acquire a sufficient share of the public confidence to be elected President, the people must have long been acquainted with his character and his merit; he must have proved himself a good and faithful servant, and will of course be far advanced in years, when the chances of life will be much against him. It may indeed, owing to popular infatuation, or some other extraordinary causes, be the ill fate of our country, that an unworthy designing man, grown old and gray in the ways of vice and hypocrisy, shall for a time dishonor the Presidential chair, or it may be the fortune of some young man to be elected, but those will rarely happen. The convention in constructing this part of the constitution, in settling the first and second offices of the Government, and pointing out the mode of filling, aware of the probability of the Vice President succeeding to the office of President, endeavored to attach as much importance and respectability to his office as possible, by making it uncertain at the time of voting, which of the persons voted for should be President, and which Vice President; so as to secure the election of the best men in the country, or at least those in whom the people reposed the highest confidence, to the two offices—thus filling the office of Vice President with one of our most distinguished citizens, who would give respectability to the Government, and in case of the Presidency becoming vacant, having at his post a man constitutionally entitled to succeed, who had been honored with the second largest number of the suffrages of the people for the same office, and who of consequence would be probably worthy of the place, and competent to its duties. Let us now, Mr. President, examine for a moment the certain effect of the change about to be made, or what must be the operation of this designating principle, if you introduce it into the constitution. Now the Elector cannot designate, but must vote for two persons as President, leaving it to circumstances not within his power to control which shall be the man: of course he will select two characters, each suitable for that office, and the second highest in vote must be the Vice President; but upon this designating plan the public attention will be entirely engrossed in the election of the President, in making one great man. The eyes of each contending party will be fixed exclusively upon their candidate for this first and highest office; no surrounding object can be viewed at the same time, they will be lost in his disc. The office of President is, in point of honor, profit, trust, and influential patronage, so infinitely superior to any other place attainable in this Government, that, in the pursuit and disposal of it, all minor considerations will be forgotten, every thing will be made to bend, in order to subserve the ambitious views of the candidates and their friends. In this angry conflict of parties, amidst the heat and anxiety of this political warfare, the Vice Presidency will either be left to chance, or what will be much worse, prostituted to the basest purposes; character, talents, virtue, and merit, will not be sought after in the candidate. The question will not be asked, is he capable? is he honest? But can he by his name, by his connections, by his wealth, by his local situation, by his influence or his intrigues, best promote the election of a President? He will be made a mere stepping-stone of ambition. Thus, by the death or other constitutional inability of the President to do the duties of the office, you may find at the head of your Government, as First Magistrate of the nation, a man who has either smuggled or bought himself into office; who, not having the confidence of the people, or feeling the constitutional responsibility of his place, but attributing his elevation merely to accident, and conscious of the superior claims of others, will be without restraint upon his conduct, without that strong inducement to consult the wishes of the people, and to pursue the true interests of the nation, that the hope of popular applause, and the prospect of re-election, would offer. Such a state of things might be productive of incalculable evils; for it is, as I fear time will show, in the power of a President of the United States to bring this Government into contempt, and this country to disgrace, if not to ruin.

Mr. Plumer said that he had generally contented himself with expressing his opinion by a silent vote, but on a question which affected the rights of the smaller States, (one of which he had the honor to represent,) he requested the indulgence of the Senate to a few observations.

He said the constitution had provided only two methods for obtaining amendments, and both are granted with great caution. If two-thirds of the several State Legislatures apply, Congress shall call a convention who are to propose amendments, which, when ratified by the conventions of three-fourths of the States, will be valid. If this mode is adopted, Congress have nothing to do but to ascertain the fact, whether the necessary number of States require a convention. If they do, a convention must be called. The State Legislatures are only to apply for a convention. They can neither propose nor decide the amendments.

The other mode is, if two-thirds of both Houses of Congress deem it necessary to propose amendments, and three-fourths of the State Legislatures ratify them, they are valid. This is the present mode. The State Legislatures have nothing to do till after Congress has proposed the amendments, and then it is their exclusive province either to ratify or reject them. But they have no authority to direct or even request Congress to propose particular amendments for themselves to ratify. Instructions on this subject are therefore improper. It is an assumption of power, not the exercise of a right. It is an attempt to create an undue influence over Congress. It is prejudging the question before it is proposed by the only authority that has the constitutional right to move it. If these instructions are obligatory, our votes must be governed, not by the convictions of our own judgments, or the propriety and fitness of the measure, but by the mandates of other Legislatures. This would destroy one of the checks that the constitution has provided against innovation. State Legislatures may, on some subjects, instruct their Senators; but on this, their instructions ought not to influence, much less bind us, to propose amendments, unless we ourselves deem them necessary.

The Senate consists of two members from each State; and in this case, the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Senate are necessary. A majority of the Senate constitutes a quorum to do business, but that quorum is a majority of all the Senators that all the States are entitled to elect. This applies with equal force to the term “two-thirds of the Senate.” But in cases where from necessity a speedy decision is requisite, and where the concurrence of two-thirds is required, the constitution is explicit in confining that two-thirds to the members present, as in cases of treaties and impeachments; and also a fifth of the members present requesting the yeas and nays. If amendments can be constitutionally proposed by two-thirds of the Senate present, it will follow that twelve Senators, when only a quorum is present, may propose them against the will of twenty-two Senators.

This amendment affects the relative interest and importance of the smaller States. The constitution requires the Electors of each State to vote for two men, one of whom to be President of the United States. This affords a degree of security to the small States against the views and ambition of the large States. It gives them weight and influence in the choice. By destroying this complex mode of choice, and introducing the simple principle of designation, the large States can with more ease elect their candidate. This amendment will enable the Electors from four States and a half to choose a President, against the will of the remaining twelve States and a half. Can such a change tend to conciliate and strengthen the Union?

This amendment has a tendency to render the Vice President less respectable. He will be voted for not as President of the United States, but as President of the Senate, elected to preside over forms in this House. In electing a subordinate officer the Electors will not require those qualifications requisite for supreme command. The office of Vice President will be a sinecure. It will be brought to market and exposed to sale to procure votes for the President. Will the ambitious, aspiring candidate for the Presidency, will his friends and favorites promote the election of a man of talents, probity, and popularity for Vice President, and who may prove his rival? No! They will seek a man of moderate talents, whose ambition is bounded by that office, and whose influence will aid them in electing the President. This mode of election is calculated to increase corruption, promote intrigue, and aid inordinate ambition. The Vice President will be selected from some of the large States; he will have a casting vote in this House; and feeble indeed must his talents be, if his influence will not be equal to that of a member. This will, in fact, be giving to that State a third Senator.

In the Southern States the blacks are considered as property, and the States in which they live are thereby entitled to eighteen additional Electors and Representatives—a number equal to all the Electors and Representatives that four States and a half are entitled to elect. Will you, by this amendment, lessen the weight and influence of the Eastern States in the election of your first officers, and still retain this unequal article in your constitution? Shall property in one part of the Union give an increase of Electors, and be wholly excluded in other States? Can this be right? Will it strengthen the Union?

Mr. Tracy.—I shall attempt to prove, sir, that the resolution before us contains principles which have a manifest tendency to deprive the small States of an important right, secured to them by a solemn and constitutional compact, and to vest an overwhelming power in the great States. And, further, I shall attempt to show that, in many other points, the resolution is objectionable, and, for a variety of causes, ought not to be adopted.

As I shall be obliged, in delineating the main features of this resolution, to mention the great States in the Union as objects of jealousy, I wish it to be understood that no special stigma is intended. “Man is man,” was the maxim expressed in an early part of this debate, by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Butler,) and in application to the subject of government, the maxim is worthy to be written in letters of gold. Yes, sir, “man is man,” and the melancholy truth that he is always imperfect and frequently wicked, induces us to fear his power, and guard against his rapacity, by the establishment and preservation of laws, and well-regulated constitutions of government. Man, when connected with very many of his fellow-men, in a great State, derives power from the circumstance of this numerous combination; and from every circumstance which clothes him with additional power, he will generally derive some additional force to his passions.

Having premised this, I shall not deem it requisite to make any apology, when I attempt to excite the attention, the vigilance, and even the jealousy of the small, in reference to the conduct of the great States. The caution is meant to apply against the imperfections and passions of man, generally, and not against any State, or description of men, particularly.

It may be proper, in this place, to explain my meaning, when I make use of the words “small” and “great,” as applicable to States.

Massachusetts has been usually called a great State; but, in respect to all the operations of this resolution, she must, I think, be ranked among the small States. The district of Maine is increasing rapidly, and must, in the nature of things, soon become a State. To which event, its location, being divided from what was the ancient Colony of Massachusetts, by the intervention of New Hampshire, will very much contribute. I believe there is a legislative provision of some years’ standing, authorizing a division at the option of Maine. When this event shall occur, Massachusetts, although, in comparison with Connecticut and Rhode Island, she will not be a small State, yet, in comparison with many others, must be so considered. I think myself justifiable, then, for my present purposes, in calling Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Vermont, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina, small States. They are limited in point of territory, and cannot reasonably expect any great increase of population for many years, not, indeed, until the other States shall become so populous as to discourage emigration, with agricultural views; which may retain the population of the small States as seamen or manufacturers. This event, if it ever arrives, must be distant. A possible exception only may exist in favor of Maine; but, when we consider its climate, and a variety of other circumstances, it is believed to form no solid exception to this statement.

By the same rule of deciding, the residue of the States must be called great; for although Georgia and several others are not sufficiently populous, at this time, to be considered relatively great States, yet their prospect of increase, with other circumstances, fairly bring them within the description, in respect to the operation of the measure now under consideration.

It will be recollected that, in the various turns which the debate has taken, gentlemen have repeatedly said that the constitution was formed for the people; that the good of the whole was its object; that nothing was discernible in it like a contest of States, nothing like jealousy of small States against the great; and although such distinctions and jealousies might have existed under the first confederation, yet they could have no existence under the last. And one gentleman (Mr. Smith, of Maryland) has said that he has been a member of this Government ten years, and has heard nothing of great and small States, as in the least affecting the operations of Government, or the feelings of those who administer it.

Propriety, therefore, requires that we attentively examine the constitution itself, not only to obtain correct ideas upon these observations, so repeatedly urged, but to place in the proper light the operations and effects of the resolution in debate. If we attend to the constitution, we shall immediately find evident marks of concession and compromise, and that the parties to these concessions were the great and small States. And the members of the convention who formed the instrument have, in private information and public communications, united in the declaration, that the constitution was the result of concession and compromise between the great and small States. In this examination of the constitution it will be impossible to keep out of view our political relations under the first confederation. We primarily united upon the footing of complete State equality—each State had one, and no State had more than one vote in the Federal Council or Congress. With such a confederation we successfully waged war, and became an independent nation. When we were relieved from the pressure of war, that confederation, both in structure and power, was found inadequate to the purposes for which it was established. Under these circumstances, the States, by their convention, entered into a new agreement, upon principles better adapted to promote their mutual security and happiness. But this last agreement, or constitution, under which we are now united, was manifestly carved out of the first confederation. The small States adhered tenaciously to the principles of State equality; and gave up only a part of that federative principle, complete State equality, and that with evident caution and reluctance. To this federative principle they were attached by habit; and their attachment was sanctioned and corroborated by the example of most if not all the ancient and the modern confederacies. And when the great States claimed a weight in the councils of the nation proportionate to their numbers and wealth, the novelty of the claim, as well as its obvious tendency to reduce the sovereignty of the small States, must have produced serious obstacles to its admission. Hence it is, that we find in the constitution but one entire departure from the federal principle. The House of Representatives is established upon the popular principle, and given to numbers and wealth, or to the great States, which, in this view of the subject, are synonymous. It was thought, by the convention, that a consolidation of the States into one simple Republic would be improper. And the local feelings and jealousies of all, but more especially of the small States, rendered a consolidation impracticable.

The Senate, who have the power of a legislative check upon the House of Representatives, and many other extensive and important powers, is preserved as an entire federative feature of Government as it was enjoyed by the small States, under the first confederacy.

In the article which obliges the Electors of President to vote for one person not an inhabitant of the same State with themselves, is discovered State jealousy. In the majorities required for many purposes by the constitution, although there were other motives for the regulations, yet the jealousy of the small States is clearly discernible. Indeed, sir, if we peruse the constitution with attention, we shall find the small States are perpetually guarding the federative principle, that is, State equality. And this, in every part of it, except in the choice of the House of Representatives, and in their ordinary legislative proceedings. They go so far as to prohibit any amendment which may affect the equality of States in the Senate.

This is guarding against almost an impossibility, because the Senators of small States must be criminally remiss in their attendance, and the Legislatures extremely off their guard, if they permit such alterations, which aim at their own existence. But lest some accident, some unaccountable blindness or perfidy should put in jeopardy the federative principle in the Senate, they totally and for ever prohibit all attempts at such a measure. In the choice of President, the mutual caution and concession of the great and small States is, if possible, more conspicuous than in any other part of the constitution.

He is to be chosen by Electors appointed as the State Legislatures shall direct, not according to numbers entirely, but adding two Electors in each State as representatives of State sovereignty. Thus Delaware obtains three votes for President, whereas she could have but one in right of numbers. Yet, mixed as this mode of choice is, with both popular and federative principles, we see the small States watching its motions and circumscribing it to one attempt only, and, on failure of an Electoral choice, they instantly seize upon the right of a federal election, and select from the candidates a President by States and not by numbers. In confirmation of my assertion, that this part of the constitution was peculiarly the effect of compromise between the great and small States, permit me to quote an authority which will certainly have great weight, not only in the Senate, but through the Union, I mean that of the present Secretary of State, (Mr. Madison,) who was a leading member of the Federal Convention who formed, and of the Virginia Convention who adopted the constitution.

In the Debates of the Virginia Convention, volume 3, page 77, Mr. Madison says, speaking of the mode of electing the President:

“As to the eventual voting by States, it has my approbation. The lesser States and some larger States will be generally pleased by that mode. The Deputies from the small States argued, and there is some force in their reasoning, that, when the people voted, the large States evidently had the advantage over the rest, and, without varying the mode, the interests of the little States might be neglected or sacrificed. Here is a compromise. For in the eventual election, the small States will have the advantage.”

After this view of the constitution, let us inquire, what is the direct object of the proposed alteration in the choice of President?

To render more practicable and certain the choice by Electors—and for this reason: that the people at large, or in other words, that the great States, ought to have more weight and influence in the choice. That it should be brought nearer to the popular and carried further from the federative principle. This claim we find was made at the formation of the constitution. The great States naturally wished for a popular choice of First Magistrate. This mode was sanctioned by the example of many of the States in the choice of Governor. The small States claimed a choice on the federative principle, by the Legislatures, and to vote by States; analogies and examples were not wanting to sanction this mode of election. A consideration of the weight and influence of a President of this Union, must have multiplied the difficulties of agreeing upon the mode of choice. But as I have before said, by mutual concession, they agreed upon the present mode, combining both principles and dividing between the two parties, thus mutually jealous, as they could, this important privilege of electing a Chief Magistrate.

This mode then became established, and the right of the small States to elect upon the federative principle, or by States, in case of the contingency of electoral failure of choice, cannot with reason and fairness be taken from them, without their consent, and on a full understanding of its operation; since it was meant to be secured to them by the constitution, and was one of the terms upon which they became members of the present confederacy; and for which privilege they gave an equivalent to the great States in sacrificing so much of the federative principle, or State equality.

The constitution is nicely balanced, with the federative and popular principles; the Senate are the guardians of the former, and the House of Representatives of the latter; and any attempts to destroy this balance, under whatever specious names or pretences they may be presented, should be watched with a jealous eye. Perhaps a fair definition of the constitutional powers of amending is, that you may upon experiment so modify the constitution in its practice and operation, as to give it, upon its own principles, a more complete effect. But this is an attack upon a fundamental principle established after a long deliberation, and by mutual concession, a principle of essential importance to the instrument itself, and an attempt to wrest from the small States a vested right, and by it, to increase the power and influence of the large States. I shall not pretend, sir, that the parties to this constitutional compact cannot alter its original essential principles, and that such alterations may not be effected under the name of amendment; but, let a proposal of that kind come forward in its own proper and undisguised shape; let it be fairly stated to Congress, to the State Legislatures, to the people at large, that the intention is to change an important federative feature in the constitution, which change in itself and all its consequences, will tend to a consolidation of this Union into a simple republic; let it be fairly stated, that the small States have too much agency in the important article of electing a Chief Magistrate, and that the great States claim the choice; and we shall then have a fair decision. If the Senators of the small States, and if their State Legislatures, will then quietly part with the right they have, no person can reasonably complain.

Nothing can be more obvious, than the intention of the plan adopted by our constitution for choosing a President. The Electors are to nominate two persons, of whom they cannot know which will be President; this circumstance not only induces them to select both from the best men; but gives a direct advantage into the hands of the small States even in the electoral choice. For they can always select from the two candidates set up by the Electors of large States, by throwing their votes upon their favorite, and of course giving him a majority; or, if the Electors of the large States should, to prevent this effect, scatter their votes for one candidate, then the Electors of the small States would have it in their power to elect a Vice President. So that, in any event, the small States will have a considerable agency in the election. But if the discriminating or designating principle is carried, as contained in this resolution, the whole, or nearly the whole right and agency of the small States, in the electoral choice of Chief Magistrate, is destroyed, and their chance of obtaining a federative choice by States, if not destroyed, is very much diminished.

The whole power of election is now vested in the two parties; numbers and States, or, great and small States; and it is demonstration itself, if you increase the power of the one, in just such proportion you diminish that of the other. Do the gentlemen suppose that the public will, when constitutionally expressed by a majority of States, in pursuance of the federative principle of our Government, is of less validity, or less binding upon the community at large, than the public will expressed by a popular majority? The framers of your constitution, the people who adopted it, meant, that the public will, in the choice of a President, should be expressed by Electors, if they could agree, and if not, the public will should be expressed by a majority of the States, acting in their federative capacity, and that in both cases the expression of the public will should be equally binding.

It is pretended that the public will can never properly or constitutionally be expressed by a majority of numbers of the people, or of the House of Representatives. This may be a pleasing doctrine enough to great States; but it is certainly incorrect. Our constitution has given the expression of the public will, in a variety of instances, other than that of the choice of President, into very different hands from either House of Representatives or the people at large. The President and Senate, and in many cases the President alone, can express the public will, in appointments of high trust and responsibility, and it cannot be forgotten that the President sometimes expresses the public will by removals. Treaties, highly important expressions of the public will, are made by the President and Senate; and they are the supreme law of the land. In the several States, many great offices are filled, and even the Chief Magistracy, by various modes of election. The public will is sometimes expressed by pluralities instead of majorities, sometimes by both branches of the Legislatures, and sometimes by one, and in certain contingencies, elections are settled by lot. The people have adopted constitutions containing such regulations, and experience has proved that they are well calculated to preserve their liberties and promote their happiness. From what good or even pardonable motive, then, can it be urged that the present mode of electing our President has a tendency to counteract the public will? Do gentlemen intend to destroy every federal feature in this constitution? And is this resolution a precursor to a complete consolidation of the Union, and to the establishment of a simple republic?—Or will it suffice to break down every federative feature which secures to one portion of the Union, to the small States, their rights?

Mr. Taylor.—The opposition to this discriminating amendment to the constitution is condensed into a single stratagem, namely: an effort to excite the passion of jealousy in various forms. Endeavors have been made to excite geographical jealousies—a jealousy of the smaller against the larger States—a jealousy in the people against the idea of amending the constitution; and even a jealousy against individual members of this House. Sir, is this passion a good medium through which to discern truth, or is it a mirror calculated to reflect error? Will it enlighten or deceive? Is it planted in good or in evil—in moral or in vicious principles? Wherefore, then, do gentlemen endeavor to blow it up? Is it because they distrust the strength of their arguments, that they resort to this furious and erring passion? Is it because they know that

——“Trifles light as air,

Are, to the jealous, confirmations strong

As proofs of holy writ!”

So far as these efforts have been directed towards a geographical demarcation of the interests of the Union into North and South, in order to excite a jealousy of one division against another; and, so far as they have been used to create suspicions of individuals, they have been either so feeble, inapplicable, or frivolous, as to bear but lightly upon the question, and to merit but little attention. But the attempts to array States against States because they differ in size, and to prejudice the people against the idea of amending their constitution, bear a more formidable aspect, and ought to be repelled, because they are founded on principles the most mischievous and inimical to the constitution, and, could they be successful, are replete with great mischiefs.

Towards exciting this jealousy of smaller States against larger States, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Tracy) had labored to prove that the federal principle of the constitution of the United States was founded in the idea of minority invested with operative power. That, in pursuance of this principle, it was contemplated and intended that the election of a President should frequently come into the House of Representatives, and to divert it from thence by this amendment would trench upon the federal principle of our constitution, and diminish the rights of the smaller States, bestowed by this principle upon them. This was the scope of his argument to excite their jealousy, and is the amount also of several other arguments delivered by gentlemen on the same side of the question. He did not question the words, but the ideas of gentlemen. Words, selected from their comrades, are easily asserted to misrepresent opinions, as he had himself experienced during the discussion on the subject.

This idea of federalism ought to be well discussed by the smaller States, before they will suffer it to produce the intended effect—that of exciting their jealousy against the larger. To him it appeared to be evidently incorrect. Two principles sustain our constitution: one a majority of the people, the other a majority of the States; the first was necessary to preserve the liberty or sovereignty of the people; the last, to preserve the liberty or sovereignty of the States. But both are founded in the principle of majority; and the effort of the constitution is to preserve this principle in relation both to the people and the States, so that neither species of sovereignty or independence should be able to destroy the other. Many illustrations might be adduced. That of amending the constitution will suffice. Three-fourths of the States must concur in this object, because a less number or a majority of States might not contain a majority of people; therefore, the constitution is not amendable by a majority of States, lest a species of State sovereignty might, under color of amending the constitution, infringe the right of the people. On the other hand, a majority of the people residing in the large States cannot amend the constitution, lest they should diminish or destroy the sovereignty of the small States, the federal Union, or federalism itself. Hence a concurrence of the States to amend the constitution became necessary, not because federalism was founded in the idea of minority, but for a reason the very reverse of that idea—that is, to cover the will both of a majority of the people and a majority of States, so as to preserve the great element of self-government, as it regarded State sovereignty, and also as it regarded the sovereignty of the people.

For this great purpose certain political functions are assigned to be performed, under the auspices of the State or federal principle, and certain others under the popular principle. It was the intention of the constitution that these functions should be performed in conformity to its principle. If that principle is in fact a government of a minority, then these functions ought to be performed by a minority. When the federal principle is performing a function, according to this idea, a majority of the States ought to decide. And, by the same mode of reasoning, when the popular principle is performing a function, then a minority of the people ought to decide. This brings us precisely to the question of the amendment. It is the intention of the constitution that the popular principle shall operate in the election of a President and Vice President. It is also the intention of the constitution that the popular principle, in discharging the functions committed to it by the constitution, should operate by a majority and not by a minority. That the majority of the people should be driven, by an unforeseen state of parties, to the necessity of relinquishing their will in the election of one or the other of these officers, or that the principle of majority, in a function confided to the popular will, should be deprived of half its rights, and be laid under a necessity of violating its duty to preserve the other half, is not the intention of the constitution.

But the gentleman from Connecticut has leaped over all this ground, and gotten into the House of Representatives, without considering the principles of the constitution, as applicable to the election of President and Vice President by Electors, and distinguishing them from an election by the House of Representatives. And by mingling and interweaving the two modes of electing together, a considerable degree of complexity has been produced. If, however, it is admitted that in an election of a President and Vice President by Electors, the will of the electing majority ought fairly to operate, and that an election by the will of a minority would be an abuse or corruption of the principles of the constitution, then it follows that an amendment, to avoid this abuse, accords with, and is necessary to save these principles. In like manner, had an abuse crept into the same election, whenever it was to be made under the federal principle by the House of Representatives, enabling a minority of States to carry the election, it would not have violated the intention of the constitution to have corrected this abuse, also, by an amendment. For, sir, I must suppose it to have been the intention of the constitution that both the federal principle and the popular principle should operate in those functions respectively assigned to them, perfectly and not imperfectly—that is, the former by a majority of States, and the latter by a majority of the people.

Under this view of the subject, the amendment ought to be considered. Then the question will be, whether it is calculated or not to cause the popular principle, applied by the constitution in the first instance, to operate perfectly, and to prevent the abuse of an election by a minority? If it is, it corresponds with the intention, diminishes nothing of the rights of the smaller States, and, of course, affords them no cause of jealousy.

Sir, it could never have been the intention of the constitution to produce a state of things by which a majority of the popular principle should be under the necessity of voting against its judgment to secure a President, and by which a minor faction should acquire a power capable of defeating the majority in the election of President, or of electing a Vice President contrary to the will of the electing principle. To permit this abuse would be a fraudulent mode of defeating the operation of the popular principle in this election, in order to transfer it to the federal principle—to disinherit the people for the sake of endowing the House of Representatives; whereas it was an accidental and not an artificial disappointment in the election of a President, against which the constitution intended to provide. A fair and not an unfair attempt to elect was previously to be made by the popular principle, before the election was to go into the House of Representatives. And if the people of all the States, both large and small, should, by an abuse of the real design of the constitution, be bubbled out of the election of executive power, by leaving to them the nominal right of an abortive effort, and transferring to the House of Representatives the substantial right of a real election, nothing will remain but to corrupt the election in that House by some of those abuses of which elections by diets are susceptible, to bestow upon executive power an aspect both formidable and inconsistent with the principles by which the constitution intended to mould it.

The great check imposed upon executive power was a popular mode of election; and the true object of jealousy, which ought to attract the attention of the people of every State, is any circumstance tending to diminish or destroy that check. It was also a primary intention of the constitution to keep executive power independent of legislative; and although a provision was made for its election by the House of Representatives in a possible case, that possible case never was intended to be converted into the active rule, so as to destroy in a degree the line of separation and independency between the executive and legislative power. The controversy is not therefore between larger and smaller States, but between the people of every State and the House of Representatives. Is it better that the people—a fair majority of the popular principle—should elect executive power; or, that a minor faction should be enabled to embarrass and defeat the judgment and will of this majority, and throw the election into the House of Representatives? This is the question. If this amendment should enable the popular principle to elect executive power, and thus keep it separate and distinct from legislation, the intention of the constitution, the interest of the people, and the principles of our policy, will be preserved; and if so, it is as I have often endeavored to prove in this debate, the interest of the smaller States themselves, that the amendment should prevail. For, sir, is an exposure of their Representatives to bribery and corruption (a thing which may possibly happen at some future day, when men lose that public virtue which now governs them) an acquisition more desirable than all those great objects best (if not exclusively) attainable by the election of executive power by the popular principle of the Federal Government, as the constitution itself meditates and prefers?

So far, then, the amendment strictly coincides with the constitution and with the interests of the people of every State in the Union. But suppose by some rare accident the election should still be sent into the House of Representatives, does not the amendment then afford cause of jealousy to the smaller States? Sir, each State has but one vote, whether it is large or small; and the President and Vice President are still to be chosen out of five persons. Such is the constitution in both respects now. To have enlarged the number of nominees, would have increased the occurrence of an election by the House of Representatives; and if, as I have endeavored to prove, it is for the interest of every State, that the election should be made by the popular principle of Government and not by that House, then it follows, that whatever would have a tendency to draw the election into that House, is against the interest of every State in the Union; and that every State in the Union is interested to avoid an enlargement of the nominees, if it would have such a tendency.

To illustrate this argument, I will repeat a position which I lately advanced, namely, that the substance of a constitution may be effectually destroyed, and yet its form may remain unaltered. England illustrates it. The Government of that country took its present form in the thirteenth century; but its aspect in substance has been extremely different at different periods, under the same form. Without taking time to mark the changes in substance which have taken place under the form of Kings, Lords, and Commons, it will suffice to cast our eyes upon the present state of that Government. What are now its chief and substantial energies? Armies, debt, executive patronage, penal laws, and corporations. These are the modern energies or substance of the English monarchy; to the ancient English monarchy they were unknown. Of the ancient, they were substantial abuses; for, whether these modern energies are good or bad, they overturned the ancient monarchy substantially, without altering its form. Under every change of Administration these abuses proceeded. The outs were clamorous for preserving the constitution, as they called it; for, though divorced from its administration, the hope of getting in again caused them to maintain abuses, by which their avarice or ambition might be gratified upon the next turn of the wheel; just as in Prussia, where divorces are common, nothing is more usual than for late husbands to affect a violent passion for a former wife, if she carried off from him a good estate! And the ins, fearing the national jealousy, and the prepossession against amending the form of Government, and meeting new abuses by new remedies, brought no relief to the nation. So that under every change of men abuses proceeded.

The solution of this effect exists in the species of political craft similar to priestcraft. Mankind were anciently deprived of their religious liberty by a dissemination of a fanatical zeal for some idol; in times of ignorance, this idol was of physical structure; and when that fraud was detected, a metaphysical idol in the shape of a tenet or dogma was substituted for it, infinitely more pernicious in its effects, because infinitely more difficult of detection. The same system has been pursued by political craft. It has ever labored to excite the same species of idolatry and superstition for the same reason, namely, to conceal its own frauds and vices. Sometimes it sets up a physical, at others a metaphysical idol, as the object of vulgar superstition. Of one, the former “Grand Monarch of France;” of the other, the present “Church and State” tenet of England is an evidence. And if our constitution is to be made like the “Church and State” tenet of England, a metaphysical political idol, which it will be sacrilege to amend, even for the sake of saving both that and the national liberty; and if, like that tenet, it is to be exposed to all the means which centuries may suggest to vicious men for its substantial destruction, it is not hard to imagine that it also may become a monument of the inefficacy of unalterable forms of political law to correct avarice and ambition in the new and multifarious shapes they are for ever assuming.

It has been urged, sir, by the gentlemen in opposition, in a mode, as if they supposed we wished to conceal or deny it, that one object of this amendment is to bestow upon the majority a power to elect a Vice President. Sir, I avow it to be so. This is one object of the amendment; and the other, as to which I have heretofore expressed my sentiments, is to enable the Electors, by perfecting the election of a President, to keep it out of the House of Representatives. Are not both objects correct, if, as I have endeavored to prove, the constitution, in all cases where it refers elections to the popular principle, intended that principle to act by majorities? Did the constitution intend that any minor faction should elect a Vice President? If not, then an amendment to prevent it accords with, and is representative of, the constitution. Permit me here again to illustrate by an historical case. England, in the time of Charles the Second, was divided into two parties—Protestants and Papists—and the heir to the throne was a Papist. The Protestants, constituting the majority of the nation, passed an exclusion bill, but it was defeated, and the minor Papist faction, in the person of the Duke of York, got possession of executive power. The consequences were, domestic oppressions and rebellions, foreign wars occasionally for almost a century, and the foundation of a national debt, under which the nation has been ever since groaning, and under which the Government will finally expire.

Had the majority carried and executed the proposed exclusion of James II. from executive power, the English would have escaped all these calamities. Such precisely may be our case. I beg again that it may be understood that, in this application, I speak prospectively and not retrospectively.

But it is far from being improbable, that in place of these religious parties, political parties may arise of equal zeal and animosity. We may at some future day see our country divided into a republican party and a monarchical party. Is it wise, or according to the intention of the constitution, that a minor monarchical faction should, by any means, acquire the power of electing a Vice President, the possible successor to executive power? Ought a republican majority to stake the national liberty upon the frail life of one man? Will not a monarchical Executive overturn the system of a republican Executive? And ought the United States to shut their eyes upon this possible danger until the case shall happen, when it may be too late to open them?

Sir, let us contemplate the dreadful evils which the English nation have suffered from the cause of investing executive power in a man hostile to the national opinion, and avoid them. They suffered, because their exclusion bill was abortive. Election is our exclusion bill. Its efficacy depends upon its being exercised by a majority. It is only a minority which can render election insufficient to exclude monarchical principles from executive power. It is against minority that election is intended to operate, because minority is the author of monarchy and aristocracy.

Shall we, sir, be so injudicious as to make election destroy the principle of election by adhering to a mode of exercising it, now seen to be capable of bestowing upon a minority the choice of a Vice President? Shall we make election, invented to exclude monarchy, a handmaid for its introduction? Or shall we, if we do not see monarchy at this day assailing our republican system, conclude that it never will; although we know that this system has but two foes, of whom monarchy is one? No, sir, let us rather draw instruction from the prophetic observations of a member of the English House of Commons, whilst the bill for excluding James II. was depending, who said:

“I hear a lion in the lobby roar,

Say, Mr. Speaker, shall we shut the door,

And keep him there! Or shall we let him in,

To try if we can get him out again!”

Instead of shutting the door, the English left it open; tyranny got in; and the evils produced by its expulsion, to that nation, may possibly have been equal to those which submission would have produced.

The question was called for loudly at half-past nine, and put—the yeas and nays being taken, were:

Yeas.—Messrs. Anderson, Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Condit, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Potter, Israel Smith, John Smith, Samuel Smith, Stone, Taylor, Worthington, and Wright—22.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Butler, Dayton, Hillhouse, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Tracy, Wells, and White—10.

Upon the President declaring the question carried by two-thirds—

Mr. Tracy said he denied that the question was fairly decided. He took it to be the intention of the constitution, that there should be two-thirds of the whole number of Senators elected, which would make the number necessary to its passage 23.

It was moved to adjourn to Monday.

Mr. Taylor said that since it was proposed to adjourn to Monday, when he should be disqualified to sit in that House, he hoped the Senate would not rise without deciding the question definitively on the gentleman’s objections.

Mr. Tracy said he certainly would avail himself of the principle to oppose its passage through the State Legislatures.

The President declared the question had passed the Senate by the majority required, and conformable to the constitution and former usage.

The amendment, as adopted, is as follows:

Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, two-thirds of both Houses concurring, That, in lieu of the third paragraph of the first section of the second article of the Constitution of the United States, the following be proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by three-fourths of the Legislatures of the several States, shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the said Constitution, to wit:

The Electors shall meet in their respective States and vote by ballot for President and Vice President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and, in distinct ballots, the person voted for as Vice President; and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes for the President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed: and if no person have such majority, then, from the persons having the highest numbers, not exceeding three, on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose, immediately, by ballot, the President. But, in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members, from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President, whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice President shall act as President, as in the case of death or any other constitutional disability of the President.

The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice President, shall be the Vice President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have a majority, then, from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President, shall be eligible to that of Vice President of the United States.

Ordered, That the Secretary request the concurrence of the House of Representatives in this resolution.

Monday, December 5.

Impressment of Seamen.

The following messages were received from the President of the United States:

To the Senate of the United States:

In compliance with the desire of the Senate, expressed in their resolution of the 22d of November, on the impressment of seamen in the service of the United States, by the agents of foreign nations; I now lay before the Senate a letter from the Secretary of State, with a specification of the cases of which information has been received.

TH. JEFFERSON.

Dec. 5, 1803.

Tripolitan Aggression.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

I have the satisfaction to inform you, that the act of hostility mentioned, in my message of the 4th of November, to have been committed by a cruiser of the Emperor of Morocco, on a vessel of the United States, has been disavowed by the Emperor. All differences in consequence thereof have been amicably adjusted, and the Treaty of 1796, between this country and that, has been recognized and confirmed by the Emperor, each party restoring to the other what had been detained or taken. I enclose the Emperor’s orders given on this occasion.

The conduct of our officers generally, who have had a part in these transactions, has merited entire approbation.

The temperate and correct course pursued by our Consul, Mr. Simpson, the promptitude and energy of Commodore Preble, the efficacious co-operation of Captains Rodgers and Campbell, of the returning squadron, the proper decision of Captain Bainbridge, that a vessel which had committed an open hostility, was of right to be detained for inquiry and consideration, and the general zeal of the other officers and men, are honorable facts, which I make known with pleasure. And to these I add, what was indeed transacted in another quarter, the gallant enterprise of Captain Rodgers, in destroying, on the coast of Tripoli, a corvette of that power, of 22 guns.

I recommend to the consideration of Congress, a just indemnification for the interest acquired by the captors of the Mishouda and Mirboha, yielded by them for the public accommodation.

TH. JEFFERSON.

Dec. 5, 1803.

The Messages and papers therein respectively referred to, were read.

Ordered, That they severally lie for consideration.

Wednesday, December 7.

Aaron Burr, Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate, attended.

John Armstrong, appointed a Senator by the Executive of the State of New York, in the room of De Witt Clinton, resigned, attended.

Thursday, December 8.

The credentials of Mr. Armstrong were read, and the oath was administered to him by the Vice President as the law provides.

Monday, December 12.

Amendment of the Constitution.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the last resolution reported by the committee appointed on the 22d of October last, to consider the motion for an amendment to the constitution in the mode of electing the President and Vice President of the United States; which is as follows:

“Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, two-thirds of both Houses concurring, That the following amendment be proposed to the Legislatures of the several States as an amendment to the constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by three-fourths of the said Legislature, shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the said Constitution, to wit;

“That no person who has been twice successively elected President of the United States shall be eligible as President until four years shall have elapsed: but any citizen who has been President of the United States may, after such intervention, be eligible to the office of President for four years and no longer.”

On the question to agree to this resolution, it passed in the negative—yeas 4, nays 25, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Anderson, Butler, Dayton, and Jackson.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Armstrong, Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Condit, Ellery, Franklin, Hillhouse, Logan, Maclay, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Potter, Israel Smith, John Smith, Samuel Smith, Tracy, White, Worthington, and Wright.

Tuesday, December 13.

Abraham B. Venable, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Virginia on the 7th instant, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the Senate.

Repeal of Bankrupt Act.

The bill, entitled, “An act to repeal an act, entitled ‘An act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States,’” was read the third time; and, on motion, that the further consideration of this bill be postponed to the second Monday in December next, it passed in the negative—yeas 13, nays, 17, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Adams, Armstrong, Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley, Brown, Condit, Jackson, Israel Smith, Samuel Smith, Tracy, White, and Wright.

Nays.—Messrs. Anderson, Breckenridge, Butler, Cocke, Dayton, Ellery, Franklin, Hillhouse, Logan, Maclay, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Potter, John Smith, Venable, and Worthington.

On the question, “Shall this bill pass?” it was determined in the affirmative—yeas 17, nays 12, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Anderson, Breckenridge, Butler, Cocke, Dayton, Ellery, Franklin, Hillhouse, Logan, Maclay, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Potter, John Smith, Venable, and Worthington.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Armstrong, Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley, Brown, Condit, Israel Smith, Samuel Smith, Tracy, White, and Wright.

So it was Resolved, That this bill do pass.[5]

Thursday, December 15.

Classification of Senators.

On motion, the Senate proceeded to ascertain the classes in which the Senators of the State of Ohio should be inserted, as the constitution and rule heretofore adopted prescribe; and it was ordered, that two lots, No. 2 and a blank, be by the Secretary rolled up and put in the ballot box; and it was understood that the Senator who should draw the lot No. 2 should be inserted in the class of Senators whose terms of service respectively expire in four years from and after the third day of March, 1803, in order to equalize the classes.

Accordingly, Mr. Worthington drew lot No. 2, and Mr. John Smith drew the blank.

It was then agreed that two lots, Nos. 1 and 3, should be by the Secretary rolled up and put into the ballot-box, and one of these be drawn by Mr. John Smith, the Senator from the State of Ohio, not classed; and it was understood that, if he should draw lot No. 1, he should be inserted in the class of Senators whose terms of service will respectively expire in two years from and after the third day of March, 1803; but, if he should draw lot No. 3, it was understood that he should be inserted in the class of Senators whose terms respectively expire in six years from and after the third day of March, 1803. Mr. John Smith drew lot No. 3, and is classed accordingly.

Friday, December 16.

Importation of Slaves.

The Senate took into consideration the motion made yesterday, that a committee be appointed to inquire whether any, and, if any, what amendments ought to be made in the act, entitled “An act to prevent the importation of certain persons into certain States, by the laws whereof their admission is prohibited,” and that the committee have leave to report by bill or otherwise; and the motion was adopted; and

Ordered, That Messrs. Franklin, Venable, and I. Smith, be this committee.

Monday, December 19.

Admissions on the Floor.

The Senate took into consideration the motion made on the 16th instant, that no person be admitted on the floor of the Senate Chamber except members of the House of Representatives, foreign ministers, and the Heads of Departments, unless introduced by a member of the Senate.

On motion, it was agreed to strike out the words “unless introduced by a member of the Senate;” and on motion, it was agreed to subjoin, after the word “Departments,” “and Judges of the Supreme and District Courts of the United States.”

On motion to insert after the word “States,” “and the ladies,” it passed in the negative—yeas 12, nays 16, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Anderson, Breckenridge, Brown, Dayton, Jackson, Maclay, Potter, I. Smith, S. Smith, Tracy, White, and Wright.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Armstrong, Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley, Cocke, Condit, Ellery, Franklin, Hillhouse, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, J. Smith, Venable, and Worthington.

On motion to insert after the word “States,” “the Governors and Councillors of the respective States, and the Representatives of the State Legislatures,” it passed in the negative—yeas 13, nays 15, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Bailey, Breckenridge, Dayton, Maclay, Potter, I. Smith, S. Smith, Tracy, Venable, Worthington, and Wright.

Nays.—Messrs. Armstrong, Baldwin, Bradley, Brown, Cocke, Condit, Ellery, Franklin, Hillhouse, Jackson, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, J. Smith, and White.

On motion to agree to the resolution amended as follows:

Resolved, That no person be admitted on the floor of the Senate Chamber, except members of the House of Representatives, foreign ministers, and Heads of Departments, and Judges of the Supreme and District Courts of the United States:

It was determined in the negative—yeas 7, nays 21, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Adams, Bailey, Condit, Dayton, Franklin, Jackson, and Wright.

Nays.—Messrs. Anderson, Armstrong, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Ellery, Hillhouse, Maclay, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Potter, I. Smith, S. Smith, Tracy, Venable, White, and Worthington.

Friday, December 30.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

Mr. Breckenridge, from the committee appointed, on the 5th instant, for that purpose, reported a bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof; and the bill was read, and ordered to the second reading.

Tuesday, January 3, 1804.

Erection of Contingent Fund.

The following Message was received from the President of the United States:

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

I now lay before the Congress the annual account of the fund established for defraying the contingent charges of Government. No occasion having arisen for making use of any part of it in the present year, the balance of eighteen thousand five hundred and sixty dollars, unexpended at the end of the last year, remains now in the Treasury.

TH. JEFFERSON.

Dec. 31, 1803.

The Message and account therein referred to were read, and ordered to lie on file.

Monday, January 16.

The Vice President communicated a letter of this date from the Hon. Theodorus Bailey, resigning his seat in the Senate; which was read, and

Ordered, That the Vice President be requested to notify the Executive of the State of New York accordingly.

Transfer of Louisiana.

The following Message was received from the President of the United States:

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

In execution of the act of the present session of Congress, for taking possession of Louisiana, as ceded to us by France, and for the temporary government thereof, Governor Claiborne, of the Mississippi Territory, and General Wilkinson, were appointed Commissioners to receive possession. They proceeded with such regular troops as had been assembled at Fort Adams, from the nearest posts, and with some militia of the Mississippi Territory, to New Orleans. To be prepared for any thing unexpected which might arise out of the transaction, a respectable body of militia was ordered to be in readiness in the States of Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, and a part of those of Tennessee was moved on to the Natchez. No occasion, however, arose for their services. Our Commissioners, on their arrival at New Orleans, found the province already delivered by the Commissioners of Spain to that of France, who delivered it over to them on the 20th day of December, as appears by their declaratory act accompanying this. Governor Claiborne being duly invested with the powers heretofore exercised by the Governor and Intendant of Louisiana, assumed the government on the same day, and, for the maintenance of law and order, immediately issued the proclamation and address now communicated.

On this important acquisition, so favorable to the immediate interests of our western citizens, so auspicious to the peace and security of the nation in general, which adds to our country territories so extensive and fertile, and to our citizens new brethren to partake of the blessings of freedom and self-government, I offer to Congress and our country my sincere congratulations.

TH. JEFFERSON.

January 16, 1804.

The Message and papers therein referred to were read.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof.

On motion to amend the fourth section of the bill, by inserting the following words at the end thereof:

“The Legislative Council, a majority of the whole number concurring therein, shall have power to elect, by ballot, a delegate to Congress, who shall have a seat in the House of Representatives, and shall have the right of debating, but not of voting:”

It passed in the negative—yeas 12, nays 18, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Anderson, Breckenridge, Cocke, Ellery, Logan, Nicholas, Potter, Israel Smith, John Smith, Samuel Smith, Venable, and Worthington.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Armstrong, Baldwin, Bradley, Brown, Condit, Dayton, Franklin, Hillhouse, Jackson, Maclay, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Stone, Tracy, Wells, and White.

On motion to strike out the fourth section of the bill, as follows:

“Sec. 4. The legislative powers shall be vested in the Governor, and in twenty-four of the most fit and discreet persons of the Territory, to be called the Legislative Council, who shall be selected annually by the Governor from among those holding real estate therein, and who shall have resided one year at least in the said Territory, and hold no office of profit under the Territory, or the United States. The Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the said Legislative Council, or of a majority of them, shall have power to alter, modify, or repeal, the laws which may be in force at the commencement of this act. Their legislative powers shall also extend to all the rightful subjects of legislation; but no law shall be valid which is inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, with the laws of Congress, or which shall lay any person under restraint, burden, or disability, on account of his religious opinions, declarations, or worship; in all which he shall be free to maintain his own, and not be burdened for those of another. The Governor shall publish throughout the said Territory all the laws which shall be made, and shall, from time to time, report the same to the President of the United States, to be laid before Congress; which, if disapproved of by Congress, shall thenceforth be of no force. The Governor or Legislative Council shall have no power over the primary disposal of the soil, nor to tax the lands of the United States, nor to interfere with the claims to land within the said Territory. The Governor shall convene, prorogue, and dissolve the Legislative Council whenever he may deem it expedient. It shall be his duty to obtain all the information in his power in relation to the customs, habits, and dispositions, of the inhabitants of the said Territory, and communicate the same, from time to time, to the President of the United States.”

It passed in the negative—yeas 12, nays 18, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Cocke, Hillhouse, Olcott, Plumer, Stone, Tracy, Venable, Wells, White, and Worthington.

Nays.—Messrs. Armstrong, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Condit, Dayton, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Pickering, Potter, Israel Smith, John Smith, and Samuel Smith.

Tuesday, January 17.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof; and on the question to amend the following clause of the fifth section:

“In all criminal prosecutions which are capital, the trial shall be by a jury of twelve good and lawful men of the vicinage,” by striking out the words “which are capital.”

It passed in the negative—yeas 11, nays 16, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Cocke, Logan, Maclay, Plumer, Stone, Tracy, Wells, White, and Worthington.

Nays.—Messrs. Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Condit, Dayton, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Nicholas, Olcott, Pickering, Potter, Israel Smith, John Smith, Samuel Smith, and Venable.

And after progress, on motion,

Ordered, That the consideration of this bill be further postponed.

After the adjournment of the High Court of Impeachments, the Senate adjourned.

Monday, January 23.

The Vice President being absent on account of the ill state of his health, the Senate proceeded to the election of a President pro tempore, as the constitution provides; and the ballots having been collected and counted, a majority thereof was for the Honorable John Brown, who was accordingly elected President of the Senate pro tempore.

Mr. Logan presented the memorial of the American Convention for promoting the abolition of slavery, and improving the condition of the African race, signed Matthew Franklin, president, praying that such laws may be enacted as shall prohibit the introduction of slaves into the Territory of Louisiana, lately ceded to the United States; and the petition was read.

Tuesday, January 24.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof; and on motion to strike out of the fourth section, from the word “annually,” line fourth, to the words “United States,” line seventh, the words, “by the Governor, from among those holding real estate therein, and who shall have resided one year, at least, in the said Territory, and hold no office of profit under the Territory or the United States,” for the purpose of inserting the words following:

“The Governor shall lay off and divide the territory aforesaid into twenty-four convenient districts, from each of which districts there shall be chosen, annually, by the housekeepers resident therein, two of the most fit and discreet persons, who shall also be residents therein and landholders, and holding no office of profit under the territorial government, or that of the United States, and make a return of their names to the Governor, out of which number the Governor shall select twenty-four, to wit, one from each district. But if any of the districts should refuse or neglect to make such appointment for one month after the time appointed by the Governor for making the said elections, he shall then have the power of selecting from each district, so refusing or neglecting, one fit person for the purposes aforesaid.”

On this, a division on the question was called for, and that it be taken on striking out.

Whereupon, the yeas and nays being required by one-fifth of the Senators present, on striking out, it passed in the negative—yeas 15, nays 14, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Breckenridge, Cocke, Condit, Hillhouse, Logan, Maclay, Plumer, John Smith, Stone, Tracy, Venable, and Worthington.

Nays.—Messrs. Armstrong, Baldwin, Bradley, Brown, Dayton, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Nicholas, Olcott, Pickering, Potter, Israel Smith, and Samuel Smith.

Thursday, January 26.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof; and a motion was made to amend the bill, by inserting the following as section eighth:

“That it shall not be lawful for any person or persons to import or bring into the said Territory, from any port or place without the limits of the United States, or to cause or procure to be so imported or brought, or knowingly to aid or assist in so importing or bringing any slave or slaves; and every person so offending, and being thereof convicted, before any court within the said Territory, having competent jurisdiction, shall forfeit and pay, for each and every slave so imported or brought, the sum of —— dollars, one moiety for the use of the United States, and the other moiety for the use of the person who shall sue for the same; and every slave so imported or brought shall thereupon become entitled to, and receive his or her freedom.”

Whereupon, a motion was made to amend the amendment by striking out, after the words “port or place,” the words “without the limits of the United States,” and insert in lieu thereof, “for sale.”

A division of the question was called for, and that it be taken on striking out; and, on the question, Shall the words be struck out? it passed in the negative,—yeas 6, nays 22, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Baldwin, Bradley, Ellery, Jackson, Israel Smith, and Samuel Smith.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Armstrong, Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Condit, Franklin, Hillhouse, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Potter, John Smith, Stone, Venable, Wells, White, and Worthington.

On motion to agree to the original amendment, it passed in the affirmative—yeas 21, nays 6, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Anderson, Armstrong, Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Condit, Franklin, Hillhouse, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Potter, John Smith, Stone, Venable, Wells, White, and Worthington.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Baldwin, Bradley, Ellery, Jackson, and Israel Smith.

Monday, January 30.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof; and a motion was made to amend the bill, by adding the following to the new section, adopted as section eighth:

“And be it further enacted, That no male person brought into said Territory of Louisiana, from any parts of the United States or Territories thereof, or from any province or colony of America belonging to any foreign Prince or State, after the —— day of —— next, ought or can be holden by law to serve for more than the term of one year, any person as a servant, slave, or apprentice, after he attains the age of twenty-one years; nor female in like manner, after she attains the age of eighteen years, unless they are bound by their own voluntary act, after they arrive to such age, or bound by law for the payment of debts, damages, fines, or costs: Provided, That no person held to service or labor in either of the States or Territories aforesaid, under the laws thereof, escaping into said Territory of Louisiana, shall, by any thing contained herein, he discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up in the manner prescribed by law.”

It passed in the negative—yeas 11, nays 17, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Bradley, Brown, Ellery, Hillhouse, Logan, Olcott, Plumer, Potter, Israel Smith, Wells, and Worthington.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Armstrong, Baldwin, Breckenridge, Cocke, Condit, Dayton, Franklin, Jackson, Maclay, Nicholas, Pickering, John Smith, Samuel Smith, Venable, and White.

A motion was made to amend the bill, by adding to the end of section eighth, last adopted, the following:

“That it shall not be lawful for any person or persons to import or bring into the said Territory, from any port or place within the limits of the United States, or cause to, or procure to be so imported or brought, or knowingly to aid or assist in so importing or bringing any slave or slaves, which shall have been imported since the —— day of —— into any port or place within the limits of the United States, from any port or place without the limits of the United States; and every person so offending and being thereof convicted, before any court within the said Territory having competent jurisdiction, shall forfeit and pay, for each and every such slave so imported or brought, the sum of —— dollars; one moiety for the use of the person or persons who shall sue for the same. And no slave or slaves shall directly or indirectly be introduced into said Territory, except by a person or persons removing into said territory for actual settlement, and being at the time of such removal bona fide owner of such slave or slaves; and every slave imported or brought into the said Territory, contrary to the provisions of this act, shall thereupon be entitled to and receive his or her freedom.”

And a division was called for, and that the question be taken on the first proposition, ending with the words, “sue for the same:” and, on the question to agree to this first division of the amendment, it passed in the affirmative—yeas 21, nays 7, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Anderson, Armstrong, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Franklin, Hillhouse, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Potter, I. Smith, John Smith, Venable, Wells, White, and Worthington.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Baldwin, Condit, Dayton, Ellery, Jackson, and Samuel Smith.

A motion was made to strike out all that follows the word “and,” in the second division of the amendment, for the purpose of a further amendment; and after debate, the consideration of the subject was postponed.

Tuesday, January 31.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof; and a motion was made to strike out the last division of the amendment proposed yesterday, to wit:

“And no slave or slaves shall, directly or indirectly, be introduced into said Territory except by a person or persons removing into said Territory for actual settlement, and being, at the time of such removal, bona fide owner of such slave or slaves; and every slave imported or brought into the said Territory, contrary to the provisions of this act, shall, thereupon, be entitled to, and receive, his or her freedom;” and to insert the following:

“No slave shall be admitted into the said Territory from the United States or their Territories, who shall not be the property of some person bona fide removing from the United States into the said Territory, and making an actual settlement therein, or who shall not have passed by descent or devise to the person or persons claiming the same, and residing within the said Territory, from some person or persons deceased in some one of the United States or their Territories; and every slave who shall be brought into said Territory, otherwise than is hereby permitted, shall be forfeited, and may be recovered by any person who shall sue for the same; and the person or persons offending herein shall moreover forfeit and pay —— dollars for every slave so brought in, to be recovered by action of debt in any court having jurisdiction thereof; one moiety to the use of the United States, and the other moiety to the use of the person who shall sue for the same. And in any action instituted for the recovery of the penalty aforesaid, the person or persons sued may be held to special bail:”

And a division on the question was called for, and that it be taken on striking out; and, on the question, Shall the words be stricken out? it passed in the negative—yeas 13, nays 15, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Anderson, Armstrong, Baldwin, Breckenridge, Cocke, Condit, Jackson, Nicholas, John Smith, Samuel Smith, Stone, Venable, and Wells.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Bradley, Brown, Ellery, Franklin, Hillhouse, Logan, Maclay, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Potter, Israel Smith, Worthington, and Wright.

Wednesday, February 1.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof; and on motion, to agree to the last division of the amendment proposed on the 30th ultimo, amended as follows:

“And no slave or slaves shall, directly or indirectly, be introduced into the said Territory except by a citizen of the United States, removing into said Territory for actual settlement, and being, at the time of such removal, bona fide owner of such slave or slaves; and every slave imported or brought into the said Territory, contrary to the provisions of this act, shall thereupon be entitled to, and receive, his or her freedom:”

It passed in the affirmative—yeas 18, nays 11, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Armstrong, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Condit, Franklin, Hillhouse, Logan, Maclay, Olcott, Plumer, Potter, S. Smith, Wells, White, Worthington, and Wright.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Baldwin, Dayton, Ellery, Jackson, Nicholas, Pickering, J. Smith, Stone, and Venable.

Thursday, February 2.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and making provision for the temporary government thereof; and on motion to strike out the eighth section of the original bill, amended as follows:

“Sec. 8. The residue of the province of Louisiana, ceded to the United States, shall remain under the same name and form of government as heretofore, save only that the executive and judicial powers exercised by the former government of the province shall now be transferred to a Governor, to be appointed by the President of the United States: and that the powers exercised by the commandant of a post or district shall be hereafter vested in a civil officer, to be appointed by the President in the recess of the Senate, but to be nominated at the next meeting thereof for their advice and consent; under the orders of which commandant the officers, troops, and militia of his station shall be; who, in cases where the military have been used, under the laws heretofore existing, shall act by written orders and not in person; and the salary of the said officers, respectively, shall not exceed the rate of —— dollars per annum. The President of the United States, however, may unite the districts of two or more commandants of posts into one, where their proximity or ease of intercourse will permit without injury to the inhabitants thereof. The Governor shall receive an annual salary of —— dollars, payable quarter-yearly at the Treasury of the United States:”

It passed in the affirmative—yeas 16, nays 9, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Armstrong, Breckenridge, Cocke, Condit, Franklin, Hillhouse, Maclay, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, J. Smith, Stone, Venable, and Worthington.

Nays.—Messrs. Baldwin, Brown, Dayton, Ellery, Jackson, Nicholas, Potter, S. Smith, and Wright.

Tuesday, February 7.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and making provision for the temporary government thereof, and agreed to sundry amendments; and on motion to agree to a further amendment, as follows:

“Sec. 7. All free male white persons, who are housekeepers, and who shall have resided one year at least in the said Territory, shall be qualified to serve as grand or petit jurors in the courts of the said Territory; and they shall, until the Legislature thereof shall otherwise direct, be selected in such manner as the judges of the said courts, respectively, shall prescribe, so as to be most conducive to an impartial trial, and to be least burdensome to the inhabitants of the said Territory:”

A motion was made to strike out from the beginning, to the words “and they,” inclusive, for the purpose of inserting, “persons to serve as grand and petit jurors in the courts of the said Territory.”

A division of the question was called for, and that it first be taken on striking out; and on the question, Shall these words be struck out? it was passed in the negative—yeas 10, nays 18, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Adams, Bradley, Brown, Hillhouse, Logan, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, John Smith, and Stone.

Nays.—Messrs. Anderson, Armstrong, Breckenridge, Baldwin, Cocke, Condit, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Maclay, Nicholas, Potter, Samuel Smith, Sumter, Venable, Wells, Worthington, and Wright.

On the question to agree to the original motion, it passed in the affirmative—yeas 21, nays 7, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Anderson, Armstrong, Breckenridge, Baldwin, Cocke, Condit, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Potter, Samuel Smith, Stone, Sumter, Venable, Wells, Worthington, and Wright.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Bradley, Hillhouse, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, and John Smith.

Friday, February 17.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the third reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and making provision for the temporary government thereof; and on motion to amend the bill, by striking out of section 10th, the words:

“And no slave or slaves shall, directly or indirectly, be introduced into said Territory, except by a citizen of the United States removing into said Territory for actual settlement, and being at the time of such removal bona fide owner of such slave or slaves:”

It passed in the negative—yeas 9, nays 19, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Anderson, Baldwin, Cocke, Dayton, Nicholas, John Smith, Stone, Venable, and Wright.

Nays.—Messrs. Armstrong, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Condit, Ellery, Franklin, Hillhouse, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Olcott, Plumer, Potter, Israel Smith, Samuel Smith, Sumter, Wells, and White.

On motion to expunge from the same section, after the word “slaves,” the words “and every slave imported or brought into said Territory, contrary to the provisions of this act, shall thereupon be entitled to and receive his or her freedom:”

It passed in the negative—yeas 11, nays 17, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Anderson, Armstrong, Baldwin, Breckenridge, Cocke, Dayton, Jackson, Nicholas, Stone, Sumter, and Venable.

Nays.—Messrs. Bradley, Brown, Condit, Ellery, Franklin, Hillhouse, Logan, Maclay, Olcott, Plumer, Potter, Israel Smith, John Smith, Samuel Smith, Wells, White, and Wright.

On motion to insert, in the same section, line 3d, after the word “States,” the words “or from any State authorizing the importation of slaves from any foreign port or place:”

It passed in the negative—yeas 8, nays 13, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Brown, Hillhouse, Logan, Olcott, Plumer, John Smith, White, and Wright.

Nays.—Messrs. Anderson, Armstrong, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Cocke, Condit, Dayton, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Maclay, Nicholas, Potter, Israel Smith, Samuel Smith, Sumter, and Venable.

And having further amended the bill, and filled the blanks, it was agreed that the question on its final passage be postponed until to-morrow.

Saturday, February 18.

Erection of Louisiana into two Territories.

The Senate resumed the third reading of the bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and making provision for the temporary government thereof; and on the question to agree to the final passage of this bill, it was determined in the affirmative—yeas 20, nays 5, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Anderson, Armstrong, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Condit, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Potter, John Smith, Samuel Smith, Sumter, Venable, and Wright.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Hillhouse, Olcott, Plumer, and Stone.

So it was Resolved, That this bill pass, that it be engrossed, and that the title thereof be “An act erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and making provision for the temporary government thereof.”[6]

Thursday, February 23.

John Smith, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of New York, in the room of De Witt Clinton, took his seat in the Senate, and his credentials were read, and the oath prescribed by law was administered to him by the President.

Friday, February 24.

Agreeably to the resolution of yesterday, the Senate proceeded to elect a doorkeeper, or assistant to James Mathers, Sergeant-at-Arms; and Henry Timms was appointed.

Saturday, February 25.

John Armstrong, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of New York, in the room of Theodorus Bailey, took his seat in the Senate, and his credentials were read, and the oath prescribed by law was administered to him by the President.

Saturday, March 10.

Election of President of the Senate, pro tem.

The Vice President being absent, the Senate proceeded to the election of a President pro tempore, as the constitution prescribes, and the ballots having been collected and counted, a majority thereof was for the Honorable Jesse Franklin, who was accordingly elected President of the Senate pro tempore.

Ordered, That the Secretary wait on the President of the United States, and acquaint him that the Senate have, in the absence of the Vice President, elected the honorable Jesse Franklin President of the Senate pro tempore.

Ordered, That the Secretary make a like communication to the House of Representatives.

Tuesday, March 13.

Impeachment of Judge Chase.

A message from the House of Representatives, by Messrs. J. Randolph and Early, two of their members, was received, as follows:

“Mr. President: We are ordered, in the name of the House of Representatives and of all the People of the United States, to impeach Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors; and to acquaint the Senate that the House of Representatives will, in due time, exhibit particular articles of impeachment against him, and make good the same.

“We are also ordered to demand that the Senate take order for the appearance of the said Samuel Chase, to answer to the said impeachment.”

Turnpike Road to the Ohio.

The Senate took into consideration the amendment reported by the committee to the bill, entitled “An act authorizing the appointment of Commissioners to explore the routes most eligible for opening certain public roads;” and on the question to agree to the said amendment, as follows:

Strike out, in the first section, after the word “proceed,” in the fourth line, to the word “and,” in the seventh line, and insert, “to explore and designate the most eligible route for a turnpike road, to lead from Fort Cumberland, on the Potomac, to Wheeling, on the Ohio.”

It passed in the negative—yeas 13, nays 15, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Anderson, Breckenridge, Cocke, Dayton, Franklin, Pickering, Israel Smith, John Smith of Ohio, Samuel Smith, Stone, Sumter, Worthington, and Wright.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Armstrong, Baldwin, Bradley, Ellery, Hillhouse, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Olcott, Plumer, John Smith of New York, Venable, and White.

Ordered, That the bill be recommitted, and that Messrs. Nicholas, Worthington, and Dayton be the committee further to consider and report thereon to the Senate.

Wednesday, March 14.

Impeachment of Judge Chase.

Mr. Baldwin, from the committee to whom yesterday was referred the message from the House of Representatives relative to the impeachment of Samuel Chase, made report; which was read and adopted, as follows:

“Whereas, the House of Representatives, on the 13th day of the present month, by two of their members, Messrs. John Randolph and Early, at the bar of the Senate, impeached Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors, and acquainted the Senate that the House of Representatives will, in due time, exhibit particular articles of impeachment against him, and make good the same;

“And likewise demanded that the Senate take order for the appearance of the said Samuel Chase to answer to the said impeachment. Therefore,

“Resolved, That the Senate will take proper order thereon, of which due notice shall be given to the House of Representatives.”

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Senate notify the House of this resolution.

Monday, March 19.

Post Roads in States.

The Senate resumed the third reading of the bill, entitled “An act to alter and establish certain post roads.”

On motion, to add the following after section third:

“And be it further enacted, That two post roads shall be laid out, under the inspection of commissioners to be appointed by the President of the United States, one to lead from Tellico block-house, in the State of Tennessee, and the other from Jackson court-house, in the State of Georgia, by routes the most eligible, and as nearly direct as the nature of the ground will admit, to New Orleans.”

It passed in the affirmative—yeas 17, nays 10, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Anderson, Armstrong, Baldwin, Breckenridge, Cocke, Dayton, Franklin, Jackson, Maclay, Nicholas, John Smith of Ohio, John Smith of New York, Samuel Smith, Stone, Sumter, Venable, and Worthington.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Bradley, Hillhouse, Logan, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Israel Smith, Tracy, and White.

And, sundry other amendments having been agreed to,

Resolved, That this bill do pass as amended.

Seat of Government.

The bill for the temporary removal of the seat of Government of the United States to the city of Baltimore was taken up for its second reading.

[The debate which took place on this occasion, had progressed to some length before the reporter entered the House. Mr. Wright was then on the floor, and had made a motion to postpone the further consideration of the bill until the first Monday in May.]

Mr. W. assigned as reasons for this motion, that it was not his intention in presenting the bill, that it should pass; but that it had been offered with the view of acting as a spur to the inhabitants of Washington to effect a more complete accommodation of Congress. He trusted and believed it would have that effect; and the operation of the postponement would, by hanging the bill over their heads, most powerfully tend to produce the desirable result of a concentration of the city, and an augmentation of accommodation.

Mr. Jackson followed, and, in terms of appropriate energy, condemned the proposition of removal. He said he should not have believed, but for the express declaration of the gentleman from Maryland, that he would have brought forward a bill the sole object of which was to frighten the women and children of Washington. So far from the measure having the desired effect avowed by the gentleman, if it had any effect whatever, it would be to shake all confidence in the Government, to repress the very accommodation desired.

Mr. J. denied the moral right of Congress to remove the seat of Government; it had been fixed under the constitution, and without its violation could not be changed.

Such a measure would indicate a prostration of plighted faith; would destroy all confidence in the Government, from one end of the continent to the other.

Gentlemen, in favor of this measure, should know its cost. Already had the present seat of Government, in its origination and consequences, cost the nation the assumption of the State debts to the amount of twenty-one millions, and between one and two millions for public accommodation. Would gentlemen be willing not only to lose all that had been expended, but likewise to indemnify the proprietors in the city, whose assessed property amounted to two and a half millions of dollars, and the proprietors of property in the whole District, the amount of which he was unable to state?

Mr. J. concluded by saying, he should vote against the postponement, under the expectation that the Senate would take up the bill and reject it by a majority so great, that no similar proposition should ever again be brought before them.

Mr. Anderson declared himself hostile to the postponement, as he was in favor of the passage of the bill, under certain modifications. He considered Congress possessed the constitutional power of altering the seat of Government; and he believed, from an experience of the inconveniences attending the existing seat, it was their duty to change it. He allowed that, in such an event, an obligation would arise to indemnify the proprietors for the losses they would thereby sustain. This, however, he considered the lesser evil; as the sum required to make an indemnity would be less than that required for the improvements contemplated, and which are necessary to accommodate the Government.

Mr. Cocke declared himself decidedly inimical to the bill. The permanent seat of Government was fixed under the constitution, and the power did not belong to Congress to alter it.

Mr. Adams strenuously contended against the right of Congress to remove the seat of Government. To do so, would be to prostrate the national faith, and to shake the confidence of the nation in the Government. He considered the proposed measure as inexpedient as it was unconstitutional; as it tended directly to defeat the object of the mover.

Mr. S. Smith said, he should vote in favor of the postponement, because he believed, if the bill were not postponed, it would consume more time than could, at this late period of the session, be spared, without a serious neglect of important business before Congress. He expressed his regret at its introduction.

The question was then taken on the motion of postponement, and decided in the negative—yeas 3, nays 24, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. I. Smith, S. Smith, and Wright.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Armstrong, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Cocke, Dayton, Franklin, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, John Smith of Ohio, John Smith of New York, Stone, Sumter, Tracy, Venable, White, and Worthington.

The bill was then read a second time.

Mr. Dayton said, he had been instructed by the Legislature of New Jersey, in case any prospect presented itself of a removal of the seat of Government, to offer, in their name, the public buildings in Trenton for their accommodation. He, therefore, gave notice that, in case the bill went to a third reading, he should produce his instructions, and move the substitution of Trenton in the room of Baltimore. At the same time, he was free to declare his opinion of the impolicy of the proposed measure. The provision of the constitution had arisen from an experience of the necessity of establishing a permanent seat for the Government. To avert the evils arising from a perpetual state of mutation, and from the agitation of the public mind whenever it is discussed, the constitution had wisely provided for the establishment of a permanent seat, vesting in Congress exclusive legislation over it. While he declared this as his creed, he begged it to be understood that there were, in his opinion, some rightful grounds of removal. There were four such, two of which were the following: if the place should be found a grave-yard for those who resided in it, or if the inconveniences of conducting the machine of government should be so great as to prevent the due transaction of the public business. For the existence of these, no fault could be attached to the District. If, therefore, a removal took place on their account, Congress were bound to indemnify the proprietors. There were two other grounds of removal, which would justify a removal without indemnity, as they would be the effect of the misconduct of the inhabitants of the District. These were, the evidence of a turbulent spirit, endangering the safety of Congress, and of a determined resolution, arising from a dissatisfaction which the Government or Congress expressed in favor of a recession.

When he stated these grounds for removal, Mr. D. said, it was not from any apprehension of their occurrence. On the contrary, he believed the Government in perfect safety, and he was convinced, if any hostile arm should be raised against it, the inhabitants of Columbia would be ready to shed their blood in its defence.

Nothing could exceed his surprise at the motives expressed by the gentleman from Maryland for bringing forward this measure. He should have expected, if the gentleman wished to promote the interests of the city, he would have imitated the example of the Athenians, who, in order to make a particular fund devoted to theatrical exhibitions sacred, had passed a law punishing with death any man who should move to divert it from its allotted purpose; and that the honorable gentleman, instead of bringing forward this bill, would have introduced one punishing with death the man who should move a change of the seat of Government; so that he who made the attempt might know that he did it with a halter around his neck.

Mr. Maclay moved to strike out the words “Baltimore,” and “Maryland,” in the first section.

Motion agreed to—ayes 14, noes 10.

Mr. M. then observed, that he would concisely state the ideas which influenced him on this subject. For the existing inconveniences of this place, and the want of accommodation to which Congress was exposed, he did not consider the inhabitants of Washington in the least to blame. The causes from which these flowed, it was not in their power to control. They arose, in a great measure, from the city being surrounded by seats of trade, which naturally repressed its rise here. Those inconveniences were, he believed, of a nature not to be cured by time, and, if there was no constitutional obstacle, it would be the best policy to remove immediately. He contended that no constitutional obstacle did exist. On the contrary, he was of opinion that it was the duty of the Legislature, in case the public good required it, to remove the seat of Government. He believed that this place would not long remain the seat. The members of the Government will become tired of remaining here, when they are convinced that the inconveniences which they experience will not promote the advantage even of their posterity. The single question then is, whether less inconvenience will be produced by an immediate or a protracted removal. He was clearly of opinion that the inconvenience of removing, at this time, would be less than at a future day. He concluded by saying, that he should not, himself, have brought forward this measure at the present time. He would have waited for more conclusive proofs of the insuperable inconveniences attending a residence at this place, when opinions, at present variant, would be more united.

Mr. Jackson said, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Maclay) had picked a hole in the bill, and what effect it would produce, he could not pretend to say. If the word “Baltimore” had been suffered to remain, it would have been rejected by a large majority.

Mr. J. then went at some length into a view of the unconstitutionality of a removal, and the happy situation of Washington for the seat of the Government. He said that he was far from being friendly, in the first instance, to this measure, which might be called the hobby-horse of, perhaps, the most illustrious man that ever lived. But, once adopted, it became sacred in his eyes; and nothing short of an act of God, in the shape of an earthquake, a plague, or some other fatal scourge, would justify a removal; and, he trusted, that unless some such act occurred, this would be the last time the measure was proposed.

The time would come, though he hoped to God neither his children nor his children’s children would live to see it, when the population on this side of the Mississippi would pass that river, and when the seat of Government would be translated to its banks. Centuries would, however, elapse before that period arrived.

Mr. Anderson said, there was no such word in the constitution as “permanent,” applied to the seat of Government; nor did the constitution prohibit the removal of it when the public interest should require it. Believing that such would be the experience of the inconveniences of the place, that Congress would certainly remove within five years, he was for taking that step now. The ill accommodation of the place was manifest to every man; nor did he believe that time would cure the evil. Such losses, however, as should be sustained by the proprietors, he was ready to remunerate. This was the least expensive course which could be pursued, as to make the necessary improvements in this place will require at least the annual sum of fifty thousand dollars for twenty years to come, and at least thirty thousand dollars a year to keep the public buildings in a state of repair. In addition to this immense expense was to be added, the great loss of time which arose from the inconvenient arrangements of the place, and the consequent expenditure of public money. For these reasons, Mr. A. said, he should give a decided vote in favor of the bill.

Mr. Jackson remarked, that the gentleman from Tennessee ought, in forming his opinion of the constitutionality of removing the seat of Government, to attend as well to the laws passed by Congress on the subject, as to the provisions of the constitution itself. [Mr. J. here read the article of the constitution on the subject.] He said that, according to the rigid construction of this provision, it excluded altogether a temporary seat, after this part of the constitution was carried into effect. Under this constitutional provision, Congress passed an act on the 6th of July, 1790, not more than a year and a half after the first meeting of the Legislature, and when many of the members of that body had been members of the convention, and might, therefore, be presumed to be the best acquainted with the true meaning of the constitution. This act fixed a temporary and a permanent seat of Government. [Mr. J. read it.] He then asked, can any thing be more clear and explicit? Does it not show, in terms of unequivocal meaning, that it was the opinion of the men best qualified to decide, that the seat of Government, once fixed under the provision of the constitution, must be permanent? It was not then imagined that the Government ought to be travelling about from post to pillar, according to the prevalence of this or that party or faction. All the ideas of that day were hostile to this wheelbarrow kind of Government.

Mr. Wright contended that, while the constitution had sacredly and irrevocably fixed the permanent seat of Government in this place, Congress might make some other place the temporary seat.

Mr. Anderson said, that all that the law passed by Congress proved was, that Congress, and not the constitution, had declared this place the permanent seat. This law, like other laws, was subject to repeal.

Mr. Adams wished, on this subject, to be explicit. He asked what was the meaning of the article of the constitution on this point, and all the laws of Congress passed under it? From the formation of the constitution until the removal of the Government to this place, but one sentiment had existed, which was, that the seat of the Government once fixed under the constitution, became the permanent seat. As to the idea of the gentleman from Maryland, who says this is the permanent seat while Congress are going from one place to another, he could not understand it. The constitution says, the place fixed on by Congress, on the cession of jurisdiction by the States, shall be the seat of Government. The idea of a temporary seat implies, necessarily, two seats of Government. But the expression in the constitution is “seat,” and that implies only one seat. The reason of this provision of the constitution is obvious. As the gentleman from Georgia has very justly observed, the Government had been driven from post to pillar. The question, what place should be the seat of Government, had never presented itself without enkindling violent feelings; and it was supposed that the question would continue to distract our public councils, until some permanent seat of Government was fixed. To carry this into effect, the constitution interposed, and said, ten miles square shall be given to Congress, where their power shall be sovereign, and that shall be the seat of Government. Why give this exclusive legislation, if their residence is not to be permanent? Would it not be the acme of the ridiculous, for Congress to go to Philadelphia, and still continue to exercise exclusive legislation here? Let us now turn to the acts of Congress, and the proceedings had under them. [Mr. A. here read the act of Congress fixing the seat of Government.] It will appear that it was the intention of Congress that this should be the permanent seat of the Government, from the public buildings erected. Thus much as to the understanding of the Government. Now, as to the meaning of Maryland and Virginia, who gave up the territory, and also gave considerable sums of money for its improvement. Could this have possibly been done under the contemplation that Congress would come here, and, after staying three or four years, run off to different quarters of the Union?

Now then, after this uniform opinion, entertained by Congress, by the States of Maryland and Virginia, and by every man who has expressed an opinion on the subject, until within a few years past, are we to be told that it is possible to give a different construction to the constitution? If any thing can fix a meaning to words, every thing which has occurred to this day, unites to decide this the permanent seat of the Government. These, said Mr. A., are my ideas. On the ground of expediency, if it were admitted as applicable to the present question, I would not undertake to say whether this is the most proper place for the residence of the Government. Nor will I say that Congress could not, consistently, remove in consequence of an act of God; that implies force, to which all human institutions must give way. But, say gentlemen, if we remove, we must indemnify the proprietors. But why indemnify if the constitution does not make this the permanent seat of Government, as it has been understood to be by every body until this day? Where is the propriety of indemnifying the holders of property here, if this is not the permanent seat, more than proprietors in Philadelphia or New York, where Congress formerly met? This very argument, urged by the advocates of the bill, shows that the constitution has made this the permanent seat. As to the idea of some gentlemen, of granting millions for an indemnity, the thing is impossible; it cannot be done; the people will not suffer it.

Mr. Dayton replied to some of the remarks made in the course of the debate, principally for the purpose of explaining his previous observations.

When the question was taken, on ordering the bill to a third reading, and passed in the negative—yeas 9, nays 19, as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Anderson, Armstrong, Breckenridge, Bradley, Maclay, Plumer, Stone, Tracy, and Worthington.

Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Baldwin, Cocke, Dayton, Franklin, Hillhouse, Jackson, Logan, Nicholas, Olcott, Pickering, I. Smith, S. Smith, J. Smith of Ohio, J. Smith of New York, Sumter, Venable, White, and Wright.

So the bill was lost.

Tuesday, March 20.

Wreck and Capture of the Frigate Philadelphia.

The following Message was received from the President of the United States:

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

I communicate to Congress a letter from Captain Bainbridge, commander of the Philadelphia frigate, informing us of the wreck of that vessel on the coast of Tripoli, and that himself, his officers, and men, had fallen into the hands of the Tripolitans. This accident renders it expedient to increase our force and enlarge our expenses in the Mediterranean beyond what the last appropriation contemplated. I recommend, therefore, to the consideration of Congress, such an addition to that appropriation as they may think the exigency requires.

TH. JEFFERSON.

March 20, 1804.

The Message and papers therein referred to were read, and ordered to lie for consideration.

Tuesday, March 27.

Adjournment.

A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate that the House, having finished the business before them, are about to adjourn to the first Monday in November next.

The President then adjourned the Senate to the first Monday in November next.

EIGHTH CONGRESS.—FIRST SESSION.
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES.

New Hampshire.—Silas Betton, Clifton Claggett, David Hough, Samuel Hunt, Samuel Tenney.

Vermont.—William Chamberlain, M. Chittenden, James Elliot, Gideon Olin.

Massachusetts.—Phanuel Bishop, Jacob Crowninshield, Manasseh Cutler, Richard Cutts, Thomas Dwight, William Eustis, Seth Hastings, Simeon Larned, Silas Lee, Nahum Mitchell, Eben. Seaver, Tompson J. Skinner, William Stedman, Samuel Taggart, Samuel Thatcher, Joseph B. Varnum, P. Wadsworth, Lemuel Williams.

Rhode Island.—Nehemiah Knight, Joseph Stanton.

Connecticut.—Simeon Baldwin, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, Calvin Goddard, Roger Griswold, John C. Smith, Benjamin Tallmadge.

New York.—George Clinton, George Griswold, Josiah Hasbrouck, H. W. Livingston, Andrew McCord, Samuel L. Mitchill, Beriah Palmer, John Patterson, Oliver Phelps, Samuel Riker, Erastus Root, Peter Sailly, Thomas Sammons, Joshua Sands, David Thomas, George Tibbits, Philip Van Cortlandt, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Daniel C. Verplanck.

New Jersey.—Adam Boyd, Ebenezer Elmer, William Helms, James Mott, James Sloan, Henry Southard.

Pennsylvania.—Isaac Anderson, David Bard, Robt. Brown, Thomas Bonde, Joseph Clay, Frederick Conrad, Wm. Findlay, Andrew Gregg, John A. Hanna, Joseph Heister, John Hoge, Michael Leib, John B. Lucas, Jno. Rea, Jacob Richards, John Smilie, John Stewart, Isaac Van Horne, John Whitehill.

Delaware.—Cæsar A. Rodney.

Maryland.—John Archer, Walter Bowie, John Campbell, John Dennis, William McCreery, Nicholas E. Moore, Joseph H. Nicholson, Thomas Plater.

Virginia.—Thomas Claiborne, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, John Dawson, John W. Eppes, Edwin Gray, Thomas Griffin, David Holmes, John Geo. Jackson, Walter Jones, Joseph Lewis, Andrew Moore, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, John Randolph, Thomas M. Randolph, John Smith, James Stephenson, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, Alexander Wilson.

North Carolina.—N. Alexander, Willis Alston, jr., Wm. S. Blackledge, James Gillespie, James Holland, William Kennedy, Nathaniel Macon, Samuel D. Purviance, Richard Stanford, Marmaduke Williams, Joseph Winston, Thomas Wynns.

South Carolina.—William Butler, Levi Casey, John B. Earle, Wade Hampton, Benjamin Huger, Thomas Lowndes, Thomas Moore, Richard Wynn.

Georgia.—Joseph Bryan, Peter Early, Samuel Hammond, Daniel Meriwether.

Mississippi.—William Lattimore.

Tennessee.—G. W. Campbell, Wm. Dickson, John Rhea.

Kentucky.—Geo. M. Bedinger, John Boyle, John Fowler, Matthew Lyon, Thomas Sanford, Matthew Walton.

Ohio.—Jeremiah Morrow.

Monday, October 17, 1803.

This being the day appointed by a Proclamation of the President of the United States, of the sixteenth of July last, for the meeting of Congress, the following members of the House of Representatives appeared, produced their credentials, and took their seats, to wit:

From New Hampshire—Silas Betton, Clifton Claggett, David Hough, Samuel Hunt, and Samuel Tenney.

From Massachusetts—Phanuel Bishop, Manasseh Cutler, Jacob Crowninshield, Richard Cutts, Thomas Dwight, William Eustis, Seth Hastings, Nahum Mitchell, Ebenezer Seaver, William Stedman, Samuel Taggart, Joseph B. Varnum, Peleg Wadsworth, and Lemuel Williams.

From Rhode Island—Nehemiah Knight, and Joseph Stanton.

From Connecticut—Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, Calvin Goddard, Roger Griswold, and John C. Smith.

From Vermont—William Chamberlin, Martin Chittenden, James Elliot, and Gideon Olin.

From New York—Gaylord Griswold, Josiah Hasbrouck, Henry W. Livingston, Andrew McCord, Samuel L. Mitchill, Beriah Palmer, Thomas Sammons, Joshua Sands, David Thomas, Philip Van Cortlandt, and Daniel C. Verplanck.

From Pennsylvania—Isaac Anderson, David Bard, Robert Brown, Joseph Clay, Frederick Conrad, William Findlay, Andrew Gregg, John A. Hanna, Joseph Heister, William Hoge, Michael Leib, John Rea, Jacob Richards, John Smilie, John Stewart, Isaac Van Horne, and John Whitehill.

From Delaware—Cæsar A. Rodney.

From Maryland—John Campbell, Wm. McCreery, Nicholas R. Moore, Joseph H. Nicholson, and Thomas Plater.

From Virginia—Thomas Claiborne, Matthew Clay, John Dawson, John W. Eppes, Peterson Goodwyn, Edwin Gray, Thomas Griffin, David Holmes, John G. Jackson, Walter Jones, Joseph Lewis, jun., Thomas Lewis, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, jun., John Randolph, jun., Thomas M. Randolph, John Smith, James Stephenson, and Philip R. Thompson.

From Kentucky—George Michael Bedinger, John Boyle, John Fowler, Matthew Lyon, Thomas Sanford, and Matthew Walton.

From North Carolina—Nathaniel Alexander, Willis Alston, jun., William Blackledge, James Holland, William Kennedy, Nathaniel Macon, Richard Stanford, Marmaduke Williams, Joseph Winston, and Thomas Wynns.

From Tennessee—George Washington Campbell, William Dickson, and John Rhea.

From South Carolina—William Butler, Levi Casey, John Earle, Wade Hampton, Benjamin Huger, Thomas Moore, and Richard Winn.

From Ohio—Jeremiah Morrow.

And a quorum, consisting of a majority of the whole number, being present, the House proceeded, by ballot, to the choice of a Speaker; and upon examining the ballots, a majority of the votes of the whole House was found to be in favor of Nathaniel Macon, one of the Representatives from the State of North Carolina: Whereupon, Mr. Macon was conducted to the chair, from whence he made his acknowledgments to the House, as follows:

“Gentlemen: Accept my unfeigned thanks for the honor which you have conferred on me. The task which you have assigned me will be undertaken with great diffidence, but my utmost endeavors shall be exerted to discharge the duties of the Chair with fidelity. In executing the rules and orders of the House, I shall rely with confidence on the liberal and candid support of the House.”

The House proceeded, in the same manner, to the appointment of a Clerk; and upon examining the ballots, a majority of the votes of the whole House was found in favor of John Beckley.

The oath to support the Constitution of the United States, as prescribed by the act entitled “An act to regulate the time and manner of administering certain oaths,” was administered by Mr. Nicholson, one of the Representatives from the State of Maryland, to the Speaker; and then the same oath or affirmation was administered by Mr. Speaker to all the members present.

William Lattimore having also appeared, as the Delegate from the Mississippi Territory, the said oath was administered to him by the Speaker.

The same oath, together with the oath of office prescribed by the said recited act, was also administered by Mr. Speaker to the Clerk.

Ordered, That a message be sent to the Senate, to inform them that a quorum of this House is assembled, and have elected Nathaniel Macon, one of the Representatives for North Carolina, their Speaker; and that the Clerk of this House do go with the said message.

A message from the Senate informed the House that a quorum of the Senate is assembled, and ready to proceed to business; and that, in the absence of the Vice President of the United States, the Senate have elected the Honorable John Brown their President, pro tempore.

Resolved, That Mr. J. Randolph, jun., Mr. R. Griswold, and Mr. Nicholson, be appointed a committee on the part of this House, jointly, with such committee as may be appointed on the part of the Senate, to wait on the President of the United States, and inform him that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled, and ready to receive any communications he may be pleased to make to them.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate have appointed a committee on their part, jointly, with the committee appointed on the part of this House, to wait on the President of the United States, and inform him that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled, and ready to receive any communications he may be pleased to make to them.

Resolved, That unless otherwise ordered, the daily hour to which the House shall stand adjourned, during the present session, be eleven o’clock in the forenoon.

Mr. John Randolph, Jr., from the joint committee appointed to wait on the President of the United States, and notify him that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled, and ready to receive any communication he may be pleased to make to them, reported that the committee had performed that service, and that the President had signified to them that he would make a communication to this House, to-day, in writing.

A communication was received from the President of the United States to the two Houses of Congress. The said communication was read, and referred to the committee of the whole House on the state of the Union. [See Senate proceedings of this date, for the Message, ante page 4.]

Tuesday, October 18.

Several other members, to wit: from Pennsylvania, John B. C. Lucas; from Maryland, Daniel Heister; from Virginia, John Clopton, and John Trigg; from North Carolina, Samuel D. Purviance; and from Georgia, David Meriwether, appeared, produced their credentials, were qualified, and took their seats in the House;

President’s Message.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union; and, after some time spent therein, the Committee rose and reported the following resolutions:

1. Resolved, That so much of the President’s Message as relates to the regulations proper to be observed by foreign armed vessels within the jurisdiction of the United States; to the restraining of our citizens from entering into the service of the belligerent powers of Europe; and to the exacting from all nations the observance, towards our vessels and citizens, of those principles and practices which all civilized people acknowledge; be referred to a select committee.

2. Resolved, That so much of the President’s Message as relates to the adopting of measures for preventing the flag of the United States from being used by vessels not really American, be referred to the Committee of Commerce and Manufactures.

3. Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, That so much of the Message of the President of the United States as relates to our finances, ought to be referred to the Committee of Ways and Means.

The House proceeded to consider the said resolutions, and the same being again read, were agreed to by the House.

Ordered, That Mr. John Randolph, jr., Mr. Nicholas R. Moore, Mr. Gaylord Griswold, Mr. Crowninshield, Mr. Blackledge, Mr. Rodney, and Mr. John Rhea, of Tennessee, be appointed a committee pursuant to the first resolution.

Wednesday, October 19.

Another member, to wit, Peter Early, from Georgia, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

Mourning for Samuel Adams.

Mr. J. Randolph observed that it had lately been announced to the public that one of the earliest patriots of the Revolution had paid his last debt to nature. He had hoped that some other gentleman, better qualified for the task, would have undertaken to call the attention of the House to this interesting event. It could not, indeed, be a matter of deep regret that one of the first statesmen of our country has descended to the grave full of years and full of honors; that his character and fame were put beyond the reach of that time and chance to which every thing mortal is exposed; but it became the House to cherish a sentiment of veneration for such men—since such men are rare—and to keep alive the spirit to which they owed the constitution under which they were then deliberating. This great man, the associate of Hancock, shared with him the honor of being proscribed by a flagitious ministry, whose object was to triumph over the liberties of their country, by trampling on those of her colonies. With his great compatriot he made an early and decided stand against British encroachment, whilst souls more timid were trembling and irresolute. It is the glorious privilege of minds of this stamp to give an impulse to a people and fix the destiny of nations.

Mr. R. said, that he felt himself every way unequal to the attempt of doing justice to the merits of their departed countryman. Called upon by the occasion to say something, he could not have said less. He would not, by any poor eulogium of his, enfeeble the sentiment which pervaded the House, but content himself with moving the following resolution:

Resolved, unanimously, That this House is penetrated with a full sense of the eminent services rendered to his country in the most arduous times by the late Samuel Adams, deceased; and that the members thereof wear crape on the left arm for one month, in testimony of the national gratitude and reverence towards the memory of that undaunted and illustrious patriot.

Mr. Elliott spoke as follows:

Mr. Speaker: If any apology could be necessary for a new member, unversed in Parliamentary proceedings, to offer for rising so early in the session, it would be, that the topic which arrests his attention is connected with the illustrious and ever memorable name of Samuel Adams. The eloquence of the gentleman from Virginia I shall not attempt to rival; his remarks were peculiarly impressive, and the more so from his remarking that he was unable to do justice to the subject. I have been extremely affected by his calling the attention of the House to the circumstance that the name of that patriot was united with that of John Hancock, in an exemption from the general pardon which the British Government offered to those American revolutionists, whom they dared to style rebels. The longer I should address the House upon this subject, the more feeble would be my language, as the greater would be my sensibility. I shall, therefore, only further observe, that I shall most cordially support the motion of the gentleman from Virginia.

The question was then taken up on Mr. Randolph’s motion: which was agreed to unanimously.

Mr. Nicholson observed that, on occasions like the present, it had been usual for the House to adjourn. He, therefore, moved an adjournment; which was carried.

Thursday, October 20.

Several other members, to wit: from Massachusetts, Samuel Thatcher; from New York, John Smith; and from Maryland, John Archer, appeared, produced their credentials, were qualified, and took their seats in the House.

The House then proceeded, by ballot, to the appointment of a Chaplain to Congress, on the part of this House; and, upon examining the ballots, a majority of the votes of the whole House was found in favor of the Rev. William Parkinson.

Friday, October 21.

Two other members, to wit: from New York, John Patterson and Erastus Root, appeared, produced their credentials, and took their seats in the House.

Resolved, That the resolution of the tenth of December, one thousand eight hundred and one, authorizing Thomas Claxton to employ an additional assistant, two servants, and two horses, be, and the same is hereby, continued in force during this and the next session: and that the said Thomas Claxton be allowed a further sum of one dollar and twenty-five cents, to be paid in like manner, to enable him to increase the number of his attendants.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate have appointed the Rev. Dr. Gantt, a Chaplain to Congress, on their part.

Saturday, October 22.

Appropriation for the Louisiana Treaty.

The following Message was received from the President of the United States:

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

In my communication to you of the 17th instant, I informed you that conventions had been entered into with the Government of France for the cession of Louisiana to the United States. These, with the advice and consent of the Senate, having now been ratified, and my ratification exchanged for that of the First Consul of France, in due form, they are communicated to you for consideration in your legislative capacity. You will observe that some important conditions cannot be carried into execution, but with the aid of the Legislature; and that time presses a decision on them without delay.

The ulterior provisions, also suggested in the same communication, for the occupation and government of the country, will call for early attention. Such information relative to its government, as time and distance have permitted me to obtain, will be ready to be laid before you within a few days. But, as permanent arrangements for this object may require time and deliberation, it is for your consideration whether you will not, forthwith, make such temporary provisions for the preservation, in the meanwhile, of order and tranquillity in the country, as the case may require.

TH. JEFFERSON.

Oct. 21, 1803.

Mr. Huger hoped the reading of the treaty and conventions would be dispensed with, and that they would be printed for the use of the members.

Mr. Randolph hoped they would be read.

The reading of course was proceeded with, which being finished,

Mr. Randolph moved a reference of the Message, and of the documents accompanying it, to the whole House on Monday; which motion was agreed to without a division.

Mr. Randolph begged leave to submit a resolution, arising out of the Message, which he hoped would be considered at that time, for the purpose of referring it to the same committee to whom had been just referred the Message:

Resolved, That provision ought to be made for carrying into effect the treaty and convention concluded at Paris on the 30th April, 1803, between the United States of America and the French Republic.

Referred to the same committee, without a division.

Monday, October 24.

The Louisiana Treaty.

Mr. Griswold moved the following resolution:

Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to cause to be laid before this House a copy of the treaty between the French Republic and Spain, of the first of October, one thousand eight hundred, together with a copy of the deed of cession from Spain, executed in pursuance of the same treaty, conveying Louisiana to France, (if any such deed exists;) also copies of such correspondence between the Government of the United States and the Government or Minister of Spain, (if any such correspondence has taken place,) as will show the assent or dissent of Spain to the purchase of Louisiana by the United States; together with copies of such other documents as may be in the Department of State, or any other Department of this Government, tending to ascertain whether the United States have, in fact, acquired any title to the province of Louisiana by the treaties with France of the thirtieth of April, one thousand eight hundred and three.

Mr. Griswold said that, by adverting to the Message of the President respecting the treaty and conventions lately concluded between the United States and the French Government, he found that the President, speaking on the subject, observes: “As permanent arrangements for this object require time and deliberation, it is for your consideration whether you will not forthwith make such temporary provisions for the preservation, in the meanwhile, of order and tranquillity in the country, as the case may require.” He recommends to the immediate attention of Congress the passage of some temporary laws. This being the case, and the subject being about to be brought before the House, it became important that they should know distinctly what they had obtained by the treaty; and whether there were any territory belonging to the United States to take possession of, or any new subjects to govern. Inasmuch as if no new territory or subjects were acquired, it was perfectly idle to pass even temporary laws for the occupation of the one, or the government of the other.

In the treaty lately concluded with France, the treaty between France and Spain is referred to; only a part of it is copied. The treaty referred to must be a public treaty. In the nature of things it must be the title-deed for the province of Louisiana. The Government must have a copy of it. As there is but a part recited, it is evidently imperfect. It becomes therefore necessary to be furnished with the whole, in order to ascertain the conditions relative to the Duke of Parma; it also becomes necessary to get the deed of cession; for the promise to cede is no cession. This deed of cession, Mr. G. also presumed, was in the possession of Government. It was also important to know under what circumstances Louisiana is to be taken possession of, and whether with the consent of Spain, as she is still possessed of it. If it is to be taken possession of with her consent, the possession will be peaceable and one kind of provision will be necessary; but if it is to be taken possession of in opposition to Spain, a different provision may be necessary. From these considerations he thought it proper in the House to call upon the Executive for information on this point. Other important documents may, perhaps, likewise be in the hands of the President.

Mr. Randolph hoped the resolution would not be agreed to. He was well apprized of the aspect which it was in the power of ingenuity to give to a refusal, on the part of that House, to require any information which gentlemen might think fit to demand of the Executive, however remotely connected with subjects before them. But the dread of imputations which he knew to be groundless should never induce him to swerve from that line of conduct which his most sober judgment approved. Did he indeed conceive that the nation, or the House, entertained a doubt of our having acquired new territory and people to govern; could he for a moment believe that even a minority, respectable as to numbers, required any other evidence of this fact than the extract from the treaty which had just been read, he would readily concur with the gentleman from Connecticut in asking of the Executive, whether indeed we had a new accession of territory and of citizens, or, as that gentleman had been pleased to express himself, subjects to govern. He hoped the gentleman would excuse a small variation from his own phraseology, since, notwithstanding the predilection which some Governments and some gentlemen manifested for this form, Mr. R. asked for himself the use of such as were more familiar to American ears and American constitutions.

The Executive has laid before this House an instrument, which he tells us has been duly ratified, conveying to the United States the country known under the appellation of Louisiana. The first article affirms the right of France, to the sovereignty of this territory, to be derived under the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, which it quotes. The third article makes provision for the future government, by the United States, of its inhabitants; and the fourth provides the manner in which this territory and these inhabitants are to be transferred by France to us. There has been negotiated a convention, between us and the French Republic, stating, in the most unequivocal terms, that there does exist on her part a right to the country in question, which is supported by the strongest possible evidence, and pledging herself to put us in possession of that right, so soon as we shall have performed those stipulations, on our part, in consideration of which France has conveyed to us her sovereignty over this country and people. From the nature of our Government, these stipulations can only be fulfilled by laws to the passing of which the Legislature alone is competent. And when these laws are about to be passed, endeavors are made to impede, or frustrate, the measure, by setting on foot inquiries which mean nothing, or are unconnected with the subject, and this is done by those who have always contended that there was no discretion vested in this House by the constitution, as to carrying treaties into effect. If, sir, gentlemen believe that we must eventually do that which rests with us, towards effecting this object, to what purpose is this inquiry? Mr. R. begged the House not to impute to him any disposition to countenance this monstrous doctrine, whose advocates now found it so difficult to practise. On the contrary, he held in the highest veneration the principle established in the case of the British Treaty, and the men by whom it was established, that, in all matters requiring legislative aid, it was the right and duty of this House to deliberate, and upon such deliberation, to afford, or refuse, that aid, as in their judgments the public good might require. And he held it to be equally the right of the House to demand such information from the Executive, as to them appeared necessary to enable them to form a sound conclusion on subjects submitted, by that department, to their consideration. But those who then contended that this House possessed no discretion on the subject, that they were bound implicitly to conform to the stipulations, however odious and extravagant, into which the treaty-making power might have plunged the nation—those who then said that we cannot deliberate, are now instituting inquiries to serve as the basis of deliberation—(for if we are not to deliberate upon the result, why institute any inquiry at all?)—inquiries, which are in their very nature deliberation itself. But whilst he arraigned the consistency of other gentlemen, Mr. R. said that it behoved him to assert his own. Information on subjects of the nature of that which they were then discussing, might be required for two objects: to enable the House to determine whether it were expedient to approve a measure which on the face of it carried proof of its impolicy; or to punish ministers who may have departed from their instructions—who may have betrayed the interest confided by the nation to their care.

To illustrate this remark, let us advert to the case of the Treaty of London, generally known as Mr. Jay’s treaty. That instrument had excited the public abhorrence. The objections to carrying it into effect were believed insuperable. This sentiment pervaded the House of Representatives, and when they demanded information from the Executive, they virtually held this language: “Sir, we detest your treaty—we feel an almost invincible repugnance to giving it our sanction—but if, by the exhibition of any information in possession of the Executive, we can be convinced that the interests of the United States have been supported to the utmost extent;—that, wretched as this instrument is, the terms are as good as were attainable; and that, bad as those terms are, it is politic under existing circumstances to accept them, we will, however reluctantly, pass the laws for carrying it into effect. The present case, if he understood any thing of the general sentiment, was, happily, of a different nature. The treaty which they were then called upon to sanction, had been hailed by the acclamations of the nation. It was not difficult to foresee, from the opinions manifested in every quarter, that it would receive the cordial approbation of a triumphant majority of that House. If such be the general opinion—if we are not barely satisfied with the terms of this treaty, but lost in astonishment at the all-important benefits which we have so cheaply acquired, to what purpose do we ask information respecting the detail of the negotiation? Has any one ventured to hint disapprobation of the conduct of the ministers who have effected this negotiation? Has any one insinuated that our interests have been betrayed? If, then, we are satisfied as to the terms of this treaty, and with the conduct of our ministers abroad, let us pass the laws necessary for carrying it into effect. To refuse—to delay, upon the plea now offered, is to jeopardize the best interests of the Union. Shall we take exception to our own title? Shall we refuse the offered possession? Shall this refusal proceed from those who so lately affirmed that we ought to pursue this very object at every national hazard? I should rather suppose the eagerness of gentlemen would be ready to outstrip the forms of law in making themselves masters of this country, than that, now, when it is offered to our grasp, they should display an unwillingness, or at least an indifference, for that which so lately was all-important to them. After the message which the President has sent us, to demand, if indeed we have acquired any new subjects, as the gentleman expresses it, which renders the exercise of our legislative functions necessary, would be nothing less than a mockery of him, of this solemn business, and of ourselves. Cautionary provisions may be introduced into the laws for securing us against every hazard, although, from the nature of our stipulations, we are exposed to none. We retain in our own hands the consideration money, even after we have possession.”

Mr. R. expressed himself averse to demand the Spanish correspondence. The reasons must be obvious to all. The possession of Louisiana by us, will necessarily give rise to negotiations between the United States and Spain, relative to its boundaries. These have probably commenced, and are now pending. He hoped, therefore, the House would go into committee on the Message of the President, and after resolving to pass the requisite laws, if further information shall be wanting in relation to the mode of taking possession, or any other object of detail, the Executive might be called upon to furnish it.

Mr. Goddard did not intend to enter upon a long discussion of the resolution; but it seemed to him that the reasons of the gentleman from Virginia for opposing it were very erroneous. On what ground was the opposition made? Altogether on the ground that Spain had actually made the cession to France. Mr. G. apprehended no such impression had been made on the House by the information before them. In the first article of the treaty they learned what the title of France was. The treaty says,

“Whereas, by the article the 3d of the treaty concluded at St. Ildefonso, the 9th Vendemiaire, an 9, (1st October, 1800,) between the First Consul of the French Republic and His Catholic Majesty, it was agreed as follows:

“His Catholic Majesty promises and engages, on his part, to cede to the French Republic, six months after the full and entire execution of the conditions and stipulations therein relative to his Royal Highness the Duke of Parma, the colony or province of Louisiana, with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it; and such as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other States.

“And whereas, in pursuance of the treaty, and particularly of the third article, the French Republic has an incontestable title to the domain and to the possession of the said territory; the First Consul of the French Republic, desiring to give to the United States a strong proof of his friendship, doth hereby cede to the said United States, in the name of the French Republic, for ever and in full sovereignty, the said territory, with all its rights and appurtenances, as fully and in the same manner as they have been acquired by the French Republic in virtue of the above-mentioned treaty, concluded with his Catholic Majesty.”

Mr. Goddard asked whether the conclusion followed that France had an incontestable title to Louisiana? There was no such evidence. If in virtue of this treaty we purchase a promise on the part of His Catholic Majesty to cede, and not an incontestable title, he would ask if the promise constituted a title? France only says, we cede all our title. This, and this only, is the language of the instrument. If this is the case, is it not proper to inquire whether there are other acts by which Spain has ceded Louisiana to France? Such acts may exist. Certain stipulations were made by France to Spain, on which the cession depended. Do we not then wish to know whether these stipulations have been fulfilled and whether they are binding, or whether Spain has waived them? Are there in existence any documents to that effect? It has been hinted that such documents exist in the newspapers; but are we, in an affair of this magnitude, to be referred to the dictum of a newspaper? He apprehended that this was a novel mode of legislation.

Mr. Randolph said, if the gentleman from Connecticut would confine his motion to the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, he should be ready to acquiesce in it, though he did not believe that instrument would throw any new light on the subject.

Mr. Gregg said his wish was that the resolution should be divided, and that the Treaty of St. Ildefonso only should be requested. It had been conceded that it might be of some use in ascertaining the limits of the cession. To the other members of the resolution he was opposed. He therefore moved a division of the question.

Mr. Griswold remarked that it would be more orderly to move the striking out of the last paragraph.

Mr. Thatcher said, gentlemen objecting to this resolution had taken different grounds. Some oppose it as inconsistent with the sentiments that prevailed in the case of the British Treaty; others, because it is premature, and others, because it is unnecessary. He did not expect the first objection from any member on that floor; much less did he expect it from the quarter in which it originated. The advocates of the motion were charged with inconsistency. He was not a member of the House at the time of the British Treaty, but, on referring to the Journal, it would be perceived that the object of gentlemen who then called for papers was to go into the merits of the British Treaty. It would not be denied that the ground then taken by gentlemen on the other side was, that the House had a right to examine the merits of the treaty, and to the assertion of that right it was that the President answered. We now say that it is not necessary for us to act in our legislative capacity, intending, if it shall appear to be necessary, not to withhold acting. Mr. T. therefore conceived that they exhibited no inconsistency, as they did not purpose at this time to go into the merits of the treaty, and as they acknowledged the treaty, if constitutionally made, to be binding. But they wanted information on subjects of legislation.

Mr. Nicholson was extremely glad to find that gentlemen on the other side of the House had at length abandoned the ground which they had taken some years ago. He was rejoiced that they were now willing to acknowledge, what they had heretofore most strenuously denied, that the House of Representatives had a constitutional right, not only to call for papers, but to use their discretion in carrying any treaty into effect. That it must now be their impression was evident, or their conduct was surely unaccountable. Why else do they call for papers, why inquire into our title to the province of Louisiana? If the doctrine of a former day was still to be adhered to, why urge this inquiry? If gentlemen are consistent with themselves, if they have not forgot the lessons which they inculcated upon the ratification of the British Treaty, this House has no right to call for papers, no right to make inquiry, no right to deliberate, but must carry this treaty into effect, be it good or bad; must vote for all the necessary measures, whether they are calculated to promote the interests of the United States or not. The doctrines of old times, however, are now given up, the ground formerly taken is abandoned. We shall no longer hear that the Executive is omnipotent, and that the representatives of the people are bound to vote, blindfolded, for carrying into effect all treaties which the President and the Senate may think proper to make and ratify. He thanked the gentlemen for the admission, and hoped that the country would profit by it hereafter.

He was happy to say that this was not now, nor ever was, the doctrine of himself and his friends. They meant to deliberate, they meant to use their discretion in voting away the treasure of the nation. He agreed with gentlemen, that if a majority of the House entertained any doubt as to the validity of the title we have acquired, they ought to call for papers; and he had no doubt, if there was any dissatisfaction, they would call. He himself should have no objection to vote for the resolution if it was confined to proper objects, not indeed to satisfy himself, for he was already fully satisfied, but to satisfy other gentlemen; to satisfy the American people, that the insinuations thrown out about the title, are totally without foundation. The resolution in its present shape, however, was highly improper; it looked to extrinsic circumstances, and contemplated an inquiry into subjects totally unconnected with the treaty with France. What, said Mr. N., has Spain to do in this business? Gentlemen ask if she has acquiesced in our purchase, and call for her correspondence with our Government. What is the acquiescence of Spain to us? If the House is satisfied, from the information laid on the table, that Spain had ceded Louisiana to France, and that France had since ceded it to the United States, what more do they require? Are we not an independent nation? Have we not a right to make treaties for ourselves without asking leave of Spain? What is it to us whether she acquiesces or not? She is no party to the treaty of cession, she has no claim to the ceded territory. Are we to pause till Spain thinks proper to consent, or are we to inquire, whether, like a cross child, she has thrown away her rattle, and cries for it afterwards?

With regard to the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, Mr. N. said, he should have no objection to its being laid before the House, if it was in the possession of the Executive. In all probability, however, this was not the case, as it was known to be a secret treaty on other subjects of great importance between France and Spain. As to the deed of cession spoken of, he really did not understand what was meant, for he imagined it was not expected a formal deed of bargain and sale had been executed between two civilized nations, who negotiated by means of ambassadors. If there were any other papers which could give gentlemen more information, he had no objection, either, that these should be laid before them. Not indeed for his own satisfaction, but for that of those who were not already satisfied, if there were any of that description. One very important paper, he knew from high authority, was certainly in existence, and possibly might be in the power of the Executive. This was a formal order, under the royal signature of Spain, commanding the Spanish officers at Orleans to deliver the province to the French Prefect, which he considered equal, perhaps superior to any deed of cession; for it was equal to an express recognition on the part of Spain, that France had performed all the conditions referred to in the Treaty of St. Ildefonso. It was an acknowledgment that Spain had no further claims upon Louisiana, and would show that any interference on her part ought to have no influence on the American Government.

Mr. Mitchell said he rose to express his sentiments against the whole body of the resolution under debate. But his disinclination to adopt it did not arise from any doubt of the right which the House possessed to call upon the Executive for information. He had no hesitation to ask the President for papers whenever it was necessary to obtain them. And it was equally clear to him that whenever that dignified officer was properly applied to, he would comply cheerfully with the request of Congress, or of either branch of it. He owned that in some cases it would be the duty of the House to pursue this mode of inquiry, and equally would it be the duty of the head of the Executive Department to give his aid and countenance.

In the present stage of the proceedings respecting the treaty and conventions with France concerning Louisiana, he deemed it improper to embarrass the business by an unseasonable call upon the Executive for papers. The President had already communicated various information on this subject, in his Message on the first day of the session. Additional information was given in his Message of the 21st, wherein he told the House that the ratification and exchanges had been made. This was accompanied with instruments of cession and covenant concluded at Paris between our ministers and the agents of the French Republic. All this information we had already on our tables. This the President had put the House in possession of from his own sense of duty. This obligation was imposed on him by the constitution, which declares that he shall, from time to time, give to Congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient. Mr. M. said he had a firm belief that the President had complied with this constitutional injunction. He had communicated such intelligence as he had received; and if he was possessed of any thing else needful for the deliberation of the House, he was willing to think the Chief Magistrate of the Union would have spontaneously imparted it.

The question was taken on agreeing to the first member of the resolution, as follows:

Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to cause to be laid before this House a copy of the treaty between the French Republic and Spain, of the 1st of October, 1800.

The House divided—ayes 59, noes 59. The Speaker declaring himself in the affirmative, the motion was carried.

Mr. Rodney suggested an alteration in the second member of the resolution, so as to read “instrument,” instead of “deed.”

Mr. Griswold had no objection to the modification.

The second member, so modified, was read as follows:

“Together with a copy of the instrument of cession from Spain, executed in pursuance of the same treaty conveying Louisiana to France, (if any such instrument exists.)”

Mr. Huger confessed his impressions to be favorable to the treaty, though the arguments urged that day, certainly possessed great weight. He was rather of opinion that no such instrument as that referred to in the resolution existed. But if it did exist, its publication would certainly be satisfactory to the people and the House. He declared himself ready to vote for carrying the treaty into effect.

Mr. Nicholson did not know whether his remarks had been correctly understood. He did not know whether the document he alluded to could strictly be called the instrument of cession. He had drawn an amendment to this part of the resolution, which he would propose, if in order, to wit:

“Or other instrument showing that the Spanish Government had ordered the province of Louisiana to be delivered to France.”

The Speaker said, the House having agreed to insert the word “instrument,” it was not in order to receive a substitute.

Mr. Huger moved to reconsider the vote of the House in favor of the insertion of the word “instrument.”

Motion lost—ayes 24.

The question was then taken on the second member, as above stated, and lost—ayes 34.

The question was then taken on the third member, viz:

“Also, copies of such correspondence between the Government of the United States and the Government or Minister of Spain, (if any such correspondence has taken place,) as will show the assent or dissent of Spain to the purchase of Louisiana by the United States:”

And lost—ayes 34.

The question was then taken on the last member of the motion, and lost, without a division, viz:

“Together with copies of such other documents as may be in the Department of State, or any other department of this Government, tending to ascertain whether the United States have, in fact, acquired any title to the province of Louisiana by the treaties with France of the 30th of April, 1803.”

The question recurring on the whole of the resolution, as amended,

Mr. Nicholson moved to amend the second member by adding to the end thereof;

“Together with a copy of any instrument in possession of the Executive, showing that the Spanish Government has ordered the province of Louisiana to be delivered to the Commissary or other agent of the French Government.”

Agreed to—ayes 64.

The question was then taken by yeas and nays on the whole of the original motion, amended as follows:

“Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to cause to be laid before the House a copy of the treaty between the French Republic and Spain, of the 1st October, 1800, together with a copy of any instrument in possession of the Executive, showing that the Spanish Government has ordered the province of Louisiana to be delivered to the Commissary or other agent of the French Government:”

And lost—yeas 57, nays 59.

Amendment to the Constitution.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the report of a select committee on propositions of amendment to the constitution.

The report was read, as follows:

Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, two-thirds of both Houses concurring, That the following article be proposed to the Legislatures of the different States as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by three-fourths of the said Legislatures, shall be valid to all intents and purposes as a part of the said constitution, viz:

“In all future elections of President and Vice President, the Electors shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice President, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. The person having a majority of all the Electors for President shall be the President; and if there shall be no such majority, the President shall be chosen from the highest numbers, not exceeding three, on the list for President, by the House of Representatives, in the manner directed by the constitution. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice President shall be the Vice President, and in case of an equal number of votes for two or more persons for Vice President, they being the highest on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice President from those having such equal number, in the manner directed by the constitution.”

Mr. Dawson observed, that at the time of the adoption of the constitution, that part of it which related to the election of a President and Vice President had been objected to; and evils likely to occur had been foreseen by some gentlemen at that day. Experience had shown that they were not mistaken. Every gentleman in that House knew the situation in which the country had been placed by the controverted election of a Chief Magistrate; it was one which he trusted never would return. It had been a subject much reflected on by the people, and by the State Legislatures, several of which had declared their approbation of the principle contained in the resolution reported by the committee. The House had two years since ratified a similar amendment by a constitutional majority of two-thirds. At that time no objections were made to the principle of the amendment. All the objection then made was on account of the lateness of the day and thinness of the House. Mr. D. considered it unnecessary to make any further remarks at that time, as he could not anticipate any objections that might be urged. He moved that the Committee should rise and report the resolution without amendment.

Mr. J. Clay, though in favor of the principle of the amendment, was of opinion that, as to some of its parts, it required alteration. He therefore moved:

“But if no person have such majority, then the House of Representatives shall immediately proceed to choose by ballot from the two persons having the greatest number of votes, one of them for President; or if there be three or more persons having an equal number of votes, then the House of Representatives shall in like manner, from the persons having such equality of votes, choose the President; or if there be one person having a greater number of votes—not being a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed—than any other person, and two or more persons who have an equal number of votes one with the other, then the House of Representatives shall in like manner, from among such persons having the greater number of votes and such other persons having an equality of votes, choose the President.”

Mr. Van Cortlandt thought the amendment liable to objection.

Mr. G. W. Campbell was in favor of the principle contained in the amendment. He considered it to be the duty of this House, in introducing an amendment to the constitution on this point, to secure to the people the benefits of choosing the President, so as to prevent a contravention of their will as expressed by Electors chosen by them; resorting to legislative interposition only in extraordinary cases: and when this should be rendered necessary, so guarding the exercise of legislative power, that those only should be capable of legislative election who possessed a strong evidence of enjoying the confidence of the people. This was the true spirit and principle of the constitution, whose object was, through the several organs of the Government, faithfully to express the public opinion. For this reason he was in favor of the proposed amendment. By it we shall make a less innovation on the spirit of the constitution than by rejecting it, and adopting the report of the select committee. There were obvious reasons why the persons from whom a choice may be made should be fewer in case of a designation of the office than heretofore. At present the whole number of electoral votes is one hundred and seventy-six. As the constitution now stands, four candidates might have an equal number of votes, or three might have a majority, viz: one hundred and seventeen each. According to the proposed amendment, but one can have a majority, and if two persons should be equal and highest, it is not probable that the third candidate will have many votes.

Mr. Griswold said it was very difficult to ascertain the precise import of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania by barely hearing it read from the Chair. In the meaning therefore which he gave it, he might perhaps be mistaken. If not mistaken, it involved a principle and implied a change, which he had never before heard suggested on that floor, or in the part of the country from which he came. It is well known to every member, that under the constitution as it at present stands, the votes given for a President in this House are by States, and not according to the majority of the members of the whole body. The amendment, as reported by the select committee, preserves this original feature of the constitution by prescribing that the election shall be proceeded with as pointed out by the constitution. But the present amendment varies this mode, according to which it is to be made without respect to States. Of course a majority of the members are to decide. He submitted it to gentlemen whether they were willing in this way to sacrifice the interests and rights of the smaller States. If this be the intention of gentlemen, we ought to have time to deliberate on the subject before it is pressed to a decision. The gentleman from Pennsylvania will explain whether this is his intention.

Mr. J. Clay begged leave explicitly to state, for the satisfaction of the gentleman from Connecticut, that it was not his intention to change that part of the constitution which prescribed that the votes should be by States; and if it would induce the gentleman to vote for the resolution he had moved, he would add the words of the constitution, viz:

“But in choosing the President the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice.”

These words were accordingly added.

Mr. Dawson observed that this proposition had been submitted to the select committee, who had considered it more objectionable than that reported. Their object was to innovate as little as possible on the constitution. A great part of it referred to cases so extremely remote as were not likely to happen. The only material change it made was to reduce the number of persons from whom a choice should be made from three to two. At present the election for a President and Vice President was made from the five highest on the list. As, according to the proposed amendment, a designation of the persons voted for as President and Vice President was to be made, it was considered that by giving the three highest to the House of Representatives, from which to choose a President, and the two highest to the Senate, from which to choose a Vice President, the spirit of the constitution would not be changed. He hoped therefore the report of the committee would be agreed to. He believed it comprehended all cases which were probable; and he further believed that if they spent a month they would not devise an amendment that would provide for all possible cases that may happen.

Mr. Clopton said he rose to express his approbation of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Clay.) He said that indeed the amendment could not but be acceptable to him, inasmuch as it corresponded with the ideas he had the honor to express to the committee on this subject the other day. He begged leave now to make a few remarks in addition to those which he had then stated. He said, if any thing is to be lamented as a defect in the fundamental principles of our Government, that defect perhaps consists in a departure from the plain and simple modes of immediate election by the people as to some of the branches of the Government. He did not mean however now to discuss, nor did he know that he ever should discuss, this point. The Constitution of the United States having established a different principle in respect to the election of the several departments of the Government, except that branch of the Legislature which this House composes; and the object of the proposed amendment to the constitution not being the transmutation of a fundamental principle, but merely an alteration in the mode heretofore directed of electing one branch of the Government according to the principle already established, his business and his object was to state to this committee those ideas which occurred to him on this occasion as suited to the subject as it now stands before the committee.

Mr. C. said that most seriously considering the principles of the Government in such a point of view as he had the honor to state to the committee, he was irresistibly impressed with the opinion that a legislative election of President or Vice President, whenever resorted to, should be restrained to the smallest number above a unit, or to those persons who have equal electoral votes. He considered it as a position clearly and unquestionably true, that if the field of election, when not decided by the voice of the people themselves, should be left too wide, more chances will there always be for the introduction of abuses in determining on a choice, if those whose province it shall be to decide, should be actuated by a spirit adverse to the public sentiment. Results ungrateful to the public feeling might indeed become sources of discontent truly to be lamented. The demon of discord might be called forth, and stalking over our land, might unfortunately produce a state of things very different from that peaceful, tranquil state, which would follow a decision more conformable to the will of the people. Such a decision he believed would be ensured were the election to be confined to those two persons only who had received the most ample testimony of the public confidence, or to those who had been stamped with equal testimonials of that confidence.

Mr. Smilie would wish one principle altered in the report of the select committee, viz: that which confined the election of the President to the three highest persons voted for. It was impossible for human wisdom to provide for all cases that might occur. Their time was not well spent in providing for cases extremely remote. He had but one object in view, the designation of office; and the more simple the proposition, the more likely they were to obtain this object. It should be recollected that the constitution was the act of the people, and ought not to be altered till inconveniences actually arise under it. He believed, though particular parts might be defective in theory, they ought not to be changed till practical inconveniences had been experienced. No such inconvenience had yet been felt from choosing the President from the five highest on the list. Is it, then, prudent to embarrass the great principle, in which they generally concurred, with incidental propositions, when there was no necessity for them? This amendment was to obtain the assent of thirteen legislative bodies before it would be binding. The simpler, then, the proposition, the more likely it was to succeed. His idea, therefore, was to leave the constitution as it now stood, so far as it related to a choice being made from the five highest, and only so far to change it as related to a designation of the office.

Mr. Sanford said the great object of the amendment ought to be to prevent persons voted for as Vice President from becoming President. If the amendment effected this, it was sufficient. All other innovation upon the constitution was improper; and no danger could arise from extending the right of the House of Representatives to making a choice from the five highest.

Mr. Rodney said that in the select committee he had been in favor of the number stated in the constitution. He was not for innovating on the constitution one tittle more than was absolutely necessary. As to the mere designation of office, the people looked for and expected it; and if that were obtained, they would be satisfied. He well knew that if amendments to this simple proposition were multiplied, objections to the whole would also be increased. Having been originally in favor of five, and thinking the inconveniences apprehended by some gentlemen not likely to occur, he should vote in favor of the amendment of the gentleman from Maryland, principally for the reason assigned by the gentleman from Connecticut, that it would allow to the smaller States a larger scope of choice.

Mr. Elliot hoped the amendment of the gentleman from Maryland would not prevail; and coming, as he did himself, from a small State, he trusted the House would pardon him for assigning his reasons for that hope. He felt as much confidence in the House of Representatives as the gentleman from Connecticut; but he was of opinion that their discretion ought to be limited. The amendment will give the House of Representatives the unqualified power of electing from the whole number on the list of persons voted for as President, and on that ground he opposed it. It was said to be a question of larger and smaller States, and those who represent the smaller States were called upon to check the usurpation of the larger States. Our system was undoubtedly federative, and there might be danger of a usurpation of the large States if the small ones were not protected by the constitution. His wish was that they might be so guarded.

Mr. G. W. Campbell said he, too, represented a small State, and was anxious to preserve the rights of the small States. But in a great constitutional question, while these rights were not lost sight of, principle ought also to be regarded. This he conceived to be his duty, whatever effect it might have upon the State he represented. For this reason he considered it proper to express his opinions on the present occasion. It was a vital principle to preserve the constitution as pure as possible. This rendered it necessary to show that the proposition of the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Clay) came nearer to the principle of the constitution than that offered by the gentleman from Maryland. He had already observed that, there being at present no designation, four was the smallest possible number from which a choice could be made: to this number but one was added, making, altogether, five. In future elections there will be one hundred and seventy-six Electors, and if there be a designation of office, but one person can have a majority. To confine the choice to two persons will, therefore, in principle, approach as near as possible to the original principle of the constitution.

Mr. C. was in favor of preserving that part of the constitution which directed the election to be made by States, wishing as little innovation as possible on the principles of the constitution. He did not, however, conceive a mere change of words dangerous, but the establishment of a principle that deprived the people of the power of electing those who possessed the largest share of their confidence. He was decidedly in favor of whatever had this effect, as according with the true spirit of the constitution; and he was, therefore, opposed to the amendment of the gentleman from Maryland. His own opinion, too, was that it was best to express in one article whatever related to the election of President and Vice President, than refer to the constitution; by which the provisions on that subject would be rendered much clearer.

The question was then taken on Mr. Nicholson’s amendment, and lost—ayes, 29, noes 77.

Mr. Randolph said he came to the House under the impression that another subject would have occupied their attention on account of its primary importance, not meaning, however, to disparage the importance of an amendment to the constitution. But on a subject which must be discussed in a few days, if at all, it was improper that time should be lost. The proposed amendment to the constitution was not, he believed, so extremely pressing as to require immediate attention. The subject to which Mr. R. had expected the attention of the House would have been first directed, was the Treaty with France. Hoping that the committee would have decided on the amendment at an early hour, he had refrained from any motion. But perceiving that a decision was not likely soon to be made, he would move that the committee should rise, for the purpose of taking up the treaty respecting Louisiana.

Mr. Dawson opposed the rising of the committee.

The question was taken on Mr. Randolph’s motion, and carried—yeas 60, nays 55. When the committee rose.

And on motion, the House adjourned.

Tuesday, October 25.

Louisiana Treaty.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the Message from the President of the United States, of the twenty-first instant, enclosing a treaty and conventions entered into and ratified by the United States and the French Republic; to which Committee of the whole House was also referred a motion for carrying the same into effect.

Mr. G. Griswold said he had hoped that some gentleman, in favor of the resolution under consideration, would have risen to assign his reasons in favor of it. But no gentleman friendly to its adoption having risen, and feeling himself embarrassed, he would take the liberty of suggesting his doubts as to the propriety of the resolution. He hoped the committee would have the candor to believe that, in stating those doubts which hung upon his mind, his object was not to delay the progress of the measures contemplated, but to gain information.

In reflecting, for the short time during which the subject had been before him, he had not been able to pursue it in all its bearings, nor to solve all the difficulties it presented. He had first asked himself where was to be found the constitutional power of the Government to incorporate the territory, with the inhabitants thereof, in the Union of the United States, with the privileges of citizens of the United States—is there any such power? And if there is, where is it lodged? In giving his opinion on the constitutional right of making treaties, he would say that it was vested in the President and Senate, and that a treaty made by them on a subject constitutionally in their treaty-making power, was valid without the assent of this House. This House had, to be sure, the physical power of refusing the necessary means to carry treaties into effect; but this power was essentially different from that conferred by the constitution. But if the treaty-making power should be exceeded, if it should be undertaken to make it operate upon subjects not constitutionally vested, he had a right to say that it was his duty not to carry it into effect. Even should its provisions be highly beneficial, it was no less their constitutional duty to resist it. He would not undertake to say that his mind was perfectly fixed, but he entertained doubts—serious doubts; and he hoped gentlemen would candidly give them answers.

Mr. Randolph rose for the purpose of satisfying, so far as was in his power, the doubts expressed by the gentleman from New York (Mr. G. Griswold). He had listened with great pleasure to the candid exposition which the gentleman had given of his objections, and from the temper which he had manifested, Mr. R. relied on being able to satisfy some of his scruples on this subject. The objections which have been urged to the motion before the committee, resolved themselves into arguments against the constitutionality, and arguments against the expediency of the treaty proposed to be carried into effect. As it would be needless to repel objections of this last kind, unless those of the first description could be satisfactorily answered, he should first reply to the observations which had been made on the constitutional doctrine.

He understood the gentleman from New York as denying that there existed in the United States, as such, a capacity to acquire territory; that, by the constitution, they were restricted to the limits which existed at the time of its adoption. If this position be correct, it undeniably follows that those limits must have been accurately defined and generally known at the time when the Government took effect. Either they have been particularly described in the constitutional compact, or are referred to as settled beyond dispute, and universally acknowledged. But this was not the fact, in either case. The constitution not only did not describe any particular boundary, beyond which the United States could not extend, but our boundary was unsettled on our north-eastern, southern, and north-western frontier, at the time of its adoption. But perhaps we shall be told, that, although our limits were in dispute with our English and Spanish neighbors, still there were certain boundaries specified in the Treaty of Paris, of 1783, which were the actual boundaries of the United States. It was, however, a well attested fact—one of which we possessed official information from the Executive—that the limits assigned us by that treaty were incapable of being established. A line running west, from the Lake of the Woods, not touching the Mississippi at all—it followed that the United States were without limits beyond the source of the Mississippi. It will not be denied, that, among the powers which the Government possesses under the constitution, there exists that of settling disputes concerning our limits with the neighboring nations. This power was not only necessary in relation to the disputed boundaries on the side of Canada and Florida, but was indispensable to a government over a country of indefinite extent. The existence of this power will not be denied: it has been exercised in ascertaining our north-eastern and southern frontier, and it involves in it the power of extending the limits of the Confederacy. Let us suppose that the Commissioners, under the Treaty of London, had determined the river St. John or St. Lawrence to be the true St. Croix—would not that part of the province of New Brunswick or Quebec which lies on this side of those rivers at this time have been a part of the United States? Suppose the northern boundary of Florida had been fixed, under the Treaty of San Lorenzo, to extend from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf; would not all the country north of this line and east of the Mississippi—part of the very country conveyed by the treaty lately negotiated, and which gentlemen conceived we could not constitutionally hold—would not that country, at this time, compose a part of the United States? That the constitution should tie us down to particular limits, without expressing those limits; that we should be restrained to the then boundaries of the United States, when it is in proof to the committee that no such bounds existed, or do now exist, was altogether incomprehensible and inadmissible. For, if the constitution meant the practical limits of the United States, the extent of country which we then possessed—our recent acquisitions, on the side of Canada and the Natchez, could not be defended. But, sir, said Mr. R., my position is not only maintainable by the reason of the constitution, but by the practice under it. Congress have expressed, in their own acts, a solemn recognition of the principle, that the United States, in their federative capacity, may acquire, and have acquired, territory. It will be recollected, that adverse claims once existed between the United States and the State of Georgia, in relation to a certain tract of country between the northern boundary of the Spanish possessions and what we contended was the southern limit of Georgia—the United States asserting that the country in question was the property of the United States, in their confederate capacity, and the State of Georgia claiming it as hers. Although I have always advocated the claim of that State, it never was on the principle of an incapacity in the United States to acquire territory, or any other which affects the question now before us. It is true, sir, we appointed commissioners to settle the matter in dispute, amicably, with Georgia; but in the mean time we assumed the jurisdiction, erected a government over the country, and thereby established the principle that the United States, as such, could acquire territory; the country in question, as we contended, never having been included within the limits of any particular States, and being ceded to the Confederacy by the Treaty of 1783. But perhaps it may be answered, that this acquisition, being made anterior to the date of the present constitution, cannot affect any limitation or restriction, which it may have provided in relation to this subject; and that to prove that the old confederation could acquire territory, is not to prove the same capacity in the present system of Government. To this I reply, that the constitution contains no such expressed limitation, nor can any be fairly inferred from it: and that if the old confederation—a mere government of States—a loosely connected league—all of whose powers, with many more, are possessed by the present Federal Government—if this mere alliance of States could rightfully acquire territory in their allied capacity, much more is the existing Government competent to make such an acquisition. To me the inference is irresistible.

But the gentleman does not rest himself on this ground alone. He does not embark his whole treasure in a single bottom. Granting that the United States are not destitute of capacity to acquire territory, he denies that this acquisition has been made in a regular way—Congress, says he, alone is competent to such an act. In this transaction he scents at a distance Executive encroachment, and we are called upon to assert our rights, and to repel it. If any usurpation of the privileges of Congress, or of this House, be made to appear, I pledge myself to that gentleman to join him in resisting it. But let us inquire into the fact. No gentleman will deny the right of the President to initiate business here, by message, recommending particular subjects to our attention. If the Government of the United States possess the constitutional power to acquire territory from foreign States, the Executive, as the organ by which we communicate with such States, must be the prime agent in negotiating such an acquisition. Conceding, then, that the power of confirming this act, and annexing to the United States the territory thus acquired, ultimately rests with Congress, where has been the invasion of the privileges of that body? Does not the President of the United States submit this subject to Congress for their sanction? Does he not recognize the principle, which I trust we will never give up, that no treaty is binding until we pass the laws for executing it—that the powers conferred by the constitution on Congress cannot be modified, or abridged, by any treaty whatever—that the subjects of which they have cognizance cannot be taken, in any way, out of their jurisdiction? In this procedure nothing is to be seen but a respect, on the part of the Executive, for our rights; a recognition of a discretion on our part to accord or refuse our sanction. Where, then, is the violation of our rights? As to the initiative, in a matter like this, it necessarily devolved on the Executive.

Mr. R. said, that he would not dilate upon the importance of the navigation of the Mississippi, which had been the theme of every tongue, which we now possessed unfettered by the equal claim of the nation holding the west bank, a fruitful source of quarrel; but he would call the attention of the committee to a report which had been made at the last session and to which publicity had lately been given.

I am not surprised, Mr. Chairman, that in a performance so replete with information, a single error should be discovered, especially as it does not affect the soundness of its conclusion. As long ago as the year 1673, the inhabitants of the French province of Canada explored the country on the Mississippi. A few years afterwards (1685) La Salle, with emigrants from old France, made a settlement on the Bay of St. Bernard, and at the close of the 17th century, previous to the existence of Pensacola, another French settlement was made by the Governor, D’Ibberville, at Mobile, and on the Isle Dauphin, or Massacre, at the mouth of that bay. In 1712, a short time previous to the peace of Utrecht, Louis XIV. described the extent of the colony of Louisiana (by the settlements) in his grant of its exclusive commerce to Crozat. Three years subsequent to this, the Spanish establishment at Pensacola was formed, as well as the settlement of the Adais on the river Mexicana. After various conflicting efforts, on both sides, the bay and river Perdido was established, (from the peace of 1719,) as the boundary between the French province of Louisiana on the one side and the Spanish province of Florida on the other: this river being nearly equi-distant between Mobile and Pensacola. Near the close of the war between England and France, rendered memorable for the unexampled success with which it was conducted by that unrivalled statesman, the great Lord Chatham, Spain became a party on the side of France. The loss of the Havana, and other important dependencies, was the immediate consequence. In 1762, France, by a secret treaty of cotemporaneous date with the preliminary Treaty of Peace, relinquished Louisiana to Spain, as an indemnity for her losses, sustained by advocating the cause of France. By the definitive Treaty of 1763, France ceded to England all that part of Louisiana which lies east of the Mississippi, except the island of New Orleans—the rest of the province to Spain. It is to be observed that although France ostensibly ceded this country to England, virtually the cession was on the part of Spain; because France was no longer interested in the business, but as the friend of Spain, (having previously relinquished the whole to her,) and because in 1783 restitution was made by England, not to France, but to Spain, England having acquired this portion of Louisiana, together with the Spanish province of Florida, annexed to the former that part of Florida which lies west of the Apalachicola and east of the Perdido; thereby forming the province of West Florida.

It is only in English geography, and during this period, from 1763 to 1783, that such a country as West Florida is known. For Spain, having acquired both the Floridas in 1783, re-annexed to Louisiana the country west of the Perdido subject to the government of New Orleans, and established the ancient boundaries of Florida; the country between the Perdido and Apalachicola being subject to the Governor of St. Augustine. By the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, Spain cedes to France “the province of Louisiana with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain:” viz: to the Perdido, “and that it had when France possessed it to the Perdido—and such as it should be after treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other powers;” that is, saving to the United States the country given up by the Treaty of San Lorenzo. We have succeeded to all the right of France. If the navigation of the Mississippi alone were of sufficient importance to justify war, surely the possession of every drop of water which runs into it—the exclusion of European nations from its banks, who would have with us the same causes of quarrel, did we possess New Orleans only, which we have had with the former possessors of that key of the river; the entire command of the Mobile and its widely extended branches, scarcely inferior in consequence to the Mississippi itself—watering the finest country and affording the best navigation in the United States—surely these would be acknowledged to be inestimably valuable.

Mr. Purviance.—I am clearly and decidedly in favor of the resolution on your table, premising the appropriations for carrying the treaty between France and this country into effect; and I sincerely regret, that in doing so, I shall act adversely to the general sentiment of the gentlemen with whom it is my pleasure and my pride to confess I have hitherto politically officiated.

It is true I am, and always have been, opposed to the general tenor of the present Administration. It has not appeared to me to possess that bold commanding aspect—that erect and resolute front—which ought to be assumed by the Executive of a free people, when claiming satisfaction for a wrong sustained. It has not shown that strong, muscular, athletic shape, which is calculated to intimidate aggression, or which is enabled to resist it; nor do I think that it has manifested that firm, dignified, manly tone of virtue and of spirit, which, resting on the love of a free people, and conscious of their strength, can ask for the prompt, direct, and unequivocal satisfaction to which it is entitled, and, being denied, can take it. It has not appeared like the veteran chief, ready to gird his loins in defence of his country’s rights; but, if I may be allowed to use the magna componere parvis, it has, to my mind, somewhat resembled a militia subaltern, who, in time of war, directed his men not to fire on the enemy, lest the enemy might fire again.

Under such an Administration, I have thought that it would be better to have the ceded territory on any terms than not to have it at all. If we have not the spirit or the means of doing ourselves justice, would it not be better that we bribe those who might be in a situation to molest us, and thus put it out of their power to do us any injury, which we cannot or which we will not avenge? There are but two ways of maintaining our national independence—men and money. Since we did not use the first, we must have recourse to the last. One of these two we should be compelled to resort to if France gained possession of Louisiana, and we had better resort to it now. I deny that they have as yet gained possession: they have not received a delivery of the four redoubts which garrison and command the country, nor have they a single armed soldier there, except those which are particularly attached to the equipage of the Colonial Prefect. If, sir, we were obliged to resort to the necessity of purchasing their friendship, after they had procured an establishment, it would not be confined to one instance of humiliation and acknowledgment on our part, or one instance of insult only on theirs. If we purchase this friendship once, we should be compelled to make annual contributions to their avarice, and be annually subjected to their insolence. Repeated concessions would only produce a repetition of injury, and, at last, when we had completely compromitted our national dignity, and offered up our last cent as an oblation to Gallic rapacity, we would then be further from conciliation than ever. The spirit of universal domination, instead of being allayed by those measures which had been intended for its abatement, would rage with redoubled fury. Elated by those sacrifices which had been intended to appease it, it would still grow more fierce; it would soon stride across the Mississippi, and every encroachment which conquest or cunning could effect might be expected. The tomahawk of the savage and the knife of the negro would confederate in the league, and there would be no interval of peace, until we should either be able to drive them from their location altogether, or else offer up our sovereignty as a homage of our respect, and permit the name of our country to be blotted out of the list of nations for ever.

I confess there are many gentlemen of that nation for whom I entertain the sincerest esteem; but although I love some of them as friends, they will pardon me when I say that I do not like all of them as neighbors. Blood, havoc, and devastation, have for some years past encircled their proximity, and circumstances equally disastrous and equally improbable have already taken place. Do we want any evidences of this? We can find them in Switzerland, in Italy, in Egypt, in Hanover, in France itself. We have seen the ancient throne of the Capets tumbled from its base; we have seen the tide of succession which had flowed on uninterruptedly for ages dammed up for ever; we have seen the sources of the life blood royal drained dry. And by whom? By the pert younglings of the day.

“An eagle towering in his pride of flight

Was, by a mousing owl, hawkt at and killed.”

We have afterwards seen these puny upstarts, when their hands had been reddened in the slaughter pens of Paris, kicked from their seats, and a Corsican soldier embellished with the majesty of the Bourbons. We have seen one half of the Old World subjected to his dominion, and the other half alarmed at his power. And is it thought, sir, that America alone, with an army scarcely sufficient to defend our garrisons, with a navy scarcely sufficient to punish a Bashaw, with a treasury incommensurate to our engagements, and an Executive unwilling to strain our energies—is it, I say sir, for America alone, under these circumstances, singly to withstand that gigantic nation, fighting on her own ground, fed from her own granaries, and furnished from her own arsenals? The time once was, indeed, when we could have redressed our own wrongs, and had an opportunity of doing so; but that necessity and that opportunity, I take it sir, have now both passed away.

Yes, thank God! We have now a treaty, signed by themselves, in which they have voluntarily passed away the only means of annoyance which they possessed. But I do not thank the honorable gentleman who is at the head of our Executive. At the time this negotiation was commenced there could not be the smallest hope of its being carried into effect. The French Consul had obtained it perhaps for the express purpose of carrying into effect his favorite scheme of universal domination; it might give him the chance of injuring the British, controlling the Spaniards, and dismembering America. Compared with these objects a handful of bank stock was of no more consequence to him than a handful of sand. His fleet and army were ready to sail, and his colonial prefect had already arrived. But, mark! The King of Great Britain, who at this crisis I take to have been by far the most able negotiator we had, declares war. The scene is now changed. That which France had refused to our intercessions, she was now compelled to grant from mere necessity. A state of warfare took place about the last of March, and the treaty was signed soon afterwards. As long as I retain the small stock of understanding which it has pleased God to give me, I shall never be induced to believe, that it was owing in the smallest degree to the efficacy of diplomatic representation. The mind of that great man (Buonaparte) is not made of such soft materials as to receive an impress from the collision of every gentle hand. Stern, collected, and inflexible, he laughs to scorn the toying arts of persuasion; his soul is a stupendous rock, which the rushing of mighty waters cannot shake from its place. No, sir; had it not been for this happy coincidence of circumstances, the personal solicitations of our ministers would have been regarded with as listless an ear as if they had been whispered across the ocean.

Mr. Elliot.—Mr. Chairman, although in the short time since I have had the honor of a seat on this floor, I have several times risen in debate, that circumstance scarcely diminishes my diffidence at the present moment. Uneducated in the schools, and unpractised in the arts, of parliamentary eloquence, it is with no inconsiderable degree of diffidence that I rise upon the present occasion. There are occasions, however, where even the eye of timidity should sparkle with confidence; and there are questions in the discussion of which the finger should be removed from the lip of silence herself. And such is every occasion and every question involving the existence, the infraction, or even the correct and just construction of that constitution which is the palladium of our privileges, and the temple of our glory. If I might be permitted to borrow a metaphorical expression from one of the most celebrated commanders of antiquity, who declared that he intended to spread all his sails on the ocean of war, I would say that it is with fear and trembling I presume to launch my little feeble bark on the vast ocean of eloquence and literature (pointing to the federal members) by which I am surrounded. If, however, the remark be just, that it is even sweet and glorious to die for one’s country, surely the humbler sacrifice of native diffidence may with propriety be expected and exacted from a juvenile American Representative.

Whatever minuter shades or minor differences of opinion may exist among the American people, there is one point in which we shall all meet with cordial unanimity. We all unite in an ardent devotion to the constitution. He who is not devoted to it is unworthy of the honorable name of an American. I lament that it is necessary to speak particularly of myself; but duty, not only to myself, but to my constituents, a numerous and respectable section of the American people, demands it. It may be objected to me, and with truth, that there was a time when I professed sentiments hostile to some of the most important provisions in the constitution. It was not, however, at the time when the constitution was submitted to the people. I was then in infancy and obscurity, deprived of the means, and even of the hopes of education. I had yet read much and reflected more. My ardent and excursive eye had wandered rapidly over the wide field of ancient history; I thought I beheld my country, like the Roman Republic in the age of Cato, the sport of every wind and of every wave. As far as I understood the constitution, I admired it and wished for its adoption. But when an elegant anonymous writer predicted, as the consequence of its adoption, that “liberty would be but a name, to adorn the short historic page of the halcyon days of America,” I trembled and shuddered for the possible consequences. If in the plenitude of juvenile self-sufficiency (and who has not been young?) I have since fancied that I could form a more perfect constitution, that dream of the imagination has long been past. I have long been sincerely and ardently attached to the constitution.

The treaty before us is of an immense consequence, and my attention was early turned to the subject. From the moment of my election, I have devoted many studious and laborious hours to the subjects connected with it, and I have anticipated all the objections against it; none of those presented this day by the gentleman from New York, who opened the debate, or by the gentlemen who followed him on the same side, have struck my mind as novel. The question of the constitutionality of the treaty first presents itself. It is said to be unconstitutional, because it enlarges the territory of the United States. To reduce the arguments of gentlemen on this head to syllogistic form, they would not strike the mind with great force. The constitution is silent on the subject of the acquisition of territory. By the treaty we acquire territory; therefore the treaty is unconstitutional. It has been well remarked by an eminent civilian, that those are not the most correct and conclusive reasoners who are very expert at their quicquids, their atquis, and their ergos; but those, who, from correct premises, by just reasoning, deduce correct conclusions. This question is not to be determined from a mere view of the constitution itself, although it may be considered as admitted that it does not prohibit, in express terms, the acquisition of territory. It is a rule of law, that in order to ascertain the import of a contract, the evident intention of the parties, at the time of forming it, is principally to be regarded. This rule will apply, as it respects the present question, to our constitution, of which it may be said, as the great Dr. Johnson said of the science of the law, that it is the last result of human wisdom acting upon human experience. The constitution is a compact between the American people for certain great objects expressed in the preamble, [Mr. E. here read the preamble,] in language to which eloquence and learning can add no force or weight. Previous to the formation of this constitution there existed certain principles of the law of nature and nations, consecrated by time and experience, in conformity to which the constitution was formed. The question before us, I have always believed, must be decided upon the laws of nations alone; and under this impression I have examined the works of the most celebrated authors on that subject.

I recollect a time, sir, when a foreign minister in this country, at a moment when genius, fancy, and ardent patriotism, were lords of the ascendant over learning, wisdom, and experience, spoke of the law of nations and its principles as mere worm eaten authorities, and aphorisms of Vattel and others. I also recollect that the illustrious man who is now President of the United States was then Secretary of State, and that he delivered the unanimous sentiments of the American people when, in his reply to that minister, he observed that something more than mere sarcasms of that kind was necessary to disprove those authorities and principles; and that, until they were disproved, the American nation would hold itself bound by them. This is the man, sir, who has been so injuriously calumniated within these walls this morning, and upon whom such a torrent of bitter eloquence has been poured by the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Purviance;) a gentleman who is himself a model of eloquence, uniting all the excellencies of Cicero and Demosthenes, and all other orators, ancient and modern.

The American people, in forming their constitution, had an eye to that law of nations, which is deducible by natural reason and established by common consent, to regulate the intercourse and concerns of nations. With a view to this law the treaty-making power was constituted, and by virtue of this law, the Government and the people of the United States, in common with all other nations, possess the power and right of making acquisitions of territory by conquest, cession, or purchase. Indeed the gentlemen who deny us the right of acquiring by purchase, would probably allow us to keep the territory, were it obtained by conquest.

Colonies, or provinces, are a part of the eminent domain of the nation possessing them, and of course are national property; colonial territory may be transferred from one nation to another by purchase; this purchase can be effected by treaty alone, as nations do not, like individuals, execute deeds, and cause them to be recorded in public offices; that department of the Government of the nation purchasing, which possesses the treaty-making power generally, is competent to make treaties for that purpose. These positions are established by the laws of nations, and are applicable to the case before us. [Here Mr. E. read a variety of extracts from Vattel to establish these positions, and observed that they were corroborated by Grotius, Puffendorf, and other eminent writers on the law of nature and nations, whose works he had consulted.]

A mere recapitulation, and that not a tedious one, of these principles and authorities, will now answer the present purpose. Colonies have always been considered as national property, although the law or practice of nations, in this instance, may not conform to the law of nature. Greece treated her colonies with peculiar indulgence: Rome considered any privileges which hers were suffered to possess, as mere matters of grace, not of right. The one was a natural and tender parent, the other a cruel stepmother. Yet I have no recollection that the Grecian colonies in Asia Minor, Italy, or even at Ionia, were represented in the Amphyctionic Council, the General Assembly of the States of Greece. The claim of the British Colonies, which now constitute the United States, to be represented in that body by which they were taxed, though just in itself, was novel and unwarranted by the practice of nations. Thank God the claim was successful, and in consequence of it, we are now here as the representatives of the American people, deliberating upon their most important interests. It is unnecessary to reiterate the other positions; they are undeniable in themselves, and their applicability to the present case will hardly be disputed. If the treaty be extremely pernicious, or has not been made by sufficient authority, or has been made for unjust purposes, it is void by the laws of nations.

The expediency of the treaty is another question, and an important one. I once hoped that the interests of our country would never require an extension of its limits, and I regret even that that necessity now exists. Evils and dangers may be apprehended from this source, and great evils and dangers may possibly result. But the regions of possibility are illimitable; those of probability are marked by certain well-defined boundaries, obvious to all men of reason and reflection, and, in the language of the poet,

“As broad and obvious to the passing clown,

As to the letter’d sage’s curious eye.”

If we cannot find, in the peculiar principles of our form of government, and in the virtue and intelligence of our citizens, a sufficient security against the dangers from a widely extended territory, in vain shall we seek it elsewhere. There is no magical quality in a degree of latitude or longitude, a river or a mountain. And it has been well remarked, that every danger from this quarter might have been apprehended before the acquisition of this territory. The Roman Empire, or that of Alexander in the zenith of its glory, was scarcely capable of containing a greater population than the territory of the United States; and men conversant with history do not wonder at the transient existence and rapid ruin of those empires. I repeat it, Mr. Chairman, we must look for our security in principles and circumstances inapplicable to the ancient nations. With the present question of expediency, I confess, sir, are naturally intermingled many considerations, infinitely interesting to the future peace, prosperity, felicity, and glory of our beloved country. The physical strength of a nation depends upon an aggregation of circumstances, amongst which, compactness of population, as well as territory, may be reckoned; our population may become too scattered; but this too is only a possible event. These possible evils ought not to be put in competition with the certain advantage which we derive from the acquisition.

But a gentleman tells us that the Administration hold out to us an Eden of the western world, a land flowing with milk and honey, while they have obtained nothing but a dreary and barren wilderness. Perhaps, if the gentleman be correct, the acquisition is scarcely the less important. To demonstrate the advantages of this purchase, it is not necessary to describe Louisiana as an Elysian region—to describe it as Homer does the Fortunate Islands, a region, on whose auspicious climate even winter smiles, where no bleak wind blows from its mountains, and no gale is felt but the zephyr, diffusing health and pleasure. But from geographical information, defective as it is, and from reasonable analogies, we may conclude that, with the exception of some considerable tracts, it is a country fertile and salubrious. Geography points us to China, Persia, India, Arabia Felix, and Japan, countries situated in corresponding latitudes, which, though always overshadowed by the horrid gloom of despotism, are always productive, and teach us by analogy that Louisiana, in natural fertility, is probably equal to those beautiful oriental regions.

The gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Purviance) says, he shall vote for carrying the treaty into effect, because the possession of the territory is important, and the Administration not having, as it ought to have done, made use of men to obtain it, he will consent to make use of money. He has applied many curious epithets to the Administration. He wishes for an Administration athletic and muscular, meaning, I suppose, like the wrestlers in the Grecian circus, or the gladiators in that of Rome. When I came within these walls, sir, I ardently hoped that the voice of party would be silent during the discussion of this subject, and I did not expect to hear the Administration attacked in the language of vulgarity, malignity, and factious fury. When it is thus assailed, shall its defenders be silent? During the last session of Congress, an extraordinary degree of agitation was produced in the public mind by an egregious violation of our rights by an officer of the Spanish Government. Neither the people nor the Government were deficient in that spirit which the gentleman extols, but they were not governed by false ideas of national honor, and they were acquainted with the law of nations; they knew that we had no right to make the denunciatio belli precede the repetitio rerum—a declaration of war precede a demand for justice.

Mr. Sanford did not rise to make a display of his talents. Those who had confided to him the representation of their interests could have no such expectations, as they had unfortunately selected a plain Western farmer. He was sorry to see so much time wasted. He begged the House would recollect the time within which it was necessary to pass laws for carrying the treaty into effect. Much has been said of a breach of the constitution; but has any man shown it? The constitution does not prohibit the powers exercised on this occasion; and not having prohibited them, they must be considered as possessed by Government. In his opinion, it was necessary to carry the treaty into immediate effect. This done, other measures would require attention which would afford an ample harvest for the talents and eloquence of gentlemen with which, on any other occasion, he would be highly pleased.

Mr. Thatcher was sorry to be obliged, at this late hour, to state his reasons for voting against the resolution; but he should not discharge his duty to his constituents, were he to refrain from expressing his ideas. These reasons he should state as briefly as possible. This resolution is general, and contemplates two objects; it calls for the occupation and government of Louisiana, and for an appropriation of fifteen millions of dollars. He had hoped that, on a question of such national importance, they would have been allowed the papers necessary for its elucidation. But gentlemen have denied us this privilege. As the question, whether the treaty should be carried into effect, is a great constitutional question, I shall, in my remarks, confine myself to the constitutional objections against the treaty. Two objections have been made arising from the 3d and 7th articles of the treaty.

The third provides that “the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States; and in the mean time they shall be maintained and protected in the free, enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which they profess.”

I conceive, said Mr. T., that the only sound doctrine is, not that which has been stated by the gentleman from Kentucky, (Mr. Sanford,) that whatever power is not prohibited by the constitution is agreeable to it, but that such powers as are not given are still held by the States or the people. No arguments have been addressed to prove that the constitution delegates such a power. The gentleman from Vermont, (Mr. Elliot,) who has gratified us with so long and flowery a speech, and who has ransacked Vattel, and various other eminent authors on the laws of nations, has proved that where the United States have a right to make a treaty, a treaty may be made. But these authorities do not apply unless he prove that the constitution gives the powers exercised in the present instance. The confederation under which we now live is a partnership of States, and it is not competent to it to admit a new partner but with the consent of all the partners. If such power exist, it does not reside in the President and Senate. The constitution says new States may be admitted by Congress. If this article of the constitution authorizes the exercise of power under the treaty, it must reside with the Legislature, and not with the President and Senate.

The gentleman from Virginia says, the principle contained in the third article of the treaty has been already recognized by Congress, and has instanced our treaties with Spain and Great Britain respecting the adjustment of our limits. By adverting to these treaties, it will be seen that there was then no pretence that we had acquired new territory. They only establish our lines agreeably to the Treaty of Peace. Certainly then the facts are not similar, and there exists no analogy of reasoning between the two cases. The gentleman from Virginia asks whether we could not purchase the right of deposit at New Orleans? But the argument meant to be conveyed in this question does not apply. We had the right before this treaty was formed; nor did we, in consequence of that right, undertake to admit the people of New Orleans into the Union.

Mr. Crowninshield.—Mr. Chairman: I rise, sir, to correct the gentleman from North Carolina in one particular; he has stated that the First Consul of France signed the treaty ceding Louisiana to the United States after the declaration of war by Great Britain against France. I believe he is mistaken, sir, for the Louisiana treaties were signed the 30th April, and Great Britain issued a declaration of war against France on the 17th of May. If I am right, the gentleman might have spared himself the trouble of detracting from the merits of the Executive on this great occasion.

Now I am up, I beg leave to state to the committee some of the reasons why I shall give my vote in favor of the treaties.

A resolution is on the table which recommends that provision ought to be made to carry into effect the late treaties with France, which cede Louisiana to the United States. Feeling as I do that we have acquired this country at a cheap price, that it is a necessary barrier in the Southern and Western quarters of the Union, that it offers immense advantages to us as an agricultural and commercial nation, I am highly in favor of the acquisition, and I shall most cordially give my vote in approbation of the resolution.

What, sir, shall we let slip this golden opportunity of acquiring New Orleans and the whole of Louisiana for the trifling sum of fifteen millions of dollars, when one-quarter part of the purchase money will be paid to our own citizens, the remainder in public stock, which we are not obliged to redeem under fifteen years? I trust, sir, we shall not omit to seize the only means now left to us for getting a peaceable possession of the finest country in the world. The bargain is a good one, and considering it merely in that light, we ought not to relinquish it. I have no doubt that the country acquired is richly worth fifty millions of dollars, and it is my opinion that we ought not to hesitate a moment in passing the resolution on the table.

We have now an opening for a free trade to New Orleans and Louisiana, which we never had before, and I hope we shall embrace it. Let us ratify the treaties, with all their provisions, and we shall see that in less than three years we have gained the greatest advantages in our commerce. I wish we may immediately proceed to adopt the resolution before the committee.

Mr. Mitchill rose and said, he entreated the indulgence of the committee for rising at so late a stage of the debate, when seven hours have already been employed in the sitting of the day. And the reason of his request was, that such extraordinary doctrines have been advanced against carrying into effect the treaty with France which cedes Louisiana to our nation, and such repeated allusions have been made to the sentiments which he submitted to the House during the debate of yesterday, that he felt himself called upon to attempt a reply, and therein to show that the grounds taken by the gentlemen of the opposition are neither strong nor tenable. Although the subject is ample and copious, he should endeavor to condense his remarks, to so moderate a compass, as not to trespass long upon the patience of the committee.

My colleague, said Mr. M., who opened the debate this morning, (Mr. G. Griswold,) displayed in his speech the objections raised against the resolution on the table, so fully, that he almost exhausted the subject. For, in listening attentively to the reasoning of the gentleman from Virginia, who followed him, (Mr. J. Lewis,) and of the other gentleman from Virginia, who spoke next, (Mr. Griffin,) he could not discern that any new or additional matter of much consequence had been urged. Nor did he discover much more than a repetition in substance of his colleague’s reasoning, in what had been urged by the gentleman from Mass., (Mr. Thatcher,) and the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Griswold;) though the statement of their objections had received a form and coloring diversified according to the skill and ingenuity of each.

The gentlemen, Mr. Chairman, who resist the provisions necessary to the completion of this treaty, do so because they say it has been ratified by the President and Senate in open violation of the constitution of the United States, and is, therefore, no treaty, but a nullity, an instrument void ab initio, not a part of the supreme law of the land, and consequently not binding upon Congress or the nation. They draw this bold and extraordinary conclusion from the style and meaning of the 3d and 7th articles of the treaty. The former of these, they say, is unconstitutional, because it proposes to annex a new territory, with its inhabitants, to our present dominion; the latter, because it abolishes for a term of years the discriminating duties of tonnage and impost within the ceded territory, giving a preference there to France and Spain, and leaving those duties unaltered in all the ports of the Union.

By the third article, it is agreed that the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States as soon as possible, according to the principles of the federal constitution, and be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of the citizens of the United States; and in the mean time they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which they profess.

On expounding this article, my colleague has declared that the President and Senate have no power to acquire new territory by treaty, and he argues that our people are to be for ever confined to their present limits. This is an assertion directly contrary to the powers inherent in independent nations, and contradictory to the frequent and allowed exercise of that power in our own nation. We are constantly in the practice of receiving territory by cession from the red men of the West, the aborigines of our country. The very treaty mentioned in the President’s Message, with the Kaskaskias Indians, whereby we have acquired a large extent of land, would, according to this doctrine, be unconstitutional; and so would all the treaties which add to the size of our statute book, with the numerous tribes of the natives on our frontiers. According to this construction, all our negotiations so happily concluded with those people, whom we ever have uniformly acknowledged as the sovereigns of the soil, are nugatory, and to be holden for naught. He said, he was perfectly aware of the answer which would be made, that we held all our national domain, under Great Britain, by virtue of the treaty concluded at Paris in 1783. What, after all, was the amount of that cession by England? Certainly not a conveyance of a country which never was theirs, but rightfully belonged to the Indian natives; for it was, in its true construction, merely a quit claim of the pretensions or title of the land which the English had obtained by conquest and treaty from the French. By that negotiation, the United States obtained a bare relinquishment of the claims and possessions of those two powerful nations. But the paramount title of the original inhabitants was not affected by this. However contemptuously the rights of these rude and feeble tribes had been regarded by the Europeans, their descendants in these States had considered them with recognition and respect. Until the Indians sold their lands for an equivalent, the humane and just principles of the American Government acknowledged them to be the only legitimate owners. And the sovereignty acquired by treaty or purchase to our Government was derived from the title which the natives transferred to them as grantees in a fair bargain and sale. Such, Mr. M. argued, were the rules of true construction, and these rules admitted and acted upon by the Federal Government; and yet, according to the novel doctrine of this day, every treaty with the natives for parcels of their country, although hitherto deemed lawful, would be an unconstitutional act. According to this notion, every treaty for lands, held with the aborigines since the organization of the Government, was a violation of the constitution. And thus this invaluable instrument, this bulwark of our liberties, had been violated perhaps twenty times or more, since we began to buy the surplusage of their hunting grounds. The Indian tribes are as much aliens as any other foreign nations. Their lands are as much foreign dominion as the soil of France or Spain. Yet we have gone on to annex the territories which they sold us, to our present territory, from the time we acquired independence, and no mortal, until this debate arose, Mr. Chairman, has so much as thought that thereby a breach of the constitution was made. My colleague is surely entitled to great credit for his perspicuity in finding out that all our great and wise predecessors in administering this Government have been plunderers and constitution-breakers. But, sir, the just judgment on this subject is, that the Presidents and Senate of the United States have heretofore acted constitutionally in acquiring by purchase foreign dominions from the alien Indians. And by a parity of reasoning, they have acted not only constitutionally, but eminently for the interest of the country, in buying Louisiana from the white men, its present sovereigns.

But, independent of correct principles and steady precedent in favor of the acquirement of new territory, it may be worth while to mention a few of the strange consequences which flow from the doctrine which the gentlemen of the other side of the House contend for. According to their reasoning, if by any force of the currents of the ocean, or any conflicts of the winds and the waves, a new surface of earth should emerge from the neighborhood of Cape Hatteras, it would be unconstitutional to take possession of it. Yet it appears to me, sir, very like an absurdity to say the United States would break their bond of union by erecting a light-house on it. Suppose that, by volcanic action, islands should be suddenly elevated from the bottom of the neighboring Atlantic, as they have repeatedly risen from the depths of the Mediterranean, would it be unconstitutional to take possession of them? So far from it, there would on the other hand be a duty in the Government to assume the dominion of all adjacent islands. Again; suppose for a moment that our present limits were full of people, would it be unconstitutional to purchase additional territory for them to settle upon? Must the hive always contain its present numbers, and no swarm ever go forth? At this rate we should, before a great lapse of time, arrive at a plenum of inhabitants, and if no new settlement could be obtained for them, the Chinese custom of infanticide must be tolerated to get rid of those tender little beings for whom food enough could not be procured, to rear them to manhood. And thus, when this maximum of population shall have arrived, there would be no constitutional power to purchase and possess any of the waste lands on this or the other side of the Mississippi, for them to spread and thrive upon. A doctrine against which, he confessed, his understanding revolted.

Our Government having in this manner the right of acquiring additional territory, had very often exercised that right by actual purchases and by possessions and settlements afterwards. The whole of the recent State of Ohio and of the Indiana Territory was obtained and peopled in this manner. And in the settlement of limits both on the side of Florida and Nova Scotia, the principle had again and again been acted upon; and, strange to tell, nobody, until this eventful time, had possessed acuteness enough to find out the error.

But the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Chairman, (Mr. Griswold,) contends that even if we had a right to purchase soil, we have no business with the inhabitants. His words, however, are very select; for he said, and often repeated it, that the treaty-making power did not extend to the admission of foreign nations into this confederacy. To this it may be replied that the President and Senate have not attempted to admit foreign nations into our confederacy. They have bought a tract of land, out of their regard to the good of our people and their welfare. And this land, Congress are called upon to pay for. Unfortunately for the bargain, this region contains civilized and Christian inhabitants; and their existence there, it is alleged, nullifies the treaty. The gentleman construed the Constitution of the United States very differently from the manner in which Mr. M. himself did. By the third section of the third article of that instrument, it is declared, that Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property of the United States, and nothing therein contained shall be construed so as to prejudice any claim of the United States, or of any particular State.

In the case of Louisiana no injury is done either to the nation or to any State belonging to that great body politic. There was nothing compulsory upon the inhabitants of Louisiana to make them stay and submit to our Government. But if they chose to remain, it had been most kindly and wisely provided, that until they should be admitted to the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States, they shall be maintained and protected in the enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which they profess. What would the gentleman propose that we shall do with them? Send them away to the Spanish provinces, or turn them loose in the wilderness? No, sir, it is our purpose to pursue a much more dignified system of measures. It is intended, first, to extend to this newly acquired people the blessings of law and social order. To protect them from rapacity, violence, and anarchy. To make them secure in their lives, limbs, and property, reputation, and civil privileges. To make them safe in the rights of conscience. In this way they are to be trained up in a knowledge of our own laws and institutions. They are thus to serve an apprenticeship to liberty; they are to be taught the lessons of freedom; and by degrees they are to be raised to the enjoyment and practice of independence. All this is to be done as soon as possible; that is, as soon as the nature of the case will permit; and according to the principles of the federal constitution. Strange! that proceedings declared on the face of them to be constitutional, should be inveighed against as violations of the constitution! Secondly, after they shall have been a sufficient length of time in this probationary condition, they shall, as soon as the principles of the constitution permit, and conformably thereto, be declared citizens of the United States. Congress will judge of the time, manner, and expediency of this. The act we are now about to perform will not confer on them this elevated character. They will thereby gain no admission into this House, nor into the other House of Congress. There will be no alien influence thereby introduced into our councils. By degrees, however, they will pass on from the childhood of republicanism, through the improving period of youth, and arrive at the mature experience of manhood. And then, they may be admitted to the full privileges which their merit and station will entitle them to.

Mr. J. Randolph said that a sense of duty alone could have induced him to rise at that late hour. He wished to call the attention of the committee to a stipulation in the Treaty of London. [Here Mr. R. read an extract from the third article of that treaty, whereby the United States are pledged not to impose on imports in British vessels from their territories in America, adjacent to the United States, any higher duties than would be paid upon such imports, if brought into our Atlantic ports in American bottoms.] In this case, he said, gentlemen could not avail themselves of the distinction taken by his friend from Maryland (Mr. Nicholson) between a Territory and a State, even if they were so disposed—since the ports in question were ports of a State. The ports of New York, on the Lakes, were as much ports of that State, as the city of New York itself; they had their custom-house officers, were governed by the same regulations as other ports,—duties were exacted at them; and yet, under the article of the British Treaty which had been just read, British bottoms could and did enter them subject to no higher duties than were paid by American bottoms in the Atlantic ports. Mr. R. said that he did not mean to affirm that this exemption made by the Treaty of London was constitutional, so long as a distinction prevailed between American and British bottoms in other ports. He had never given a vote to carry that treaty into effect—but he hoped the gentlemen from Connecticut—both of whom he believed had done so; one of whom, at least, he knew had been a conspicuous advocate of that treaty—he hoped that gentleman (Mr. Griswold) would inform the committee how he got over the constitutional objection to this article of the Treaty of London, which he had endeavored to urge against that under discussion. How could the gentleman, with the opinion which he now holds, agree to admit British bottoms into certain ports, on the same terms on which American bottoms were admitted into American ports, generally? thereby making that very difference,—giving that very preference to those particular ports of certain States, which he tells us cannot constitutionally be given to the port of New Orleans—although that port is not within any State, and, if his (Mr. Griswold’s) doctrine be correct, not even within the United States!

The gentleman from Connecticut professed a wish that this important discussion should be conducted with moderation and candor. In this sentiment he concurred. He was therefore altogether unprepared, after this preamble, to hear the gentleman from Connecticut represent the treaty in question as conceding the most valuable commercial privileges to France and Spain, and thereby sapping the very foundation of our own carrying trade. In the spirit of candor the stipulations in question would be viewed, not as conceding advantages in trade to those nations, but as securing them to ourselves. The article in question did indeed profess to grant, for a limited time, to French and Spanish vessels, laden with the products of their respective countries, admission into the ports of the ceded territory, on equal terms with our own ships. But, although nominally an advantage has been conceded to these nations, substantially their situation was changed for the worse, and the benefit in fact conferred on us. For what were our rights in these ports, and what were theirs, setting aside the treaty? The treaty then had rendered our situation more eligible and theirs less so. How then could gentlemen declare that it was calculated to injure our carrying trade? when by it our trade was put on the footing of absolute security, while that of France and Spain was admitted under considerable restrictions, enjoying in but one particular, and for twelve years only, an equality with ours. Their trade, before on so superior a footing, had descended from its pre-eminence in privilege, and given way to ours; and yet gentlemen warn us of the destruction of our carrying trade, and commercial prosperity, from the very source which has enlarged and secured both. The enemies of the treaty, therefore, are the advocates of the trade of France and Spain, and the enemies so far of our own; since, by retaining things in their present posture, they would continue to those nations the superior advantages which they now enjoy in the ports of Louisiana, they would continue the restrictions which heretofore have fettered our commerce to that country, and they would refuse to put our trade on a footing superior to that of France and Spain.

On the subject of expediency, the gentleman had undervalued the country west of the Mississippi, and had declared that he considered the barren province of Florida as more important to us. Mr. R. asked if the country west of the Mississippi were not valuable, according to the gentleman’s own statement, since it afforded the means of acquiring Florida, which he prized so highly, from Spain? He had no doubt of the readiness of that power to relinquish Florida, in itself a dead expense to her—only valuable as an out-work to her other possessions, and now insulated by those of the United States—for a very small portion of the country which we claimed in virtue of the treaty under discussion.

He denied the correctness of the doctrine advanced by the same gentleman, that the stipulation entered into by France, in time of war, to raise the Duke of Parma to the throne of Etruria, bound her to obtain a recognition of that King from every power of Europe. All which concerned us in that treaty had been recited in ours with France. By the Treaty of St. Ildefonso His Catholic Majesty stipulates “to redeliver (retroceder) to the French Republic, six months after the full and entire execution of the conditions and stipulations herein relative to His Royal Highness the Duke of Parma, the colony or province of Louisiana.” What these stipulations were is certainly known only to the parties themselves, for they never were officially made public, although we are at no loss to conjecture them. Nor are we at all concerned whether France has or has not complied with them. Because in a treaty executed at Madrid, six months after, in March, 1801, they show that they consider the former treaty as having passed the title to the country to France. The fifth article is as follows:

“This treaty being in pursuance of that already concluded between the First Consul and His Catholic Majesty, by which the King delivers to France possession of Louisiana, the contracting parties agree to carry into effect the said treaty,” &c.

Spain, therefore, being satisfied as to the stipulations entered into by France in the Treaty of San Ildefonso, declares herself in the second treaty ready to redeliver the country to her whenever she was ready to receive it, and Mr. R. said, he had it from high authority that the royal mandate to that effect was in the hands of the Minister of the French Republic near the United States, and would be forwarded to the existing Government of Louisiana so soon as the treaty should be confirmed on our part.

Having departed considerably from the particular point on which he wished to be satisfied by the gentleman from Connecticut, who had spoken first, (Mr. Griswold,) he would again recall the attention of that gentleman to the third article of the Treaty of London, and request that he would reconcile its provisions to the doctrine which he had advanced on the seventh article of the treaty then before the committee.

The committee now rose. Mr. Speaker resumed the Chair, and Mr. Dawson reported that the committee had, according to order, had the said message, treaty, conventions, and motion, under consideration, and come to several resolutions thereupon; which he delivered in at the Clerk’s table, where the same were read, as follows:

1. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for carrying into effect the treaty and conventions concluded at Paris on the thirtieth of April, one thousand eight hundred and three, between the United States of America and the French Republic.

2. Resolved, That so much of the Message of the President, of the twenty-first instant, as relates to the establishment of a Provisional Government over the territory acquired by the United States, in virtue of the treaty and conventions lately negotiated with the French Republic, be referred to a select committee; and that they report by bill, or otherwise.

3. Resolved, that so much of the aforesaid conventions as relates to the payment, by the United States, of sixty millions of francs to the French Republic, and to the payment, by the United States, of debts due by France to citizens of the United States, be referred to the Committee of Ways and Means.

The House proceeded to consider the said resolutions at the Clerk’s table: Whereupon the first resolution being again read, was, on the question put thereupon, agreed to by the House—yeas 90, nays 25, as follows:

Yeas.—Willis Alston, jr., Nathaniel Alexander, Isaac Anderson, John Archer, David Bard, George Michael Bedinger, Phanuel Bishop, William Blackledge, John Boyle, Robert Brown, William Butler, George W. Campbell, Levi Casey, Martin Chittenden, Clifton Claggett, Thomas Claiborne, Joseph Clay, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, Frederick Conrad, Jacob Crowninshield, Richard Cutts, John Dawson, William Dickson, John Earle, Peter Early, James Elliot, John W. Eppes, William Eustis, William Findley, John Fowler, Peterson Goodwyn, Edwin Gray, Andrew Gregg, Wade Hampton, John A. Hanna, Josiah Hasbrouck, Joseph Heister, William Hoge, David Holmes, Samuel Hunt, John G. Jackson, Walter Jones, William Kennedy, Nehemiah Knight, Michael Leib, John B. C. Lucas, Matthew Lyon, Andrew McCord, William McCreery, David Meriwether, Samuel L. Mitchill, Nicholas R. Moore, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, jun., Joseph H. Nicholson, Gideon Olin, Beriah Palmer, John Patterson, Samuel D. Purviance, John Randolph, jun., Thomas M. Randolph, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob Richards, Cæsar A. Rodney, Erastus Root, Thomas Sammons, Thomas Sanford, Ebenezer Seaver, John Smilie, John Smith of New York, John Smith of Virginia, Richard Stanford, Joseph Stanton, John Stewart, David Thomas, Philip R. Thompson, John Trigg, Philip Van Cortlandt, Joseph A. Varnum, Daniel C. Verplanck, Matthew Walton, John Whitehill, Marmaduke Williams, Richard Winn, Joseph Winston, and Thomas Wynns.

Nays.—William Chamberlin, Manasseh Cutler, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, Thomas Dwight, Calvin Goddard, Thomas Griffin, Gaylord Griswold, Roger Griswold, Seth Hastings, David Hough, Joseph Lewis, jun., Thomas Lewis, Henry W. Livingston, Nahum Mitchill, Thomas Plater, Joshua Sands, John Cotton Smith, William Stedman, James Stephenson, Samuel Taggart, Samuel Tenney, Samuel Thatcher, Peleg Wadsworth, and Lemuel Williams.

The second resolution being again read, and amended at the Clerk’s table, was, on the question put thereupon, agreed to by the House, as follows:

Resolved, That so much of the Message of the President, of the twenty-first instant, as relates to the occupation and establishment of a Provisional Government over the Territory acquired by the United States, in virtue of the treaty and conventions lately negotiated with the French Republic, be referred to a select committee; and that they report by bill, or otherwise.

Ordered, That Mr. John Randolph, jr., Mr. John Rhea, of Tennessee, Mr. Hoge, Mr. Gaylord Griswold, and Mr. Bedinger, be appointed a committee, pursuant to the said resolution.

The third resolution reported from the Committee of the whole House, being again read, was agreed to by the House.

Thursday, October 27.

Another member, to-wit, Abram Trigg, from Virginia, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

Louisiana Treaty.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill from the Senate, entitled, “An act to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the thirtieth of April last, and for other purposes.”

The bill having been read, by paragraphs, as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to take possession of and occupy the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris, on the thirtieth day of April last, between the two nations; and that he may for that purpose, and in order to maintain in the said territories the authority of the United States, employ any part of the army and navy of the United States, and of the force authorized by an act passed the third day of March last, entitled, “An act directing a detachment from the militia of the United States, and for erecting certain arsenals,” which he may deem necessary; and so much of the sum appropriated by the said acts as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated for the purpose of carrying this act into effect; to be applied under the direction of the President of the United States.

Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That, until Congress shall have made provision for the temporary government of the said territories, all the military, civil, and judicial powers, exercised by the officers of the existing government of the same, shall be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct.

Mr. J. Randolph said he was apprised that the bill was of such a nature as seemed to delegate to the President of the United States a power, the exercise of which was intended to have but a short duration; he was also aware, that some such power was necessary to be vested in the Executive, to enable him to take possession of the country ceded by France. But he could conceive no cause for giving a latitude, as to time, so extensive as that allowed by the second section, which says, that “until Congress shall have made provision for the temporary government of the said territories, all the military, civil, and judicial powers, exercised by the officers of the existing government of the same, shall be vested in such person or persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct.” If we give this power out of our hands, it may be irrevocable until Congress shall have made legislative provision; that is, a single branch of the Government, the Executive branch, with a small minority of either House, may prevent its resumption. He did not believe that, under any circumstances, it was proper to delegate to the Executive a power so extensive; but if proper under certain circumstances, he was sure it was improper under present circumstances. As he conceived it proper to deal out power to the Executive with as sparing a hand as was consistent with the public good, he should move an amendment to substitute in the place of the words “Congress shall have made provision for the temporary government of the said territories”—these words, “the expiration of the present session of Congress, unless provision for the temporary government of the said territories be sooner made by Congress.” So that if Congress shall make provision for the government of the territory at any time during the session, the power of the President will cease, and at any rate at the expiration of the session. In other words, this amendment will compel Congress to take early measures for reducing this enormous power, delegated to the Executive, by the establishment of a government for the people of Louisiana.

Mr. R. Griswold moved to strike out the whole of the second section, which would supersede the motion of the gentleman from Virginia. He made this motion to obtain an explanation respecting the nature and extent of the delegated power. That section provides “that until Congress shall have made provision for the temporary government of the said territories, all the military, civil, and judicial powers, exercised by the officers of the existing government of the same, shall be vested in such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct.” I wish to know, said Mr. Griswold, whether any gentleman can inform me what the military, civil, and judicial powers, exercised by the officers of the existing province are; for we are about to confirm them, and direct their execution by the authorities of the United States.

It is probable that some of them may be inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States. We have certain restrictions on powers exercised under it. For instance, that the habeas corpus shall not be suspended in cases of invasion or rebellion, and a variety of other restraints. It is for this reason that I think we ought to have some knowledge of the powers exercised in Louisiana, before we confirm them in the lump; and in order to obtain this information, I move to strike out the section.

Mr. Elliot rose to second the motion of the gentleman from Connecticut, and to express his coincidence in the sentiments of that gentleman on this subject. He would never consent to delegate, for a single moment, such extensive powers to the President, even over a Territory. Such a delegation of power was unconstitutional. If such a provision as that contemplated by the section were necessary, it became Congress itself to enter upon the task of legislation.

Mr. J. Randolph had hoped that some other member would have given the gentleman from Connecticut the satisfaction he asked in relation to the provisions of the section proposed to be stricken out. No one having risen, he would do it himself as well as he was able. That gentleman asks whether we know the civil, military, and judicial powers that subsist in Louisiana; and contends that it is necessary we should know them before they are transferred to the Executive of the United States. If the section were to stand as it now does, Mr. R. said he would be as unwilling as the gentleman from Connecticut to agree to it. But, with the proposed limitation, he saw no substantial objection to it. He was one of those who did not know with precision what the subsisting civil, military, and judicial powers exercised in Louisiana were; and yet he saw not the difficulty which the gentleman had stated, as to the temporary transfer of the powers to the Executive with the limitation proposed—and wherefore? Because, in the nature of things, it was almost impossible to take possession of the country without the exercise of such powers at some point of time, and if they should be exercised but for a single moment, such exercise would be as hostile to the principles of the gentleman as the exercise of them for a whole year.

I ask, said Mr. R., whether if the country should be taken possession of on the principles advocated by the gentleman on a former day, these powers would not all have attached to the Executive? Suppose, instead of assuming the civil government of the territory, it had been taken possession of by storm, by an army of 40 or 50,000 soldiers—will the gentleman contend, that under such circumstances, the privilege of the habeas corpus or trial by jury would have been invaded? Undoubtedly not. If the gentleman will advert with precision to the first section, he will perceive that it is contemplated to take possession in such a manner as will give the United States security in that possession. For though we might not doubt the disposition of the Government of France to give us a secure possession, or apprehend difficulty from any other quarter, yet it would be recollected that there were citizens or subjects in the territory requiring some government. It was not impossible that on taking possession there may be some turbulent spirits, who, having at heart the advancement of personal schemes, may be disposed to resist. It would be unwise then in Congress to delay making the requisite provision, until necessity claimed it, and until, perhaps, after Congress had adjourned.

Gentlemen will see the absolute necessity of the path chalked out by the Senate. They will see the necessity of the United States taking possession of the country in the capacity of sovereigns, in the same extent as that of the existing government of the province. After having taken possession, and being in the secure enjoyment of the country, it will be extremely proper to guard against any apprehended Executive invasion of right. This step will then be politic, and it will be observed that the section as amended enjoins this duty upon Congress. If, however, the gentleman from Connecticut will show us any way in which the country may be taken possession of, with security, and by which the people may enjoy all the rights and franchises of citizens of the United States immediately, I shall be happy to give it the sanction of my vote. But to my mind this appears impossible.

Mr. Griswold thought it extraordinary that the gentleman from Virginia should call upon him to propose a plan for avoiding the difficulties that would apparently result from the system proposed by the bill, when it had only that day been laid upon their tables, and had been yesterday refused to be referred to a select committee; and of consequence, no time for reflection had been allowed. Under these circumstances, it was indeed extraordinary that he should be expected to propose a plan. He confessed he was unable to offer any. To do it would doubtless require time and deliberation. It was sufficient for him that the bill infringed the constitution. By the second section it is proposed to transfer to the President of the United States all the powers, civil, military, and judicial, exercised at present in that province. What are those powers? No gentleman is able to inform me. It may be presumed that they are legislative; the President, therefore, is to be made the legislator of that country; that they are judicial, the President, therefore, is to be made judge; that they are executive, and so far they constitutionally devolve on the President. Hence, we are about making the President the legislator, the judge, and the executive of this territory. I do not, said Mr. G., understand that, according to the constitution, we have a right to make him legislator, judge, and executive, in any territory belonging to the United States. Though, therefore, on this occasion, I feel no jealousy of the abuse of the powers conferred on the President, yet I cannot agree to them, because I consider them repugnant to the constitution.

The argument that the powers are necessary, though unconstitutional, is no argument with me. If gentlemen can so explain the section, as to show to the satisfaction of the committee that it is competent to this House to transfer to the President all these powers, I shall have no objection to the section; but until this is done, it is my duty to vote for striking it out. And though it is impossible for me, at this moment, to devise a plan for overcoming these difficulties, yet I trust, if time be allowed, there will be found wisdom enough in the committee to devise one. To the first section, authorizing the taking possession of the country, so far as I can understand it, I can see no objection.

Mr. Nicholson was opposed to striking out the second section, as he did not perceive the evils contemplated by the gentleman from Connecticut. The question is, whether we shall take immediate possession of this country, or wait till this body shall have time to form such a government as shall be hereafter likely to render the people happy, under laws according to the provisions of the constitution? I think, said Mr. N., it will be injudicious to delay taking the possession, until such a government shall be formed. The only question then that can be started is, whether the second section of this bill violates the constitution. On this point I differ entirely from the gentleman from Connecticut. I do not see in it any violation of the constitution. The gentleman supposes that by adopting the provisions of the second section we shall vest all the civil, military, and judicial powers of the existing Government of Louisiana in the President. But it clearly is not so. We vest in him the appointment of the persons who shall exercise these powers, but we do not delegate to him the exercise of the powers themselves. Is there any difference between this, and the provisions of the ordinance of 1787, which relates to territorial governments? By that ordinance, and I have never heard its constitutionality questioned, all the civil, military, and judicial powers are vested in such persons as the President may appoint.

Mr. Mitchill expressed his wish that the section of the bill might stand. To strike it out would be to make void all the proceedings respecting the province of Louisiana, on which Congress had been engaged with so much care and diligence. We had purchased the country, and made arrangements to pay for it; and now, with the consent of France, possession is to be taken; when behold! an objection is made to that part of the intended statute which confers on the President the power to occupy and hold it peaceably for the nation.

But, let it be examined fairly what Congress are meditating to do. The third section of the fourth article of the constitution contemplates that territory and other property may belong to the United States. By a treaty with France the nation has lately acquired title to a new territory, with various kinds of public property on it or annexed to it. By the same section of the constitution, Congress is clothed with the power to dispose of such territory and property, and to make all needful rules and regulations respecting it. This is as fair an exercise of constitutional authority as that by which we assemble and hold our seats in this House. To the title thus obtained, we wish now to add the possession; and it is proposed that for this important purpose the President shall be duly empowered. There is no person in the nation to whom this can be so properly confided as to the President.

Mr. Dana said if the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania were inserted, it might imply that we may pass laws that were unconstitutional; it was, therefore, superfluous. It is objected to the scope of the second section, that it is unconstitutional; insert the amendment and it nullifies it. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Mitchill) has referred to a subject with which he is well conversant. He is correct in stating that the formal style of the English acts is in the name of the King. In the formal style of the acts of Parliament, the King is legislator; but will it be inferred from this circumstance that he is the real legislator? The gentleman is too well acquainted with the constitution and laws of that country, not to know that the King, though nominally the dispenser of justice, cannot himself sit upon the bench, and that this has been the case since the act of settlement. He might, in support of this position, refer to the declaration of a celebrated Chief Justice of England, who had said that the honor of the Crown had nothing to do with the courts of justice.

The gentleman is equally unfortunate in his remarks on the power of Congress to make rules for the government of a Territory. It is objected to this, that in this case you make no laws at all. Is it to make laws, to say a man may do as he pleases? The proposed government is not even provisional or circumscribed. Insufficient also is any argument deducible from the ordinance establishing territorial governments. He presumed the ordinance alluded to was that of 1787. Under that ordinance the President is authorized to appoint the judges of the Territory; but once appointed, they hold their offices during good behavior. Who, under that ordinance, make the laws? Neither the judges nor the President. No laws can be accepted but such as have received the sanction of a representative body. What is proposed by the bill? That all powers, military, civil, and judicial, exercised by the officers of the existing government, shall be vested in such persons, and shall be exercised in such manner as the President shall direct. He may, under this authority, establish the whole code of Spanish laws, however contrary to our own; appoint whomsoever he pleases as judges, and remove them according to his pleasure; thus uniting in himself all the power, legislative, executive, and judicial. This, though a complete despotism, gentlemen may perhaps say is necessary. If so, let the military power be exercised by the President as commander-in-chief of the armies.

Mr. Eustis said it was possible the bill under consideration might in its details be objectionable, but in principle it was certainly sound. The Government of the United States has a constitutional right to acquire territory, and they have consequently a right to take possession of it when acquired. The taking possession of it was not only the right, but the duty of the Government. And how is this to be effected? Will any gentleman venture to propose a delay until Congress shall have passed a new code of laws? Are gentlemen, at this late day, to be informed that this would be to throw away one of the most valuable acquisitions made by our country since the adoption of the constitution, or the Declaration of Independence? As the gentleman, last speaking, rightly observes, the entire government of Spain ceases on our taking possession. Are we then to abandon the people to anarchy?

As to the extent of the power vested in the Executive, it arises from necessity. This is a new case altogether. There is no doubt that on many particular subordinate points, respecting the secure possession of this country, difficulties may present themselves. But Mr. E. presumed and expected that the same wisdom that acquired it, would preside over the councils of the nation to meet and overcome those difficulties. The second section of the bill contemplates the transfer to officers of the United States, of the same powers now exercised. It may be that the exercise of all these powers will not be necessary; while it is possible that others may be necessary. There may be difficulties of various kinds. He should name none. But as they arise, it will be the duty of the Government to be prepared to meet them. He would, therefore, wish this act rather to increase than curtail them; and that the President should be authorized not only to continue all necessary existing powers, but to institute such other powers as may be necessary for the well-being of the Territory. Till when? Until this House and the other branch of the Legislature shall make the necessary laws. The powers delegated by the bill are imposed by the imperious circumstances of the case. What if forcible possession shall prove necessary, and the innocent inhabitants should be slaughtered, through a want of the powers necessary to preserve tranquillity and good order; whose will, under such circumstances, will be the governing one? Will not the President, in such event, have all the powers now given him?

Mr. R. Griswold.—The powers proposed to be conferred by the gentleman are without limits. It may be necessary for the welfare of the people, to secure their religion. The President may be, therefore, constituted grand inquisitor, he may also be made a king, and likewise a judge, for the good of the people. I am not, said Mr. G., willing myself to give him such extensive powers. I can, however, well account for certain gentlemen urging on this occasion the old French argument of “imperious necessity.” But such a pretext can never justify me in giving a vote that will violate the constitution. I can, in truth, see no such necessity, as provision can be made for admitting these people to the enjoyment of all the privileges stipulated by the treaty, without involving a violation of the constitution. Gentlemen may criminate, as they please, the motives of those who are for restraining this extension of executive power; but I trust, whatever may be the feelings of gentlemen, that the committee will not be impressed with the same opinion entertained by them; but that if they consider this delegation of power as repugnant to the constitution, they will not agree to it, or, in other words, to the investiture of the President with absolute power over this province. If, on the other hand, they think the delegation is constitutional, they will feel no repugnance to agreeing to it; because, as I observed before, the power will be of short duration, and will not, probably, be abused.

As to the idea of some gentlemen, that this territory, not being a part of the United States, but a colony, and that therefore we may do as we please with it, it is not correct. If we acquire a colony by conquest or purchase—and I believe we may do both—it is not consistent with the constitution to delegate to the President, even over a colony thus acquired, all power, legislative, executive, and judicial; for this would make him the despot of the colony. Mr. G. concluded his remarks by observing that he had no jealousy of the abuse of this power by the President; but not being, in his opinion, authorized by the constitution, he could not agree to vote for it.

Mr. Smilie said, this subject struck him differently from other gentlemen. If it appeared clear to him that the constitutional right to delegate the powers contemplated by the second section did not exist, he should vote against it. But he entertained no doubt on this point. He knew that it had been doubted whether the constitution authorized the Government of the United States to acquire territory; but those doubts were this day abandoned. He agreed in opinion with the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Varnum,) that the Constitution of the United States did not extend to this territory any further than they were bound by the compact between the ceding power and the people. On this principle they had a right, viewing it in the light of a colony, to give it such government as the Government of the United States might think proper, without thereby violating the constitution; when incorporated into the Union, the inhabitants must enjoy all the rights of citizens. He would thank gentlemen to show any part of the constitution that extends either legislative, executive, or judicial power, over this territory. If none such could be shown, it must rest with the discretion of the Government to give it such a system as they may think best for it. At the same time, Mr. S. said, he would pledge himself to be among the first to incorporate the territory in the Union, and to admit the people to all the rights of citizens of the United States.

Mr. Rodney.—When a constitutional question is made, and constitutional objections urged by a respectable member of this House, they shall always receive from me a respectful attention. On this occasion I shall endeavor to answer the objections, and remove the doubts entertained by some gentlemen. I believe we shall find that, by adopting the second section of the bill under consideration, we shall not infringe the constitution in the remotest degree. No person is more opposed to the extreme of absolute and unlimited power, or to vesting in any man that authority which, by not being circumscribed within known bounds, may be easily abused. No man can be more opposed to the exercise by the President of powers exercised by the Spanish inquisition, and authorized by other Governments. But cases may occur where, for a moment, powers to which, without an absolute necessity, no one would agree, become necessary to be vested in some department of the Government; and I am in favor of this section for the reasons assigned by my friend from Virginia, to wit, that the exercise of the powers delegated will be confined to a short space, and will be of no further duration than shall be necessary to obtain the end of a secure possession of the Territory.

The United States, it is acknowledged, have a right to extend their territory beyond that which they possessed when the constitution was formed. If, then, there exist the right to acquire territory, there is a consequence of the laws that pervade all civilized nations, which will show not only the constitutionality but the propriety also of this section. It is a received principle of the law of nations, that, when territory is ceded, the people who inhabit it have a right to the laws they formerly lived under, embracing the whole civil and criminal code, until they are altered or amended by the country to whom the cession is made. This is the received principle of the law of nations, and operates wherever the right to acquire territory is previously given. I will put a plain case, on the ground so commonly of late resorted to, that of acquiring territory by war. The right to make war is vested by the constitution in the Government of the United States. Suppose we had gone down the Mississippi, and favored the wishes of some of our citizens. Would not gentlemen, in that case, have acknowledged that we should have possessed the right of laying contributions? Should we not have had the right of saying to those who exercised the powers of government in that country, “Begone! We will make new arrangements; the powers of government shall be exercised by such particular organs as we like. Your laws and your religion shall be preserved; but your officers shall be replaced by ours.” Under the laws of nations we should have enjoyed all these powers.

But, independent of this power conferred by the law of nations, I am inclined to think the provisions of the constitution apply to this case. There is a wide distinction between States and Territories, and the constitution appears clearly to indicate it. By examining the constitution accurately, it will be found that the provision relied upon by the gentleman from Connecticut will not avail to support his argument. It will appear that it is to operate in the case of States only. By the third section of the fourth article of the constitution, it is declared that “the Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States or any particular State.”

This provision does not limit or restrain the authority of Congress with respect to Territories, but vests them with full and complete power to exercise a sound discretion generally on the subject. Let us not be told this power, from its greatness, is liable to abuse. If arguments are drawn from the abuse against the use of power, I know no power which may not be abused, and it will follow that the same arguments that are urged against the use of this power may be urged against the use of all power.

We may be told that, in the government of the North-western Territory, there are certain fixed rules established. But by a recurrence to the ordinance for the government of that Territory, and to the laws of Congress subsequently made, it will be seen that Congress have conceived themselves to be possessed of the right, and have actually exercised the power, to alter the Territory, by adding to or taking from it as they thought proper, and by making rules variant from those under which it was originally organized.

In the Territories of the United States, under the ordinances of Congress, the governor and the judges have a right to make laws. Could this be done in a State? I presume not. It shows that Congress have a power in the Territories, which they cannot exercise in States; and that the limitations of power, found in the constitution, are applicable to States and not to Territories.

The question was then put on striking out the second section, and lost—ayes 30.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading to-morrow.

Friday, October 28.

Louisiana Treaty.

The bill sent from the Senate, entitled “An act to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the thirtieth of April last, and for the temporary government thereof,” together with the amendments agreed to yesterday, was read the second time, as follows:

Be it enacted, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to take possession of and occupy the territory ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the thirtieth of April last, between the two nations; and that he may for that purpose, and in order to maintain in the said territories the authority of the United States, employ any part of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the force authorized by an act passed the third day of March last, entitled ‘An act directing a detachment from the militia of the United States, and for erecting certain arsenals,’ which he may deem necessary, and so much of the sum appropriated by the said act as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated for the purpose of carrying this act into effect; to be applied under the direction of the President of the United States.

Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That, until the expiration of the present session of Congress, or unless provision be sooner made for the temporary government of the said territories, all the military, civil, and judicial powers exercised by the officers of the existing Government of the same, shall be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct, for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of Louisiana in the full enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion.

On the question, Shall the bill pass? the yeas and nays were required, and stood—yeas 89, nays 23, as follows:

Yeas.—Willis Alston, Isaac Anderson, John Archer, David Bard, George M. Bedinger, Samuel Bishop, William Blackledge, John Boyle, Robert Brown, William Butler, George W. Campbell, John Campbell, Levi Casey, Thomas Claiborne, Joseph Clay, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, Frederick Conrad, Jacob Crowninshield, Richard Cutts, John Dawson, William Dickson, John Earle, Peter Early, John W. Eppes, William Eustis, William Findlay, John Fowler, Peterson Goodwyn, Andrew Gregg, Wade Hampton, John A. Hanna, Josiah Hasbrouck, Daniel Heister, Joseph Heister, William Hoge, James Holland, David Holmes, Benjamin Huger, Walter Jones, William Kennedy, Nehemiah Knight, Michael Leib, John B. C. Lucas, Matthew Lyon, Andrew McCord, William McCreery, David Meriwether, Samuel L. Mitchill, Nicholas R. Moore, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, jr., Joseph H. Nicholson, Gideon Olin, Beriah Palmer, John Patterson, Samuel D. Purviance, John Randolph, jr., Thomas M. Randolph, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob Richards, Cæsar A. Rodney, Erastus Root, Thomas Sammons, Thomas Sanford, Ebenezer Seaver, John Smilie, John Smith of New York, John Smith of Virginia, Richard Stanford, Joseph Stanton, John Stewart, David Thomas, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, John Trigg, Philip Van Cortlandt, Isaac Van Horne, Joseph B. Varnum, Daniel C. Verplanck, Matthew Walton, John Whitehill, Marmaduke Williams, Richard Winn, Jos. Winston, and Thomas Wynns.

Nays.—William Chamberlain, Martin Chittenden, Clifton Claggett, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, Thomas Dwight, James Elliot, Calvin Goddard, Thomas Griffin, Gaylord Griswold, Roger Griswold, Seth Hastings, Joseph Lewis, jr., Thomas Lewis, Henry W. Livingston, Nahum Mitchell, Thomas Plater, Joshua Sands, John Cotton Smith, William Stedman, James Stephenson, Samuel Tenney, and Samuel Thatcher.

Saturday, October 29.

Mourning for Edmund Pendleton.

Mr. Eustis rose and observed, that within a few days past the House were called upon to take notice of an event which, perhaps, would be more interesting to posterity than to the present generation; the death of one of those illustrious patriots who, by a life devoted to his country, had bequeathed a name and an example to posterity which he would not attempt to describe. He had information that another of these sages, Edmund Pendleton, of Virginia, had paid the last tribute to nature.

On this occasion he begged leave to offer to the House the following resolution:

Resolved, That this House, impressed with a lively sense of the important services rendered to his country by Edmund Pendleton, deceased, will wear a badge of mourning for thirty days, as an emblem of their veneration for his illustrious character, and of their regret that another star has fallen from the splendid constellation of virtue and talents which guided the people of the United States in their struggle for Independence.

The resolution was immediately taken up, and agreed to—ayes 77.

Wednesday, November 2.

Road to Natchez and New Orleans.

Mr. Mitchill called the attention of the House to a subject of considerable importance, growing out of our possessions on the Mississippi. He stated that the mail to Natchez was at present transported by a route circuitous and difficult of performance. The Cherokee country, which constituted a part of it, was so destitute of water and articles of subsistence, as to render it necessary for the conveyor of the mail to carry whatever himself or his horses required. Even the water used was carried in goat skins. A great portion of the country was likewise infested with robbers. The measure he proposed was to inquire by what means the carriage of the mail to the Natchez and New Orleans could be facilitated, so as to abridge the time now consumed, and lessen the dangers and difficulties attending the transportation. Mr. M. believed a route might be pursued whereby four hundred miles could be saved in the present distance to the Natchez. Mr. M. desired such an inquiry to be made into the means of accomplishing this important object, as should, while it tended to promote the great political and commercial interests of the country, convince the Indian tribes that our object was not to invade their rights. He further observed, that the usual voyage to New Orleans was about thirty days. If the route by land should be improved, that place might be probably reached in ten days. He therefore offered the following resolution:

Resolved, That the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads be directed to inquire by what means the mail may be conveyed with greater facility and dispatch, than it is at present, between the City of Washington, and the Natchez and New Orleans.

Agreed to without a division.

Monday, November 7.

Another member, to wit, Oliver Phelps, from New York, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

Thursday, November 10.

Another member, to wit, James Gillespie, from North Carolina, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

Monday, November 14.

A petition of Andrew Moore, of the State of Virginia, was presented to the House and read, complaining of an undue election and return of Thomas Lewis, to serve as a member in this House, for the district composed of the counties of Greenbrier, Kenawha, Monroe, Botetourt, and Rockbridge, in the said State.

Ordered, That the said petition be referred to the Committee of Elections.

Tuesday, November 15.

Another member, to wit, George Tibbits, from New York, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

Thursday, November 17.

Postage of Newspapers.

Mr. G. W. Campbell.—There is a subject to which I wish to draw the attention of the House. It is, sir, the postage charged on the transportation of newspapers in the mail. This subject I conceive of sufficient importance to meet the attention of this House, as it affects the means of acquiring political information in the different parts of the Union.

I presume it will not be denied, that the most effectual way of rendering the people at large useful citizens, and of securing to them their liberties and independence, would be to increase the sources of information, make them well acquainted with their political rights, and also with the proceedings of their Government. So long as they are informed on those subjects, so long they will be disposed to acquiesce in, and support such measures as may be calculated to promote the general good, but will be prepared to resist any attempts that may be made to infringe their rights by those in power. It is believed that newspapers are the most general and effectual means of disseminating political information among the citizens at large; and it ought therefore to be the object of Government to facilitate their circulation as much as possible. I conceive, sir, the most direct way to attain this object would be to cause them to be transported in the mail free of postage.

The moneys arising from the postage on newspapers cannot certainly be such an object to Government, as would justify the principle of laying a tax on information, or pursuing any measures that would have a tendency to diminish, in the least degree, the means by which it may be acquired. It seems to be admitted by all those who have considered the subject, that the Post Office establishment was never intended as a paramount source of revenue; and therefore we find that the moneys arising therefrom have not generally been taken into the calculation, in the estimates of our finances. The whole amount of the postage on newspapers I believe to be very inconsiderable, as an item of revenue; and a great proportion of it, as I am informed, is given to the deputy postmasters for keeping the accounts of such postage, and for collecting the same: and if information is to be relied upon, many of those deputy postmasters, who are allowed about fifty per cent on the amount of postage thus collected, are of opinion that the labor of keeping those accounts and of collection, exceeds this compensation; and they would be well satisfied that no such postage existed. If this statement be correct, it will go a great way to prove the measure impolitic.

But perhaps it may be said that the postage to be collected on newspapers, has a tendency to ensure their arrival at the places of destination, and the delivery of them to those to whom they are directed. This, upon investigation, will, I believe, be found not to be the case. It is made the duty of the postmasters, by law, to forward and deliver newspapers, as well as letters,—they act upon oath, and if a sense of propriety in their conduct, and the obligation of an oath, would not induce them to perform their duty in this respect, it cannot be expected that the paltry emolument accruing to them from their part of one cent, or one and a half cents on each newspaper, would have that effect; and even this sum must be still less relied upon, as an inducement, when it is considered, as already stated, that the labor required in keeping accounts for this purpose and in collection, is not in reality compensated by the sum received. In order, therefore, to bring this subject fairly before the House, I move that the House come to the following resolution:

Resolved, That so much of the act to establish post-offices and post roads in the United States as charges a postage on the transmission of newspapers ought to be repealed.

Ordered to lie on the table.

Friday, November 18.

Two other members, to wit: Joseph Bryan, and Samuel Hammond, from Georgia, appeared, presented their credentials, were qualified, and took their seats in the House.

Monday, November 21.

Two other members, to wit: Simeon Baldwin and Benjamin Tallmadge, from Connecticut, appeared, produced their credentials, were qualified, and took their seats in the House.

Wednesday, November 23.

Repeal of the Bankrupt Law.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the resolution, offered by Mr. Newton, for repealing the Bankrupt law.

The resolution was advocated by Messrs. Newton, Elliot, Smilie, Hastings, Stanford, and Randolph; and opposed by Messrs. Jackson, Early, Skinner, and Eustis.

The advocates of repeal observed that though the resolution had lain on the table for a considerable time, purposely with a view to collect public opinion, no remonstrance hostile to it had been received from any part of the Union, and that this circumstance indicated the unfavorable sentiment entertained of the bankrupt system; and that even among those most materially interested in its provisions, a dead silence prevailed. Some gentlemen were averse to the repeal, inasmuch as the law would expire by its own limitation, in a few years; but the House should recollect that in the mean time they were responsible for all its evils and iniquities. If, too, it should be suffered to die a natural death, the inevitable effect would be that those who are now struggling to avoid bankruptcy will precipitate themselves into such a situation as to avail themselves of its benefit.

With regard to the principle of the present bankrupt system, and probably of any other bankrupt system that could be devised, it was unjust, inasmuch as it favored one class of citizens, the merchants, at the expense of all other classes; to advance the interest of the first it sacrificed the interests of all the other members of the community. To prove this, it was only necessary to illustrate it by the common case of a merchant availing himself of the benefits of bankruptcy, and thereby cancelling the demands of the mechanic or the farmer who might be his creditor; and of the same individual mechanic or farmer, the debtors of another merchant, remaining his debtor with their property subject at any period of their life to his seizure. In the case of the insolvent merchant his debts were totally discharged; whereas in the case of the insolvent mechanic and farmer, they were of eternal obligation. The preferable system was that established by the several States, which existed before the bankrupt system, and which still existed, extending to all insolvent debtors the same relief.

It was contended that the partial operation of the bankrupt system had the most mischievous influence on the morals of the mercantile world. That it operated as an impunity to fraud and negligence; that it created extensive credits, and excited a spirit of the most prodigal expenditure; that although the American merchants were probably the most honest and certainly the most able and enterprising in the world, the facility with which credits were obtained, and the impunity with which risks were incurred, had, under the auspices of this law, introduced into their private expenditures a ruinous extravagance; and that nothing was more common than to see a merchant, of but small capital, living at an expense superior to that of the European trader who had realized his plum, and at an expense which shamed the frugal disbursements of the affluent planter. What were the effects? The scene of luxury and splendor was enjoyed for a few years, and was succeeded by a failure. Did it become the Legislature to encourage, or repress this spirit?

The principle of the bankrupt system was inequitable as it regarded the relation of debtor and creditor. However it might be averred to the contrary, it was a truth that its provisions operated to the advantage of the debtor, and of course to the detriment of the creditor. There was no weight in the remark that the commission was taken out at the instance of the creditor, as that was merely a nominal act, a creditor usually being made use of who was the friend of the bankrupt. That it operated to the benefit of the debtor was clear from its liberating all his future acquisitions, after availing himself of the benefit of a commission, from seizure: whereas, under an insolvent law, the person alone was released. That hence sprang up a ten-fold temptation to fraud under this act, over that which existed under the common insolvent laws. For that under the latter an insolvent debtor, if guilty of a fraudulent concealment of property, could at any future period be called upon to satisfy the claims of his creditors by a delivery of his visible property; while, under this law, the bankrupt may live in the greatest splendor, even ostentatiously displaying his property, without rendering it liable to seizure. Fraud once successfully perpetrated and concealed, every restraint is removed; and so deleterious had this effect been that it had manifestly inflicted a deep wound upon the confidence of man with man in the ordinary transactions of life.

It was further contended, that while justice and humanity dictated the liberation from arrest of the body of the unfortunate debtor, justice inhibited the exoneration of property from going to satisfy just debts; that the obligation, wherever the ability existed, to pay just debts, was eternal, and that this law, in having a retro-active effect, was unjust. Evils infinitely greater had been inflicted by inconsiderate and fraudulent debtors taking refuge in the provisions of the bankrupt law than from all the inhumanity exercised by merciless creditors over unfortunate debtors. That the principle of the bankrupt law was also retro-active, inasmuch as it destroyed the grade of dignity existing in many of the States, by which a bonded debt obtained a preference over an open account; that it absolutely impaired the subsisting contract between the person holding and the person signing the bond.

It was remarked that the principle of the bankrupt law, however good in theory, could never be carried into effect, as had been proved by a long course of British experience, without a recurrence to those sanguinary laws which they had introduced for the prevention and punishment of fraud, but which were so abhorrent to our code of laws that public opinion could not tolerate them.

The expenses of going through the forms of bankruptcy constituted no inconsiderable objection to the system. The appointment of a Commissioner was understood to be in no small degree lucrative, and the various processes through which the bankrupt was compelled to go, in practice, reduced the little property he had left to a state still less. Indeed, from the practical effects of the system, it would appear that it had been made more for the emolument of the Commissioner than for the benefit of the creditor.[7]

However necessary this system might be in England, who owed almost the whole of her prosperity to trade, it became not a nation, the leading feature of whose character was agriculture, to tread in her footsteps; but, on the contrary, to avert rather than to hasten the period when such a system would be rendered necessary; that, in truth, the spirit of trade in this country was sufficiently vigorous, and only required the common protection given to all other occupations, to prosper to every beneficial purpose.

In the commercial world, the honest, though unfortunate merchant, had nothing to fear from his creditors. A long experience had shown that the mercantile world felt with sympathy and acted with magnanimity to the unfortunate. In addition to these objections, it was urged that the bankrupt law was injurious, as it enlarged the sphere of the Federal courts. The constitution was a system of compromise. Many powers were given without a view to their immediate exercise. It did not, therefore, follow that, because the power given to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy was given, it must now be exercised. The powers of the General Government, if not too great, were sufficiently great. It became Congress, therefore, neither to take from nor add to the powers of the State courts. To increase the powers of the Federal courts, through the operation of the bankrupt system, was to derogate from the powers of the State courts. The State tribunals were weak enough, without thus trenching upon them.

The authorities under this law not only went to enlarge the powers of the Federal Government generally, but particularly to the extension of executive power. The appointment of Commissioners of Bankruptcy was an additional weight thrown into the scale of executive patronage. The power of that department ought to be viewed with an eye of jealousy, and the House, however willing to allow to it the enjoyment of all fair and necessary power, ought vigilantly to guard against its undue increase. It might be answered that this evil might be removed by placing the appointment of the Commissioners in the hands of the courts. But this would not be the effect. The Judicial Department, in the aspect of its political weight, was not to be contemned. So long as it remains, as fixed by the constitution, it will rest for support somewhere—it will naturally ally itself to some other department of the Government, and the inducements to such alliance will be most naturally held out by the Executive; but however peculiar circumstances might at this time indicate otherwise, such a tendency was a kind of political gravity, which, however it might for a time be checked, would eventually exert its influence.

On the other hand, the opponents of the repeal observed that the silence of the public on the subject indicated neither hostility nor opposition to the present system of bankruptcy; if it indicated any prevailing sentiment, it was that of confidence in the judgment of their representatives. If the system really was so unpopular as some gentlemen had represented it to be, their tables would ere this have been covered with memorials for its repeal, whereas not a single petition to that effect had been presented during the session.

They contended that it would be true policy to suffer the act to expire by its own limitation. Little more than two years would elapse before the arrival of that period. This conduct was dictated by the undisputed fact that the present system had been adopted as an experiment. Hence the limitation of the act. This experiment was now in a fair course of trial. Little more than three years had elapsed since its commencement, and sufficient time had not yet passed to test the goodness or the badness of the principle it involved. It was a fact that the distresses of the commercial world called forth such a system when it was formed in the year 1800; it was a fact that it had done much good; and it might be that a system of bankruptcy, improved to the extent of which it was susceptible, would be of permanent utility. Amendments, radical amendments, the system certainly required; and should the House determine not to destroy it, the amendments could and doubtless would be made.

It was believed that the general sentiment of the nation concurred in the propriety of affording some relief to the distresses of the commercial world. On the form and extent of that relief great contrariety of opinion existed. It was the opinion of well-informed merchants and of the best writers, that a greater relief should be afforded to the misfortunes of men engaged in trade than in other occupations. To the argument that the proper relief to be extended should be left to the determination of the States, the objection that the laws of the different States were on this point various and contradictory, was conclusive. Trade, of all human occupations, embraced the widest range. Its operations were confined to no particular State or climate, but pervaded the whole world. It was of great importance then, if practicable, that laws in relation to it should be equally wide with this extensive range. Though this was utterly impracticable, yet it was practicable to make the same laws pervade a whole nation. Of this opinion were the venerable patriots of 1789, who framed the constitution; such was the spirit of the constitution itself; and such its language in speaking of uniform laws respecting imports, bankruptcies, and intercourse between the several States. Not that the power to pass such laws was imperative: but they manifested the sense of that body and the spirit of the instrument, that all laws on those subjects should be uniform throughout the United States.

To the argument, that the exoneration of property from the payment of just debts was a violation of justice, it was replied, that however correct the principle might be in ordinary cases, it did not hold in commercial concerns. In other employments an inability to comply with contracts was generally the result of idleness or imprudence; but so great and inevitable were the risks attendant on commerce, that no human prudence could guard against them.

Of trade, credit was the life; without it, it could not exist. In this country, too, it was the great source of revenue. How impolitic then was it, in a country where the whole of the revenue, and much of the wealth of its citizens, depended upon trade, to adopt regulations which would repress mercantile exertion and enterprise.

It was contended, that it was not true that the principle of a bankrupt law operated in favor of the debtor; the reverse was the case, and constituted one of the strongest arguments of its superiority to insolvent laws, under which the time of surrender was left to the option of the debtor; whereas, under a bankrupt law, the creditor, whenever he had reason to apprehend the fraud or failure of his debtor, could take out a commission under the bankrupt law; the creditor may arrest the prodigal or unjust career of the debtor; while, under the insolvent law, the debtor rarely surrenders his property, until he has squandered nearly the whole, or until he has made a fraudulent transfer of it. Such was the operation of the principle of a good bankrupt system; with regard to the present it was admitted that its provisions were unfair, and operated frequently the other way.

A leading argument in favor of a bankrupt system was that it multiplied checks against fraud; there would of course be less temptation to commit fraud, as the chances of concealing it diminished. In most countries the terrors of an awful punishment awaited the commission of fraud under this act, even the terrors of death. Though it might not be sound policy in this country to make punishments so terrible, yet it was always within the power of the Legislature to make transgressions so penal, as to guard against the apprehended evils.

It was contended that one great object of the constitution in bestowing this power on the General Government was the establishment of national credit upon the broad principles of justice; such was the effect of the system of bankruptcy by which the same obligations were imposed upon the merchants of all States in their relation to each other, and towards foreigners. Remove this system, and you virtually re-enact the partial and varying laws of the different States. In Virginia, for instance, the person only of the debtor is liberated, while in Maryland both person and property are liberated. Will not the citizen of one State acquire advantages over the citizen of another, and will not foreigners have reference in their dealings to the laws of the States, and prefer dealing with the citizens of that State where there shall exist the greatest security for the recovery of their debts? Will not the citizen of one State remove into another, and evade the operation of the laws of the States where contracts were made? The friends of the repeal say the bankrupt system is retrospective in its operation. That was true, inasmuch as it changed the relations of debtor and creditor. But what will the repeal do? Contracts have been made under the contemplated existence of the act for a fixed period. By repealing it before that period arrives, you likewise change again the relations of debtor and creditor.

About four o’clock, the debate being closed, the question on the resolution to repeal, was taken and carried in the affirmative, ayes 94.

The Committee rose, and the House immediately took up their report, on agreeing to which the yeas and nays were required, and were, yeas 99, nays 13, as follows:

Yeas.—Willis Alston, jun., Nathaniel Alexander, Isaac Anderson, John Archer, Simeon Baldwin, David Bard, George M. Bedinger, Silas Betton, Phanuel Bishop, William Blackledge, John Boyle, Robert Brown, Joseph Bryan, William Butler, George W. Campbell, Levi Casey, William Chamberlain, Martin Chittenden, Thomas Claiborne, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, Frederick Conrad, Jacob Crowninshield, Richard Cutts, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, John Dawson, William Dickson, Thomas Dwight, John B. Earle, James Elliot, John W. Eppes, William Findlay, John Fowler, James Gillespie, Calvin Goddard, Peterson Goodwyn, Edwin Gray, Andrew Gregg, Thomas Griffin, Gaylord Griswold, Roger Griswold, Samuel Hammond, Wade Hampton, John A. Hanna, Josiah Hasbrouck, Seth Hastings, Joseph Heister, William Hoge, David Holmes, Walter Jones, William Kennedy, Nehemiah Knight, Michael Leib, Joseph Lewis, jun., John B. C. Lucas, Andrew McCord, David Meriwether, Nahum Mitchell, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, jun., Gideon Olin, Beriah Palmer, John Patterson, John Randolph, jun., John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob Richards, Cæsar A. Rodney, Erastus Root, Thomas Sammons, Thomas Sanford, Ebenezer Seaver, John Smilie, John C. Smith, John Smith of Virginia, Richard Stanford, Joseph Stanton, William Stedman, James Stephenson, John Stewart, Samuel Taggart, Benjamin Tallmadge, Samuel Tenney, David Thomas, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, John Trigg, Isaac Van Horne, Joseph B. Varnum, Matthew Walton, John Whitehill, Marmaduke Williams, Richard Winn, Joseph Winston, and Thomas Wynns.

Nays.—John Campbell, Joseph Clay, Peter Early, William Eustis, Daniel Heister, Benjamin Huger, John G. Jackson, Thomas Lowndes, William McCreery, Nicholas R. Moore, Joseph H. Nicholson, Tompson J. Skinner, John Smith of New York.

Ordered, That a bill or bills be brought in, pursuant to the said resolution; and that Mr. Newton, Mr. Hammond, Mr. Tallmadge, Mr. Van Cortlandt, and Mr. Marmaduke Williams, do prepare and bring in the same.

Thursday, November 24.

Amy Dardin.

On the motion of Mr. Claiborne, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the report of the Committee of Claims on the petition of Amy Dardin. The report is unfavorable to the prayer of the petitioner.

On agreeing to this report, a discussion took place which occupied the greater part of the day. Messrs. J. C. Smith, Gregg, and Macon supported, and Messrs. Claiborne, Smilie, and Elliot opposed the report; when the question was taken on agreeing to the report of the Committee of Claims and lost—ayes 32.

Mr. Claiborne then moved a resolution, “that the prayer of Amy Dardin is reasonable and ought to be granted.”

Messrs. Claiborne and Nicholson supported and Messrs. Griswold and Gregg opposed this resolution, which, on the question being taken, was carried—ayes 61, nays 38.

The committee then rose, and reported their agreement to the resolution.

Mr. Gregg moved an amendment directing the proper accounting officer of the Treasury to settle the claim of Amy Dardin, on the same principle with similar cases, the statute of limitations notwithstanding.

Messrs. Griswold and Gregg supported, Messrs. Nicholson and Claiborne opposed the amendment.

A concurrence in the report was then agreed to, and the Committee of Claims instructed to bring in a bill.

Friday, November 25.

Ordered, That the petition of Memucan Hunt, William Polk, and Pleasant Henderson, for themselves and others, addressed to the General Assembly of the State of North Carolina; also, sundry resolutions of the said Assembly, respecting a claim for the value of certain lands in the State of Tennessee, presented to this House on the nineteenth of January, one thousand eight hundred and two, and the report of a select committee thereon, made the twenty-fourth of March, in the same year, be referred to the committee this day appointed on the memorial of the Legislature of Tennessee.

Bankrupt Law.

Mr. Newton called for the order of the day on the bill to repeal an act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States; and the House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the said bill.

Mr. Varnum moved an amendment, extending the period of repeal to the first of January, 1804, instead of from the passage of the act; and afterwards varied the motion, so as to leave the period of repeal blank.

This motion was supported by Messrs. R. Griswold, Early, and Skinner; and opposed by Messrs. Smilie, Newton, Rodney, and Hastings. Lost—ayes 25.

On motion of Mr. R. Griswold, an amendment was introduced, directing the completion of all proceedings under commissions taken out previous to the repeal.

The committee then rose and reported the bill with the above amendment, in which the House immediately concurred, and ordered, without a division, the bill to be engrossed for a third reading on Monday.

[The bill is concise, and is confined to repealing the bankrupt act, saving cases where commissions have been taken out previously to the passage of the act, at which time the repeal takes effect.]

Monday, November 28.

Public Roads.

On the call of Mr. Jackson, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the following resolution:

“Resolved, That provision be made, by law, for the application of one-twentieth part of the net proceeds of the land lying within the State of Ohio, sold, or to be sold by Congress, from and after the 30th day of June, 1802, to the laying out, and making public roads, leading from the navigable waters emptying into the Atlantic, to the Ohio river, and to the said State of Ohio: in conformity with the act of Congress, entitled ‘An act to entitle the people of the eastern division of the territory north-west of the river Ohio, to form a constitution, and State government, and for the admission of such State into the Union on an equal footing with the original States; and for other purposes,’ passed upon the 30th April, 1802, as well as the act passed the 3d of March, 1804, in addition to and in modification of the propositions contained in the act aforesaid; and the ordinance of the convention of the State of Ohio, bearing date the 29th day of November, 1802.”

Mr. Jackson called for the reading of the acts of Congress which were referred to in the resolution, which was done: he then moved that the committee rise and report their agreement.

Mr. Varnum said he hoped the question would be taken separately on the resolution.

Mr. Jackson hoped that gentlemen opposed to the resolution would rise at that time and express their opinions.

Mr. Nicholson was opposed to the resolution, but was prevented from indisposition from expressing his sentiments; he would do it at a future period.

Mr. J. Randolph was sorry that the indisposition of his friend from Maryland should prevent him from delivering his sentiments on this occasion. He was himself unprepared to speak on this question, but it appeared to him, from a complete view of the subject some time since, that the resolutions contravened one of the provisions of the law to which it was referred; by reverting to that law, it would be found that in one of the propositions offered by Congress to the State of Ohio, it was provided that one-twentieth part of the net proceeds, arising from the sale of lands in that State, should be laid out in roads to and from it, and laid out under the direction of Congress. The State of Ohio agreed to adopt the propositions if Congress would make an amendment, (which he read.) He wished to call the attention of the committee to the facts, and wished them to attend to the different propositions. He should not have troubled the committee but from an apprehension that when gentlemen had taken up an opinion, they were loth to abandon it. One of the propositions of Congress was, that one-twentieth part of the net proceeds arising from the sale of lands in the State of Ohio should be laid out under the direction of Congress in the making of roads from the Atlantic to that State. The State of Ohio agrees to the proposition with this amendment, that not less than three per cent. should be laid out exclusively in that State, under the direction of their Legislature. He conceived that the last proposition was only a modification of the former, and that the three per cent. was a part of the five, and not an additional allowance; if the latter had been intended, why, he asked, was it not so expressed? There were several other propositions and they were stated to be amendments. He considered Congress never intended to grant more than five per cent. and should therefore vote against the resolutions.

Mr. R. Griswold apprehended there could be no doubt as to the construction which Congress gave to the law in question; there might be some doubt whether that construction was a sound one; he, however, thought it perfectly so. In the year 1801, Congress provided that one-twentieth part of the net proceeds arising from the sale of lands in the State of Ohio, should be applied to making roads to that State, under the direction of Congress. The proposition was laid before the State of Ohio. The Convention of Ohio agreed to it, provided Congress would consent to a modification of it; they wished some part of the five per cent. to be laid out exclusively in their own State and under the direction of their own Legislature; they therefore proposed that three per cent. should be laid out in the State, and under the direction of the Legislature of Ohio. If the State of Ohio had intended that the three per cent. was to be added to the five, they would have stated it (as in the other propositions) to be in addition to it. The committee which were on the subject last session, gave the law the same construction which he did, and the House concurred in that construction. He thought they were under no obligation to lay out more money than they had agreed to do, and if the committee would attend to the subject, they could be under no difficulty to determine the construction. We had an appropriation of two per cent. to make, and perhaps it might be necessary to pass a law to that effect; but he could not consent to give any more.

Mr. G. W. Campbell would beg the indulgence of the committee while he said a few words on the subject before them. As he should vote in favor of the resolution on the table, he conceived that when they were about to determine on the construction of a law, they were only to refer to the face of it, and not to inquire what the framers of it meant. He begged leave to read the law on the subject, and said that the law of Congress concerning five per cent. was in force, unless repealed by another law; and the subsequent law, which provided for the laying out of three per cent. in roads, was either in addition to or a repeal of it; he believed that it was an addition to it. It could not be the intention of the Convention of Ohio to accept of three per cent. to be laid out in their own State, and under the direction of their own Legislature, in lieu of five per cent. to be laid out under the direction of Congress. He should, considering the appropriations to be distinct ones, vote in favor of the resolutions.

Mr. Rodney deemed it necessary to make but few observations after the able arguments of his friend from Virginia, (Mr. Randolph,) and the luminous observations of the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Griswold,) against the resolutions. The question to be determined, was, whether the five per cent. was to be given exclusive of the three? It had been said that they ought not to consider the intention of those who framed the law, but he conceived it to be proper, in order to give a right construction. When they reverted to the propositions themselves, they would find one of them was, that provided the State of Ohio would not for a limited time tax the lands of the United States, that then one-twentieth part of the net proceeds arising from the sale of lands in that State should be laid out in making roads to the State of Ohio, the same to be laid out under the direction of Congress. When this proposition came before the Convention of Ohio, they said that three per cent. ought to be laid out exclusively in their own State and under the direction of their Legislature. This could only be intended as a modification of the law. He did not think there was any difficulty in determining the construction of the law, and should vote against the resolution.

Mr. Varnum conceived that the construction given to the law by the gentlemen from Virginia, Connecticut, and Delaware, was perfectly correct. He did not know whether it would be necessary to make an appropriation of the remaining two per cent. during this session, but in order to try the principle, he moved to strike out of the resolution the words one-twentieth and insert one-fiftieth.

Mr. Sanford had not intended to have troubled the committee on this occasion, but being a representative from the West, it might be expected that he might be in favor of the resolution. But he did not conceive that more than five per cent. was ever intended to be given, and this was not a question of expediency. He did not believe that the Convention of Ohio intended that the three per cent. should be given in addition to the five, nor had they any reason to expect it. This ought not to be an Eastern and a Western question. If the five per cent. was now given, Mr. S. asked whether it would not operate for the benefit of the rest of the States as well as the State of Ohio? But, as they must determine, not what Congress ought to give, but what they meant to give, and he conceived that three per cent. was a part of the five, he should therefore vote against the resolution.

Mr. Lyon spoke in favor of the resolution at some length.

Mr. Macon did not think it necessary to say any thing on the construction of the law, because he conceived the arguments of the two first gentlemen who opposed the resolution (Messrs. J. Randolph and R. Griswold) to be unanswerable; but as the question appeared to be made an Eastern and a Western one, he would say a few words. He considered the whole United States concerned in it, and not merely the State of Ohio. He believed that the arguments of gentlemen, that they had not done justice to the State of Ohio, were groundless. There was no State in the Union which has been so much favored as that State. He was sorry gentlemen had used threats on the occasion, that if they did not grant this, they might not be attached to the Union; but he believed that the State of Ohio would be the greatest loser by it. He was willing to leave it to the Western people themselves to determine, whether Congress had not done them justice, and he was certain they would answer in the affirmative.

Mr. Boyle did not consider this a question of party or of expediency; nor what Congress ought to give, but what they had given. If the construction of the law was difficult to determine, it ought to be taken against the United States and favorable to the State of Ohio, because Congress was the grantor and that State the grantee. This was the manner in which private contracts were always construed, and he thought it a sound one. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. John Randolph) had said that the three per cent. was not intended to be given in addition to the five, because it was not so expressed; but Mr. B. said, the last law was not said to be a modification, the construction was therefore doubtful and ought to be taken favorable to the State of Ohio.

Mr. Goddard did not think they were under any difficulty in determining the true construction of the law in question. He considered it to admit of but one construction; this appeared to him to be a negotiation between Congress and the State of Ohio. It was proposed by the former, that if the latter would not tax their lands for a limited time, the one-twentieth part of the net proceeds should be laid out in making roads for that state under the direction of Congress; the State of Ohio acceded to it, provided three per cent. should be laid out exclusively in that State, and Congress agreed to it; this appeared to him to be the true state of the case.

Mr. Morrow would beg the indulgence of the committee while he made a few observations on the subject. He was sorry this was made a party question. He read the report of the committee of Congress and the propositions of Congress to the State of Ohio; and observed that when the propositions came before the convention, they were pleased with them, but did not consider that the five per cent., which was to be laid out in roads, was an equivalent for what they asked: which was, that the State of Ohio should not for a limited time tax the lands of Congress. How, said Mr. M., gentlemen would ask, was this known? He would answer, by an estimate of the value of both; therefore they agreed to the propositions, provided Congress would make an amendment, and allow them an additional three per cent. to be laid out exclusively in their own State and under the direction of their Legislature: to this Congress agreed. He conceived the question for them to determine, whether the three was in addition to or in lieu of the five; he believed it could not be the latter, because it would go to defeat the original design, which was facilitating the communication between the Eastern and Western States. He was in favor of the resolution, believing that it was the intention of the Convention of Ohio, at the time they agreed to the propositions, that the three per cent. was to be given in addition to the five.

The question was taken on Mr. Varnum’s motion to strike out one-twentieth and insert one-fiftieth, and carried—yeas 75.

The question was then taken on the resolution as amended, and carried without a division.

Tuesday, November 29.

Amy Dardin.

Mr. Claiborne called for the order of the day on the bill for the relief of Amy Dardin.

The motion of Mr. Dawson being lost, there being only thirty-two ayes in favor of it, Mr. Claiborne’s motion was taken up.

Mr. Sanford moved to postpone the order of the day on the bill for the relief of Amy Dardin till to-morrow, in order to introduce a resolution for the appointment of a committee to inquire into the expediency of extending the time for adjusting the claims of individuals for supplies furnished and services rendered during the Revolutionary war, with the view of trying previously to the granting individual relief the general principle, whether Congress would repeal the statutes of limitation.

After a debate of considerable length, the motion to postpone was lost.

The House then went into a Committee of the Whole on the bill, which was so amended as to allow Amy Dardin two thousand five hundred dollars for the horse Romulus, being the estimated value thereof, not including interest.

The Committee reported the bill so amended.

The question was then taken on two thousand five hundred dollars, and decided in the negative by the vote of the Speaker.

Mr. Nicholson moved to fill the blank with two thousand three hundred and twenty dollars, being the amount of principal and interest on the value of the horse.

Mr. Sanford moved to fill it with one thousand dollars.

The House agreed to Mr. Nicholson’s motion—ayes 58, noes 43.

The yeas and nays were then taken on the engrossing of the bill for a third reading—yeas 57, nays 49.

Ordered, That the said bill be read the third time to-morrow.

Wednesday, November 30.

The Speaker laid before the House sundry depositions and other papers, transmitted from the counties of Greenbriar and Rockbridge, in the State of Virginia, respecting the contested election of Thomas Lewis, one of the members returned to serve in this House for the said State; which were ordered to be referred to the Committee of Elections.

Amy Dardin.

An engrossed bill for the relief of the legal representatives of David Dardin, deceased, was read the third time; and on the question that the said bill do pass, there appeared—yeas 58, nays 57. And Mr. Speaker having declared himself with the nays, the said question was, in conformity with the rules of the House, decided in the negative. And so the said bill was rejected.

Monday, December 19.

A memorial of the House of Representatives of the Mississippi Territory of the United States, signed by William Dunbar, their Speaker pro tempore, and attested by Richard S. Wheatly, their Clerk, was presented to the House and read, stating certain disadvantages to which the inhabitants of the settlement on the Tombigbee and Alabama rivers have been and are now subjected, in consequence of their remote situation from the other inhabited parts of the said Territory; and praying that a line of separation may be drawn between the settlements on the Mississippi river, and those of Washington District, or that judges, learned in the law, may be appointed to reside within the said district, for the benefit and convenience of the inhabitants thereof.

Ordered, That the said memorial be referred to the committee appointed, on the 25th ultimo, on the petition and memorial of sundry inhabitants of the District of Washington, situate on the Mobile, Tombigbee, and Alabama rivers, in the said Mississippi Territory; to examine and report their opinion thereupon to the House.

Mail Routes.

The House went into a Committee of the Whole on the following report of the Post Office Committee: